Information Operations Workshop Summary

Dick Deckro, Air Force Institute of Technology, richard.deckro@afit.edu

Melissa Hathaway, Booz Allen Hamilton, hathaway_melissa@bah.com

Introduction

Ninety-seven individuals attended the Military Operations Research Society’s workshop Operations Research Methods for Information Operations: A Battlespace of the 21^st Century held at the Booz Allen Hamilton facility in McLean, Virginia, 9-11 April 2002. For 29 of those in attendance, this classified workshop was their first attendance at a Military Operations Research Society (MORS) meeting.

The workshop focused on ways to increase the awareness of the relationship between Information Operations (IO) and Operations Research (OR). The overarching theme was to provide information and insights to aid the OR analysts in their support of the IO warrior/operator. Critical to reaching this goal was to assure that both OR analysts and IO warriors attended the workshop.

The early phases of the meeting reviewed what IO is (and is not), creating an overview of the field from service and joint perspectives. Later phases of the meeting had participants organized into four working groups, along with the synthesis group, to identify the state of the art in IO/OR and opportunities for OR contributions. The Working Groups were: MOEs for IO, chaired by LT Charles W. McCaffrey, NIWA;

Intel/Decision Support Tools, chaired by Gary Waag, Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) and co-chaired by Mike Miller, AT&T/JIOC and Rick Stotts, BAH;

Critical Infrastructures and Defending Information, chaired by Melissa Hathaway, BAH and Lt Col Greg McIntyre, OSD/PA&E

with Jim Chrissis, AFIT/ENS and Bob Lamb, BAH as co-chairs; and

Human Elements in Information Operations, chaired by Brian Veneklase, AIA/DO and co-chaired by Jeff Kantor, AIA/DO2. Greg Parnell, FS, USMA, served as chair of the synthesis group. Bob Sheldon gallantly served as the “MORS Bulldog” throughout the planning and execution of the workshop.

The final phase of the meeting drew on the collective expertise of the presenters and attendees to develop a set of IO/OR “challenges” for future consideration. These challenges are areas in IO that the group collectively believes have the highest potential for the military OR analyst to address in the future. Each working group ranked their top challenges, outlining the needs and requirements for each. The synthesis group then combined these working group challenges into an overall set of key challenges for the IO and OR communities.

Each phase of the workshop was successfully completed. The remainder of this piece summarizes the results of the workshop.

What is Information Operations?

The first day of the meeting contained presentations to establish a common baseline of what IO is and how each of the services and joint organizations deal with IO. Table 1 shows the keynote and plenary speakers and the first day service and joint panels.

Table 1. First Day Speakers

Session	Speakers	Topic
Keynote Presentation	Col Stephen Werner JTF-CNO	Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations
Plenary Address	Mr William Swart, JIOC	IO Challenges for the Future
	Col John Wright, AFWIC/IO	Air Force Perspective on Information Operations
Service Panel	Mr Dan Walters, FIWC Technical Director	Navy Perspective on Information Operations
	MAJ Austin Branch LIWA	Army Perspective on Information Operations
	Mr Larry Whatley JIOC	Information Operations JIOC Perspective
	Mr Jeffery McManus JPO	Information Operations JPO Perspective
Joint Panel	Lt Col Dennis Gilbert OASD/C3I	Information Operations OSD Perspective
	LTC Michael L. Warsocki IOTF	Information Operations Joint Staff Perspective

The keynote and plenary speakers provided a broad overview of IO and how IO missions are developed and executed in the ongoing war on terrorism. These presentations set the stage for the afternoon panel sessions and for the working groups’ activities. The service and joint panels gave their respective organizations’ current definitions of IO and indicated how IO is executed within their organizations. While each service and joint organization is bound by the JP 3-13 definition of IO, each has developed its own focus consistent with its individual mission. These subtleties in interpretations and implementation are key to the OR analyst’s understanding of IO. These viewpoints must be considered when developing and implementing IO models. The panels did an excellent job in clarifying these issues and presenting each organization’s specific focus.

