Network Centric Warfare: An
Overview of Emerging Theory
John J. Garstka, Joint
Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, john.garstka@js.pentagon.mil
What is Network Centric Warfare?
Network-centric operations are military operations
that are enabled by the networking of the force.a Network-centric
operations provide a force with access to a new, previously unreachable region
of the information domain. The ability to operate in this region provides
warfighters with a new type of information advantage, an advantage broadly
characterized by significantly improved capabilities for sharing and accessing
information. Network-centric warfare
enables warfighters to leverage this information advantage to dramatically
increase combat power through self-synchronization and other network-centric
operations.
Across a broad spectrum of mission areas, evidence
for the power of network-centric warfare is emerging from experiments and
exercises. Evidence collected to date supports a strong correlation between
information sharing, improved situational awareness, and significantly
increased combat power. A common theme
in this evidence is the critical role of modified (in some cases new) tactics,
techniques and procedures, in enabling warfighters to effectively leverage an
information advantage.
Network-centric operations focus on the tactical and
operational levels of warfare, but they impact all levels of military activity
from the tactical to the strategic. At the operational level, network-centric
operations provide commanders with the capability to generate precise
warfighting effects at an unprecedented operational tempo, creating conditions
for the rapid lock-out of adversary courses of action.
The
intent of this article is threefold: to provide the reader with a brief overview
of the underlying theory of network-centric warfare, to describe emerging
analytical constructs for characterizing network-centric operations, and to
highlight evidence that demonstrates the power of network-centric warfare.
What
is the Information Domain?
The information domain is
the domain where information lives. It is the domain where information is
created, manipulated and shared. It is the domain that facilitates the
communication of information between warfighters. It is the domain where the command and control of modern military
forces is exercised, where commander’s intent resides. Consequently, it is increasingly the
information domain that must be protected and defended to enable a force to generate
combat power in the face of offensive actions taken by an adversary. And, in
the all-important battle for information superiority, the information domain is
ground zero.
What
is Information Superiority?
Information Superiority is a
condition
in the information domain. A condition that is created when one
competitor is able to establish a superior information position vis-à-vis an
adversary. Information Superiority
corresponds to an imbalance in one’s favor in the information domain, to a
relative information advantage. The
concept of an information advantage is not new. Commanders have always sought ¾ and sometimes gained ¾ a decisive information advantage over their
adversaries. Indeed surprise, one of
the immutable principles of war, can be viewed as a type of information
advantage that one force is able to establish over another. A relative information advantage can:
·
Be
persistent or it can be transitory.
·
Exist
in some areas of the battlespace but not others.
·
Be
measured in the context of a task or set of tasks.
·
Be
created by taking actions to reduce our information needs and /or increase the
information needs of an adversary.
·
Be
achieved through the synergistic conduct of information operations, information
assurance, and information gain and exploitation.b
What
is a Network Centric Force?
A network-centric force is
effectively linked or networked by an information infrastructure, or infostructure. A network-centric force has the capability to share and exchange
information among the geographically distributed elements of the force:
sensors, regardless of platform; shooters, regardless of service; and decision
makers and supporting organizations, regardless of location. In short, a network-centric force is an
interoperable force, a force that has global access to assured information
whenever and wherever needed.c (It is worth noting that a force with these
capabilities is not known to currently exist in any of the US Military services
or in the armed forces any our Allied or Coalition partners.)
Networking
the Force: Extending the Information Domain
The networking
of the force changes the topology of the warfighter’s information domain. It extends the existing domain and provides
access to a new region, to a new operational envelope. This new operational envelope corresponds to
the “network-centric” region of the information domain. Within this region reside information
constructs that are enabled by the network, constructs such as the common
operational picture and the common tactical picture. For example, Figure 1 portrays how the employment of data-links
provides access to this new operational envelope in the information domain.
Operating within the
network-centric region of the information domain allows warfighters to achieve
an information position that was previously not feasible ¾ to develop a type of information advantage
that was previously not possible. This somewhat abstract concept is at the core
of the underlying theory of network-centric warfare.
