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Terms of Reference
MORS Workshop on
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Threat Identification and Assessment:
“… Detecting actual and potential threats to national security,
alerting decision makers, and determining threat capabilities and
intentions” |
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Strategy Determination:
“… formulation of appropriate options to counter the threat.” |
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Course of Action (COA) Development: formulation of options to
meet the mission of the proposed strategy and selection of preferred option |
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Detailed Planning: “… development of detailed fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities base on the approved COA” |
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Implementation: “… monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution” |
The JOPES process continues to evolve to deal with the
current trends that require military personnel to conduct many non-traditional
operational tasks (e.g., peacekeeping, nation-building, and drug interdiction)
in addition to the more classic military role of defeating an enemy.
They must also consider more capabilities to achieve their objectives
(i.e., more than physical target destruction).
These capabilities span the spectrum from kinetic (nuclear, conventional,
etc.) to non-kinetic (IO, etc.). Analytic
processes can assist military decision makers when faced with these challenging
environments.
Decision
Making Taxonomies
Decision making can be characterized via several taxonomies.
First is a taxonomy that employs the JOPES terminology of Deliberate and
Crisis but it focuses solely on the time available to make a decision.
In this taxonomy, deliberate decision making is characterized by having
plenty of time to apply formal methods and crisis decision making is applicable
when time pressure is present. This description leads to simple
distinctions -- crisis decisions must be made with simple tools and available
data, and be largely expert driven. Deliberate decisions can involve more
complex tool sets, permit time for data collection (or at least assembly), and
can employ analytical expertise in support of the decision maker.
However, this taxonomy fails to capture the true depth of the situation
and may lead to an incorrect simplification that Crisis decision aides must be
simple and Deliberate can be more complex.
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Automatable decisions are situations in which the decision is
obvious, given adequate quality and currency of information, and adequate
confidence in that information quality and currency. These decisions
can be preprogrammed. For example, the optimal scheduling algorithms
for throughput of a port or airfield, the decisions to fire the guns that
form the last line of defense for a naval platform against a missile, or the
correct type of ammunition to fire at a particular target can be
anticipated. Decision maker involvement in automatable decisions comes
before the fact establishing the baseline levels of confidence required and
the logic of the system as well as choosing to put the function on fully
automatic operation. |
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Simple decisions are those for which the full set of choices
are known, the criteria for choosing between them are established, and the
process by which those criteria are integrated are established, but human
input is required to ensure the quality or currency of the information.
Here again, to know the situation with confidence is to know what actions to
take. These simple decisions can be supported with tools that help the
decision maker recognize the pattern in the situation. These are often
captured in doctrine. |
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Complex decisions, on the other hand, are those for which the alternatives must be created, the criteria for selecting among the alternatives must be created, and the method for integrating across the criteria must also be created. Selection of a course of action and development of command intent are classic complex decisions. These require qualitatively different types of decision support or decision aids - tools that enable the decision maker to look at the problem from different perspectives, perhaps use reach back or collaboration tools to generate ideas, and engage in creative thinking. |
A third taxonomy classifies decision making situations based
on a decision maker’s
preferred style. It arises from the work of Gary Klein in
"recognition-primed decision making" or "naturalistic"
decision making. Klein and his
researchers claim that the vast majority (75% or more) of military decisions are
made using recognition-primed decision making in which the commander (or other
decision maker) matches what is known about the military situation to a set of
patterns or templates arising from their education, training, and experience.
When a match is found (they believe they understand the situation), they posit a
"correct" solution and, after a brief period of mental
"stimulation" to convince themselves they have the correct type of
problem or to make minor adjustments to fit the solution to this particular
problem, they make a decision.
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seeking a dominant solution (something that will guarantee winning); and if that does not appear available, |
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seeking
a mini-max solution; and only if that is not available, |
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conducting a deliberate decision analysis in which alternatives are compared and analyzed against one another. |
Note that this typology suggests, again, that pattern
matching tools and tools that permit the decision maker to see the problem from
different perspectives, perhaps to consult with trusted others, and to assess
the quality of the available information will be preferred by most decision
makers. Stronger tools, based on game theory or other comparative logics,
should be available when recognition-primed approaches are not satisfactory.