In addition, previous and ongoing operations have shown that the definition of IO in JP 3-13 is sufficiently broad to allow almost anything to be considered to be IO. This, in particular, was brought out in the joint panel presentations provided by Lt Col Gilbert and LTC Warsocki. Both officers, besides giving an overview of IO in their respective organizations, provided background and discussion on the proposed definition of IO in Draft DoDD 3600.1. That draft document defines IO as:

“…actions taken to influence, affect, or defend information,

information systems, and decision-making” (Draft DoDD 3600.1)

The Joint Staff viewpoint is that this is a means-based definition built around core military capabilities. It differentiates between IO and the informational element of national power, making the case that IO is not employed solely to affect adversaries. Information operations are key elements of national power, those which support effective national influence that can preclude conflict or enhance national capabilities in warfare. In addition, Draft DoDD 3600.1 suggests that IO in the military should be considered in relation to core capabilities, related capabilities and supporting capabilities. All of these capabilities lie on a solid foundation of intelligence support.

Figure 1, taken from the joint brief, summarizes these concepts.

Figure 1. Draft DoDD 3600.1 proposed structuring

Information Operations are an important element of military power and national influence in peace, crisis and conflict. Further, military information operations must support government policy, strategic goals and desired end-states. Central to understanding IO is to understand that it is about influence, and effective influence requires interagency coordination and integrated regional engagement plans. While Draft DoDD 3600.1 has not yet officially been adopted, this definition was used to guide the discussions in each working group.

The next section summarizes the results of each working group. Each group’s top challenges are presented with the summary of the group’s discussion. The synthesis group’s findings summarize the results of the first day’s talks and the discussions held in each of the working groups.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for IO

Working Group 1, MOEs for IO, chaired by LT Charles McCaffery, had 28 participants. The working group started with presentations: William Swart (JIOC) presented MOEs for IO; Jim Marshall (Aegis) presented IWCAT (IW Combat Assessment Tool); Alan Washburn (NPS) gave a talk entitled JOIST (Joint Optimizing Information Strike Tool); and, Patrick Allen (GD-AIS) presented a New Approach to IO MOEs and the IW Planning Capability (IWPC) to set the tone for the working group.

The group defined an MOE as:

“A qualitative or quantitative measure used for prediction of the effectiveness

of alternatives or assessment of results towards achieving an objective.”

This led them to the conclusion that MOEs are needed at all levels of the process. In addition, they must be considered in relation to three principal aspects: targets, actors and actions. Figure 2 summarizes this point, illustrating the principle areas within the process each will have the heaviest impact.

Figure 2. Key MOE Aspects Figure 3. Key MOE Application Areas

Figure 3 illustrates the types of MOEs that will be required throughout the process. It will be critical to the adoption of IO as a primary arrow in our national quiver that proper MOEs be developed and vetted for each stage of the process. A key to this will be determining the effects desired in each stage. Clearly, effects-based operational is critical to developing appropriate MOEs for IO. To aid this process, the group developed the evaluation matrix in Figure 4 to operationalize Draft DoDD 3600.1

Figure 4. IO MOE Matrix

Utilizing this matrix, an analyst or planner can evaluate the intended intent (influence, attack, defend) of an IO and tie it to the appropriate capabilities and systems. The working group did complete the chart as an illustration.

While the matrix is a valuable initial step, the MOE working group also recognized that the OR community faces significant challenges in this area. These top ten challenges will be critical areas for the OR analyst to pursue in support of the IO warrior concerned with MOEs.

MOE Top Ten IO/OR Challenges

1. Identify MOEs and link to IO elements.

2. Relate IO MOEs to the decision-maker.

3. Integrate IO MOEs into planning and operational systems.

4. “Normalize” MOEs across IO elements and services.

5. Aggregate effects of multiple IO elements on a target.

6. Understand and measure second and third order effects.

7. Identify data and means to acquire data for IO planning and assessment.

8. Capture uncertainty and temporal effects/factors for IO.

9. Apply the multi-disciplinary “art” of modeling to IO MOEs.

10. Model human interaction with information and physical environments.

Intel/Decision Support Tools

Working Group 2, Intel/Decision Support Tools, chaired by Gary Waag (BAH) and co-chaired by Richard Stotts (BAH) and Mike Miller (AT&T (JIOC)) had 15 participants. The working group began with several presentations: IO Planning Process, Capt James A. Leinart, USAF USTRATCOM/J535; IW Planning Capability, Capt Scott Brown, IO PMO, ESC/SRT; State of the Art Report: M&S for IA, Gary Waag, IATAC, IO Navigator, and Behavior Analysis & Prediction System (BAPS), Michael Miller, (AT&T (JIOC)) providing the group with a solid foundation on the current tools available.