If warfighters are to
effectively operate in this new region of the information domain, it must be
mapped and explored diligently. It must
be explored with the same diligence and sense of purpose that test pilots
explored the operational envelope associated with supersonic flight.
Exploration
of this flight envelope by test pilots required mastery of the theory of
aerodynamics, and a “new tool,” which took the form of the Bell X-1. Similarly, exploration of the
network-centric region of the information domain requires mastery of theory,
appropriate analytical models, and “tools” in the form of high performance
experimental networks.
An Emerging Conceptual
Model
Intuitively,
warfighters understand that a relationship exists between information and
combat power. However, capturing and
quantifying this relationship has been, and continues to be, an analytical
challenge of the first order. Describing how the network can be leveraged to increase
combat power corresponds to describing how an improved information position can
be created and leveraged to increase combat power. These two problems are the two sides of the same coin ¾ they are inextricably linked.
Continued
exploration of the relationships between information and combat power requires
both new analytic tools and new mental models. Ongoing activities to develop
metrics for the information domain are hacking through dense conceptual
“underbrush” in an attempt to identify a path that can be navigated. A conceptual model currently being developed
collaboratively by an Information Superiority Metrics Working Group is focused
on characterizing the relationships between shared information, shared
situational awareness, and the processes of collaboration and
synchronization. A key element of the
model is a focus on three domains: the physical domain, the cognitive domain, and
the information domain. d This conceptual model builds upon a
construct proposed initially by J.F.C. Fuller in 1917,e and refined in Measuring the Effects of Network-Centric Warfare.f
Physical Domain: The physical domain is the traditional domain of
warfare. It is domain where strike,
protect and maneuver take place across the environments of ground, sea, air and
space.g
Comparatively, the elements of this domain are the easiest to measure,
and consequently, combat power has traditionally been measured primarily in this
domain. Two important metrics for
measuring combat power in this domain, lethality and survivability, have been
and continue to be cornerstones of military operations research.
Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain is the domain of the mind of the
warfighter and the supporting populous. This is the domain where battles and
wars are won and lost. This is the
domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training and
experience, situational awareness, and public opinion. This is the domain where tactics, techniques
and procedures reside. Much has been written about this domain, and key
attributes of this domain have remained relatively constant since Sun Tzu wrote
The Art of War. The attributes of this domain are extremely
difficult to measure, and each sub-domain (each individual mind) is
unique. Consequently, explicit
treatment of this domain in analytic models of warfare is rare. However, a methodology that begins to
addresses key attributes and relationships of this domain has been proposed by Harmon in
the context of “entropy based warfare.”h
Elements of Emerging
Theory
At a high level of
abstraction, warfare can be represented by mappings between the information
domain, the cognitive domain, and the physical domain. The application of a multi-domain approach
can help analysts identify and characterize complex relationships between
shared information, shared situational awareness, and increased combat power in
specific mission areas.
For example, consider the air superiority
mission, and the operational situation associated with a four vs. four
air-to-air engagement (portrayed in Figure 2). To first order, the information needs of the opposing forces in
this engagement are
approximately symmetric, since both forces require
approximately the same information to perform the tasks associated with the
engagement. Now consider two cases and their respective information positions.
Case
I: Platform-Centric Operations
Fighter pilots in each
aircraft operate with only voice
communications.
Case
II: Network Centric Operations
Fighter pilots in each
aircraft operate with voice
communications and a data network.
With platform-centric
operations (Figure 3), each pilot is able to develop situational awareness
based on three types of
inputs: 1) direct observation of the physical domain; 2)
indirect observation of the physical domain by onboard sensors, the results of
which are portrayed via a human – information domain interface; and, 3) voice
communications with other warfighters.
With network-centric operations (Figure 4), a fourth input is added,
digital information that is exchanged from external sources, such as other
fighter aircraft, or airborne surveillance and C2 aircraft, over a network.