Finally, explicit comparison tools such as multi-attribute utility analysis
should be available as a last resort.
A robust review of literature will certainly identify other taxonomies. This workshop will not strive to develop a preferred taxonomy but instead will use them as a basis for departure. That is, a basis to recognize that numerous decision making situations exist and that a technique that works for one situation may not work at all in another situation.
Target
Audience
The
intended audience is analysts and operational planners at all levels of military
organizations.
Goals
and Objectives:
Identify
analytic approaches that might be used to enhance the JOPES planning functions
of Strategy Determination and Course of Action Development.
Specific Objectives:
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Examine techniques of eliciting information from decision makers and displaying information back to decision makers |
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Examine
the implications of time on the level of detailed analysis possible and how
tools/techniques can address time/detail scaling issues |
| Examine tools/techniques/theories that could be applied to the JOPES functions of Strategy Determination and Course of Action Development. |
The following graphic displays the dimensions under consideration in the workshop. A major complicating factor in planning and course of action development and selection is the diverse nature of the mission areas that must be integrated. For example, global strike missions generally imply physical destruction of targets and effectiveness can generally be monitored and compared through physical measures like targets destroyed and aircraft lost. Similarly, missile defense can be assessed through intercepts, “leaker” counts, and terminal effects of leakers. On the other hand, Information Operations may deal with other than direct combatants, applying misdirections, disruptions, and even changing of the will of the adversary as its desired effects. The situational data required to construct and assess options can be vastly different, and the results are viewed through different measures. Exacerbating the situation is the need to design the C4ISR and space support in functions to effectively support these missions. Thus, designing COAs, assessing, and “optimizing” integrated strategies and operations becomes a complex problem that presents multiple criteria to the decision maker.
Approach
The first morning of the Workshop will begin with a tutorial
on JOPES planning functions of Strategy Determination and Course of Action
Development (key questions for the tutorial shown below).
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What are the staff procedures used by combatant command
staffs? |
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When is the Commander involved and how? |
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How are component commands involved? |
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What are the stages and how long do they take? |
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How is the process changed in a crisis? |
The tutorial will lay foundation for the Working Groups.
This tutorial may be followed by a panel question/answer panel
discussion.
There will be three (3) Working Groups and a Synthesis Group
(discussed below).
Working
Group One: Tools and Theories -- Chair – Larry Sanders, Co-Chairs –
Linda Bors and Don Brock
Group one will focus on tools/theories and their application
to the JOPES Functions. In
conjunction with the planning committee, the Chair will identify a specific,
limited set of analytic tools/theories to examine (JWARS and war games are two
potential candidates). As part of
their deliberations the WG should examine the mission dimension as shown in the
above chart. Relative to the
mission dimension, integration is the key -- not stove piped tools.
Additionally, the WG should examine incorporation of uncertainty in the
tools -- can data of vastly different characteristics be combined in a
meaningful manner?
Working Group Two: Decision Maker
Interface
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Chair – Lt Col Suzanne Beers, Co-Chair –
Jack Keane
Working Group Two will examine interfacing with the decision
maker to include elicitation of information from the decision maker and
transmission of complex information back to decision makers. In general, this WG should investigate the gathering,
eliciting, sharing and presenting of information. WG members
may examine existing tools and proposed new techniques or theories.
Additionally, the WG should examine how to include/understand/gain
insight into uncertain inputs from the decision maker and how to display
uncertainty back to decision makers. In the tools, can data of vastly different
characteristics be combined in a meaningful manner?
The mission dimension should be considered as new/unique techniques and
may be required to elicit information from decision makers and display
information to decision makers as capabilities are included and integrated.
Working
Group Three: Timeliness
-- Chair
– Mark Gallagher, Co-Chair – Steve Stephens
Working group three will examine the timeliness vs. detailed
analysis trade space. Areas of
interest include scaling of tools (can they be scaled, should they be, etc), are
separate tools required, etc. Additionally,
this working group should examine and discuss the newer theories of decision
making applicability relative to timeliness issues.
