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76th MORSS

United States Coast Guard Academy
10-12 June 2008

Distributed Working Group 1

DWG 1: Methods for Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Analysis

CHAIR: Stephen Riese, (402) 294-6124, stephen.riese@jhuapl.edu

The 76th MORSS introduces an innovative method to address significant topics and better expose them to professional examination: the Distributed Working Group (DWG). Current operations, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, drive a demand for ever more responsive analysis. The DWG attempts to meet this demand by injecting a critical subject across the framework of the established MORS symposium. In this manner, a special theme is “distributed” across a selection of the traditional working groups. As a pilot effort at this year’s symposium, the first DWG will focus on the analysis of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The purpose of the IED DWG is to identify, assess, and advance novel operations research methods to counter the IED threat. The IED has emerged as our adversary’s weapon of choice and is a weapon of strategic influence that produces effects disproportionate to the immediate tactical impact. Our adversary employs the IED with a wide variety of adaptive techniques, creating a dynamic situation that demands dynamic analysis. While analysts are increasingly providing deployed commanders with relevant operational analysis, the ORSA community has yet to realize its full potential in the counter-IED fight.

In particular, DWG-1 seeks presenters and participants to identify, assess and advance ORSA methods to address the following questions:

How can analysts better determine which initiatives (equipment, TTP) provide the best help to coalition forces to attack the IED network?

Given that regional, local, and cultural conditions significantly influence the use of IEDs, how can analysts best impact the counter-IED fight?

How can the ORSA community better balance the competing analytic objectives of timeliness and credibility, given that credible results for difficult problems are usually derived from holistic, multi-disciplinary (read time consuming) approaches?

How can analysts identify and examine current and historical threat behaviors relevant to the IED event chain to better anticipate future behaviors?

What analytic methods and tools from non-traditional fields can be employed in the counter-IED fight?

Composite Group AComposite Group BComposite Group CComposite Group D

Composite Group EComposite Group FDistributed Working Group 1

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Last modified: March 31, 2008