The situational awareness that the pilots in
this 4 vs. 4 air-to-air engagement are capable of developing is a function of
their respective information positions, which to first order can represented
with the following variables:
i1,j (t)
: Percentage of own force correctly typed and
tracked
within a sphere of radius R1
by force “j”
i2, j (t) : Percentage of
adversary force correctly typed and
tracked within a sphere of radius R1 by force “j”
The
respective information positions for a network-centric force Blue force (j=1)
and a platform-centric Red Force (j=2) are portrayed in Figure 5. Since the information needs of these two
forces are approximately symmetric, the “distance”
between these two
points corresponds to a relative information advantage. If we assume that shared situational
awareness is proportional to information position, then it is not unreasonable
to assume that a force operating with voice and data links is able to develop a
higher level of shared situational awareness than a force operating only with
voice. Experimental evidence supports
the relationship between networking and increased shared situational awareness,
as well as strong correlation between shared situational awareness and
increased combat power.
Variables can be used to describe
the information exchanges between individual battlespace entities (e.g., ship,
aircraft, tanks, etc), as well as the various levels of shared situational
awareness that are enabled by these information exchanges.
A candidate set of variables
is presented below, for the information, cognitive, and physical domains.
Information Domain:
Ii(t)
= Ii (ii1(t), ii2(t), … , iij(t),
…, iin(t)) –
A time varying, vector that describes the information position of
battlespace entity “i.” Vector Ii(t) consists of component
variables iij(t).
iij(t)
– A time varying information variable, the value of which is potentially
influenced by several factors, including: the performance of operators, the
performance of sensors, and the characteristics and performance of the relevant
infostructure that links battlespace entities.
A(Ii(t),Ij(t))
– A variable which describes the relative
“distance” in the information domain between the information positions of
battlespace entity “i” and battlespace entity “j.”
Cognitive Domain:
Ei(TTP):
A variable that describes the level of experience that warfighter “i”
(associated with battlespace entity “i”) has with a specific set of Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures.
SAi(t):
A variable that describes the time varying level of situational awareness of
warfighter “i.” SAi(t) is
a function of [Ii(t), Ei(TTP)].
SSA(t):
A variable that describes the time varying level of Shared Situational
Awareness shared by “N” distinct warfighters.
Physical Domain:
IS(is1(t), is2(t), …, ij(t), …, isn(t)): A vector which describes the attributes and performance of an infostructure. The component variables ij(t)
are potentially time varying (e.g., is1(t) = voice, is2(t) = data ).
Emerging
Evidence for the Power of Network
Centric Warfare
The increased
combat power that can be generated with network-centric operations has been
demonstrated in a broad range of mission areas in service and combined
experimentation, operational demonstrations and high-intensity conflict. A significant and growing body of data
provides evidence that following conditions are valid across a broad spectrum
of mission areas (nc = network-centric, pc = platform-centric).
Improved Information Position: Inc(t)
> Ipc(t)
Increased Shared Situational Awareness: SSAnc(t)
> SSApc(t)
Increased Operational Tempo: OPTEMPOnc > OPTEMPOpc
Increased Loss Exchange Ratio: Rnc
> Rpc
Evidence supporting these
conditions in the mission areas of counter air, Counter Special Operations
Forces (CSOF), and maneuver, is highlighted below.
A US Air Force Operational Special Project
Some of the most compelling
evidence for the power of network-centric operations developed to date is
provided by an Operational Special Project conducted by the US Air Force to
evaluate the military utility of tactical data links employed by F-15Cs. Data collected during over 12,000 sorties
and 19,000 flying hours demonstrated that the kill ratios for Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) equipped aircraft over non-JTIDS
equipped adversaries were extremely high, increasing by over 2.5 x in offensive
and defensive counter air missions.i (Details are highlighted in Figure 6).
The
digitization and networking of the F-15Cs enabled digital information to be
shared between platforms, resulting in a significantly improved information
position for the JTIDS equipped F-15Cs.