The WG should consider how uncertainty affects the trade space, and how
vastly different data can affect the trade space.
The mission area dimension can be used to identify applications/examples
where this trade space is currently being used and to identify the complexity of
this dimension as these missions are integrated.
Synthesis
Group
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Chair
– Greg Keethler, Co-Chair –Mark Reid
A Chair, one or more Co-Chairs, a Recorder, and two
officers from different combatant command staffs (who have a direct role in the
JOPES process) will lead each Working Group.
The Working Group Co-Chairs are responsible for organizing and leading
the working group. They will
moderate the discussions and participate in the workshop synthesis session on
the morning of the fourth day. Working
Group Co-Chairs, in coordination with the Workshop Chair, may recruit specific
individuals to be part of their working group to ensure that the requisite
expertise exists in the group.
Working Group Recorders are responsible for recording
the discussion of their respective working groups, noting particularly the
lessons learned, issues, concerns, and recommendations of the participants.
Working Group Recorders are invited to attend the workshop synthesis
session on the afternoon of the third day.
The Working Group Co-Chairs and Working Group
Recorders will be made aware of the meeting schedule and report deadline. Each
will be asked to acknowledge that he or she will be able to support these
requirements as a condition of serving in a workshop leadership position.
In the event that a Working Group Co-Chair or Working Group Recorder is
unable to fulfill his or her duties, that individual will be expected to help
the Workshop Chair identify a suitable and available substitute.
Agenda
The Workshop will be held during a 3-day period – 18-20 November 2003.
Day #1
0700-0800 – Registration and refreshments
0800-0815 – Welcome by MORS President LTC Willie McFadden
0815-0820 – Administrative announcements by Host
0820-0830 – Guidelines for conduct of the Workshop, Pat McKenna (Chair)
0830-1000 – Tutorial on JOPES planning functions of Strategy Determination and Course of Action Development - TBD
1000-1030 – Panel Discussion with Q&A
1030-1045 – Break
1045-1145 – First Working Group Session
1145-1300 – Lunch (possible lunchtime speaker)
1300-1545 – Second WG Session
1545-1600 – Break
1600-1700 – First Day Wrap-up
1700-1830 – Mixer
Day #2
0800-0900 – Speaker (TBD – may be cancelled)
0900-1200 – Third WG Session
1200-1300 – Lunch (possible lunchtime speaker)
1300-1545 – Fourth WG Session
1545-1600 – Break
1600-1700 – Second Day Wrap-up
Day #3
0800-0900 – Synthesis Group briefs on what they’re observing, questions they would like the WGs to address, issues not addressed.
0900-1100 – Final WG Session to tie up loose ends
1100-1300 – WGs brief Workshop on findings and recommendations
Attendees
This Workshop will be by invitation only with attendance
limited to 110.
Each pair of Working Group Co-Chairs, in conjunction
with their Working Group Recorder, will produce a short summary document for
their working group. This document will include the following items and will
be submitted prior to departure on the third day.
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Purpose of the working
group |
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Membership of the
working group |
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Annotated Outbrief
Templates |
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Smooth copies of all
visual materials, in both hard and soft copy, with annotations |
Prior
to departure on the third day, the Synthesis Group, in conjunction with the
Workshop
Chair, will review and integrate the working group reports.
They will draft a meeting summary and an integrated list of issues
concerns, and recommendations.
The
Workshop Chair will submit the meeting summary to the MORS office no later
than 60 days after the meeting ends. That
report will draw upon, the
materials described above.
Briefing to Sponsors
Final Report
PHALANX Article
Proponents
The workshop is co-championed by the Air Force Studies and
Analyses Agency (AFSAA) and by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
All other MORS Sponsors have expressed an interest in the workshop.
Planning
and Organizing Committee
Pat McKenna, Chair – (402) 294-1654
Dr. Roy Rice, FS, Chair – (256) 726-2038
Technical Chair - TBD
Publications Committee – Bob Holcomb
Special Meetings Committee – Bill Dunn
USAF - TBD
USA - TBD
USN - TBD
USMC - TBD
OSD - TBD
Joint Staff - TBD
Working Group #1