WG 2 evaluated what they believed was the current state of the art for Intel/Decision Support Tools. Their analysis is given in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Evaluation of Current State of Intel/Decision Support Tools for IO

The working group’s opinion was that the current state of IO tool development is good in terms of applications to individual disciplines, with both a recognized need for IO tools and funding to support filling that need. Unfortunately, they found that there is a lack of tools that integrate across multiple disciplines. They also found that there is a lack of tools to translate detailed IO activities into campaign and theater-level effects. Due to a lack of data, there is a deficiency in tools that model IO processes.

The Intel/Decision Support Tools working group felt that some of the difficulty for the tools area is due to the infancy of IO and IO tools. Senior decision makers know that IO is important, but do not have full confidence in the available tools because of limited testing, validation, verification or accreditation of IO tools. This uncertainty, coupled with the lack of integrating tools, has prevented the establishment of the value added of IO compared to more conventional kinetic approaches.

Finally, Intel/Decision Support Tools working group developed the following IO/OR Challenges as the most critical areas within their focus area.

Intel/Decision Support Tools Top IO/OR Challenges

1. Ability to aggregate detailed IO activities into campaign and/or theater-level effects (vertical integration)

2. Tools that integrate across multiple disciplines (horizontal integration)

3. IO “JMEM” (Quantification of cause and effect relationships)

4. More research into human behavioral modeling to reflect the impact of the operator and/or decision maker involved in IO operations

5. Lack of data to support IO modeling (specificity, structure, storage)

6. Paradigm for VV&A of IO tools (to support Warfighter confidence)

7. A common and agreed IO Body of Knowledge (BOK), concentrating on establishing a lexicon, taxonomy and set of quantitative metrics

a. A central repository for all of the above BOK products and M&S tools

b. Need for a designated advocate to emerge

8. Tools that better account for the relative cost versus benefit of IO

9. Development and promotion of standards that incorporate all of the above to facilitate re-use and interoperability of IO M&S tools

Critical Infrastructures and Defending Information Working Group

The Critical Infrastructures and Defending Information working group was chaired by Melissa Hathaway

(BAH) and Lt Col Greg McIntyre (OSD/PA&E) and co-chaired by Robert Lamb (BAH) and James Chrissis (AFIT). The group had 16 participants. Initiating the working groups deliberations were the following presentations: SIAM by Julie Rosen and Wayne Smith (SAIC); Defending Networks – An Operational Perspective by COL Larry Huffman, (DISA GNOSC); Role of the JTF-CNO by CDR Bob Gourley, (ATU, JTF-CNO) and Top Problems Facing IA/CIP World by Tom Bozek, (ASD/C3I).

The group’s working hypothesis was:

Defending the information network is an essential component of defending critical infrastructures…because each infrastructure has an information component.

The group reviewed and summarized what was meant by critical infrastructures at both the DoD and the broader National level, noting that the scope must span both the domestic and foreign structures as well as the public and private sectors. It is critical to recognize that many elements of our national infrastructures are in private hands: large portions of our infrastructures are not owned or controlled by the government, and any effective defense must recognize those aspects. To protect our national infrastructures, private sector cooperation is essential. The group also established that the threat is significant, with all the existing interconnections. The very elements that make these structures valuable make them vulnerable (Interconnection = Utility = Vulnerability). The bad news is that hackers are getting better, but the good news is the IA tools are also improving. That said, it is a move, countermove game and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

The working group, after reviewing an array of approaches, developed a process and schema to define and prioritize (critical) assets. This detailed process considered the elements of Assessment and Operations, is depicted in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Critical Infrastructure/Defending Information Challenge Areas

Attention centered on the following key questions:

· How do we define and identify the critical assets?