It is clear that when compared to the information position of a fighters
operating with voice only, that the pilots flying F-15Cs with data-links were
able to establish a relative information advantage that translated to a
significantly higher level of shared situational awareness. The pilots were then able to exploit this
awareness advantage to significantly increase their operational effectiveness.
Fleet
Battle Experiment Delta
Recent proof of the enormous power of shared
information enabled by a network-centric force was provided by Fleet Battle
Experiment (FBE) Delta, conducted in October 1998 in conjunction with Exercise
Foal Eagle ’98, an annual joint and combined exercise sponsored by Combined
Forces Command Korea. In this
experiment, the seemingly intractable problem of countering hundreds of North
Korean special operations boats (a Counter Special Operations Forces (CSOF)
mission) was dealt with on a timeline previously not thought possible. The application of network-centric concepts
enabled elements of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division, AH-64 Apache
helicopters, Air Force AC-130s, as well a range of Navy and Marine Corps units
to operate in the network-centric region of the information domain and to share
a common operational picture. This
resulted in a very high level of shared situational awareness that allowed
these forces to synchronize their efforts from the bottom up to achieve
dramatically increased combat power and to accomplish their mission in the half
the time required with traditional platform-centric operations.j
Maneuver:
Army Digitization and Experimentation
The US Army’s Task Force XXI
Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) and subsequent training operations with
the digitized forces have highlighted the potential combat power that can be
generated by a network-centric force.
The networking of the principal components of the ground force with the
Tactical Internet enabled ground forces to operate more effectively in the
information domain and develop a high level of shared battlespace awareness and
to increase combat power.k
During the AWE, the improved
information position established by the Experimental Force (EXFOR) enabled it
to generate increased combat power, which was reflected in the metrics of
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Lethality, and Survivability. Actual data collected during the AWE
reflected the following:l
OPTEMPO:
Plan
Development at the Division Level was reduced from 72 to 12 hours, resulting in
a 6-fold increase in OPTEMPO
Lethality:
Call
for Fire reduced from 3 min. vs. 0.5 min, which resulted in a 10-fold increase
in Lethality
OPTEMPO, Survivability, Lethality:
Deliberate Attack at the
company level 40 min. vs. 20 min.
Additionally, observations
from subsequent warfighting exercises and experiments with digitized and
networked ground forces have highlighted relationships between an improved
information position and increased combat power.
Value of Increased Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) at the
Unit Level: Increased SSA enabled by information sharing
over the network allows units at the platoon level to focus more of their
mental efforts on fighting the enemy and less on keeping track of their
location and the location of the rest of their unit. This increase in SSA has the potential, yet unmeasured; to result
in increased survivability and lethality. m
Value of Increased SSA in Increasing OPTEMPO:
Increases in SSA have allowed units at the platoon and company level to remain
in tactical march formations longer utilizing the speed of these formations to
increase the operational tempo of battle.
On several occasions, this increased operational tempo has allowed blue
forces to surprise opposition forces and gain a tactical advantage. Before the increase in situational
awareness enabled by information sharing, units had to move into attack
formation earlier to avoid surprise contact with the enemy and to conserve
combat power.n
Value of Increased SA in Maintaining Force Ratio: At the brigade and division
level, increased situational awareness has allowed to commanders to leave
forces in contact longer with the enemy.
Increased situational awareness of blue and red forces allows commanders
to develop a better real time understanding of the status and disposition of
their forces, of red forces, and force ratios.
This increased battlespace awareness gives them the confidence to allow
units to stay in contact longer with the enemy, resulting in increased combat
power.o
Network Centric Operations: Implications
The ability to increase
combat power at the tactical level provides operational commanders with
increased flexibility to employ their forces to generate desired effects across
the spectrum of operations. Emerging
evidence highlights that network-centric warfare can provide commanders with an
improved capability for dictating the sequence of battle and the nature of
engagements, controlling force ratios and rates of closure, and rapidly
foreclosing enemy courses of action.