· What are the interdependencies among and between those critical assets?

· How do we increase information sharing and promote more cooperative relationships among the players?

· How do we address the unknowns? How do we evolve an effective process of discovery?

· How do we account for the global, dynamic nature of the problem and data?

Given this schema, the group then expanded each area in Figure 6, outlining key elements of each. These included: value; existing and needed tools; data requirements and known sources, if any; metrics; and, key issues for the specific area. This information was developed for each of the elements shown in Figure 6.

The group noted that the volume of data is increasing exponentially. To deal with this situation data management, mining, filters, fusion and visualization are required to better support the decision making process. In addition, information sharing is essential to achieve our analysis goals.

To improve our understanding of Critical Infrastructure/Defending Information the working group pointed out that it will be essential to:

· Increase IO ACTD and experiments.

· Continue integration of IO into Federal, Joint, and Service exercises and wargames.

· Facilitate communication and sharing of data among/between the Computer Network Defense (CND) and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) communities.

· Strengthen existing programs to address current problem set.

Supporting these areas will be a critical set of challenges for the IO/OR community.

Human Elements in IO

Brian Veneklase (AIA) chaired the fourth working group, Human Elements in IO. Jeff Kantor (AIA) served as the group’s co-chair. Fifteen individuals participated in various portions of the working group. The working group began with the following presentations: Modeling Human Effects by Capt Rob Renfro (AFSAA) and Dick Deckro (AFIT); Applying Human Effectiveness Research to IO was presented by Lt Col Richard Simpson (AFRL/HE); The Human Factor: Applying Analytical Methods to Asymmetric, Nonlinear, Complex Problems by Thomas Murray (Sequoia); Developing A Behavioral Analysis and Influence System by Mike Miller (AT&T (JIOC)); and Integrated Strategic Influence Planning System by Jeff Kantor (AIA). These talks helped review the state of the art in human elements and IO and identified future research trends.

The group found that while the benefits of human modeling in IO are well recognized, the implementation of human elements in IO is weak. The inability to prove the capability of influential means to achieve credible options for operational application is a key deficiency. Without such proof, it is difficult to impossible to get widespread acceptance of such approaches. While this difficulty appears in the other working groups deliberations, it is particularly critical when considering the human element in IO. Given the emphasis of influence in the definition of IO, it is vital that verified, validated and accepted models for the human element in IO be developed. As with the other areas, the need to achieve “buy-in” with commanders for human element IO is essential for its development. To do this, it will be necessary to tie human elements in IO to effects-based operations and demonstrate its usefulness in wargames and exercises.

“Stovepipe programs,” while certainly necessary in many cases, are a problem for sharing knowledge and information through out the IO community. This is particularly a problem in the human element area. Some organizations do have the ability to produce actionable profiles but the techniques and best practices are not generally known, adopted or validated in the production community.

Developments and automated tools are in their infancy for both the experienced senior personnel and the IO operators. For these tools to evolve to a more operational status

requires that critical funding and resource issues be addressed. Developing a core of personnel that have the necessary analytical knowledge, social sciences knowledge AND the depth of specific cultural knowledge to develop and effectively implement such models and tools is a crucial challenge. There already is a shortage of personnel with cultural knowledge of some specific regions. Finding an OR analyst, who is also knowledgeable in IO and the social sciences, who understands a specific foreign culture, and speaks the language will be a daunting task if the DoD does not start to develop such individuals. This is clearly an area where cross disciplinary teams, a staple in the practice of OR, must be applied.

Data availability is also a key problem in human elements in IO. There is limited data available, and what is out there is often classified or proprietary. These restrictions contribute to stovepiped programs. In addition, privacy laws can generate disclosure requirements while proprietary rights can create non-disclosure issues.