For example, consider the
operational situation associated with the CSOF mission. If the maritime component
commander can dramatically increase combat power in the CSOF mission, then the
ground component commander has the option of potentially reallocating ground
forces to other, more pressing mission areas, that he otherwise might need to
keep in reserve to deal with SOF leakers.
Conclusion
The networking of the force
is extending the information domain and creating conditions for the emergence
of network-centric operations. The source of the increased combat power
associated with network-centric warfare is non-intuitive. However, the application of emerging
conceptual models is providing a framework for identifying key relationships
between shared information, increased shared situational awareness, and
increased combat power. The evidence
of the power of network-centric warfare collected to date highlights the
importance of experimentation in developing and refining concepts and doctrine
for network-centric operations, as well as the benefits that can accrue to a
warfighting force that masters the concepts of network-centric warfare.
Acknowledgements
Key insights presented in
this paper are the outgrowth of ongoing series of discussions and workshops
conducted by the Information Superiority Metrics Working Group. The comments and insight of the members of
this group were instrumental in refining the ideas and concepts described in
this article. In particular, I would
like to thank Dr Dave Alberts, OASD(C3I), for his invaluable comments
and suggestions.
Biography
Mr John J. Garstka is the Chief Technology Officer in the Directorate
for C4 Systems on the Joint Staff (JCS/J6).
He is a recognized thought leader in the area of network-centric warfare
and is the co-author, with Dave Alberts and Fred Stein, of Network Centric
Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (available on line
at http://www.dodccrp.org). Mr Garstka has worked on the Joint Staff since
1996. Prior to joining the Joint Staff,
he was a consultant with Cambridge Research Associates, and served in the U.S.
Air Force from 1983-1993. Mr Garstka is
a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, where he
earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics in 1983. He also holds a Master of Science Degree in
Engineering-Economic Systems from Stanford University, where he studied as a
Hertz Fellow. Mr Garstka is also a
Major in the USAFR, currently assigned to the Mission Area Directorate for
Information Dominance, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
Notes:
a.
VADM
Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka. “Network Centric Warfare: Its
Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the
Naval Institute 124:1 (January, 1998), 232-35.
b.
Information Superiority:
Making the Joint Vision Happen, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence), Pentagon, Washington,
D.C., November, 2000.
c.
Ibid.
d.
The
Information Superiority Metrics Working Group is a community of interest,
sponsored by ASD(C3I), JCS/J6, and JFCOM/J9.
Information at http://www.dodccrp.org.
e.
J.F.C.
Fuller, “The Foundations and Science and War”
f.
Measuring the Effects of
Network-Centric Warfare, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment), Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.
g.
Ibid.
h.
Mark
Harmon, Entropy Based Warfare: A Unified Theory for Modeling the Revolution in
Military Affairs. Booz-Allen &
Hamilton, 1997.
i.
JTIDS
Operational Special Project (OSP) Report To Congress, Dec 1997, Mission Area
Director for Information Dominance, Office of the Secretary of the Air force
for Acquisition, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
j.
Vadm
Arthur K. Cebrowki, USN, Written testimony to hearing on Defense Information
Superiority and Information Assurance – Entering the 21st Century,
held by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military
Procurement. February 23, 1999.
- Lt. Gen. Leon J.
LaPorte and Col. Winn Noyes, Operation-Centric
Warfare: The Bold Shift, Army, Vol 50, Number 8, August 2000, p 16-20.
- BG William L. Bond,
USA, Army Digitization Overview, Briefing to Dr. Jacques Gansler, Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), at the Pentagon,
Arlington, VA, on May 20, 1998.
- NCW – Emerging Lessons
Learned from the First Digital Division, Presentation by COL (Ret) Fred
Stein at conference on “Network Centric Warfare: Missions, Needs,
Opportunities, and Challenges,” Washington, D.C.; Oct 21-22, 1999.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.