Human Elements in IO Top 10 Challenges

1. Increase available information and capabilities to the field – GET THE CAPABILITY TO THE WARFIGHTER

•Integrate human element analysis into Joint planning process

2. How to project/ quantify human element effects of IO

•Joint “Munitions” Effectiveness Manual for IO

•Battle Damage Assessment for IO

•Reliable force multiplier factors for IO

3. Realistically model individual and group behavior

•New skills required

•Model/ database upkeep

•Verification, Validation and Accreditation (VV&A)

4. (TIE) How to educate operational world about:

•State-of-the-Art (now, +5, +10) modeling human elements in IO

•PME training to operationalize IO (i.e. ISS & SSS)

4. (TIE) How to fully integrate kinetic & IO applications

•Increase leadership confidence in human element operations

•Incorporate human element IO into wargames and exercises

•Leverage weapon system technology for psychological effect

6. Use OR to help shape the growth and direction of national Human Factors analysis

7. Adapting/ using qualitative approaches for qualitative problems arising from human element, rapid information rate, etc. (linear/ nonlinear)

8. Need for geopolitical, cultural, religious micro-climate aware Subject Matter Experts (SME) analysts and operators.

9. (TIE) Need for index/ shared Library (Case Studies, Baseline Studies, and models), and Taxonomy/ Rosetta Stone for human element variables in IO

9. (TIE) How to use human element IO in a defensive / deterrent posture (hard and soft targets).

Synthesis

The synthesis group, Greg Parnell, FS, Chair, Mike Garrambone, Jerry Kotchka, FS, Roy Reiss, Bob Sheldon, and Jon Stoffel, participated in each of the working groups and presented a summary of the groups’ findings. They identified four major overarching Information Operations challenges:

1. Understand the needs of combatant commanders.

2. Understand the linkage of information, information systems, and decision-making processes to the effects we want to attain.

3. Identify measures of effectiveness to assess IO courses of action and battle damage effectiveness.

4. Integrate information operations into planning, analysis and operations.

4.5.

The synthesis group identified several key issues of the IO community that must be addressed if IO is to become a primary option for the nation. To attain the full power of IO, we must:

1. Integrate IO into planning and operational systems

2. Develop an IO “JMEM” (quantification of cause and effect relationships)

3. Create a common and agreed IO Body of Knowledge (BOK), concentrating on establishing a lexicon, taxonomy and set of quantitative metrics

4. Develop and validate better IO tools and models

5. Develop and standardize methods to evaluate IO courses of action

6. Assess the relative warfighting utility of IO capabilities versus cost.

The synthesis group also highlighted key issues for the IO analytical community. The analyst themselves require better education and training on IO. Coupled with this, there should be a dedicated career path for the IO analyst. The level and detail of education and training necessary to develop outstanding IO analytical warriors will be approaching the levels required to develop outstanding pilots, aviators and other combat specialists. To obtain the maximum benefit from such an investment, it may be necessary to keep individuals in those disciplines, as we do with pilots and aviators. If we do that, we must assure a career progression path for the IO warrior analyst, or we will be unable to retain many of our best people.

To assure the development and implementation of appropriate IO models, the analytical community must develop:

· Tools that integrate across multiple disciplines.

· An IO “JMEM” that supports the quantification of cause and effect relationships.

· Tools to assess IO uncertainty and risk.

· A paradigm for VV&A of IO tools both because it is good modeling but also to build up the warfighters’ confidence in the products and their capabilities.

All of these factors must be implemented into standards for the development of IO modeling and simulation tools that facilitate re-use and interoperability. Coupled with this is the need for data to support IO modeling. Requirements for the specificity, structure, accessibility for authorized users, and storage of such data are essential. There must also be more research into human behavioral modeling to reflect the impact of the operator and decision maker involved in IO operations.

In conclusion several key, recurring themes that ran through all the sessions of the workshop. If we are to fully utilize the power of IO, the nation must develop:

• Better understanding of the linkage of IO to Effects-Based Operations (EBO). This is a key to unlocking the potential power of IO. What specific effect is desired for what duration and what are the options, both the kinetic and non-kinetic, to achieve those effects?

• Predictive models that will evaluate courses of action across spectrum of capabilities to assess effect on adversary’s strategic decision makers. While there are a number of models and tools available, work is required to horizontally and vertically integrate these models to effectively implement national and defense objectives.

• Understanding and modeling of human element. If we accept that IO is “…actions taken to influence, affect and defend information, information systems, and decision-making” it is of paramount importance that we develop the human element area in IO to target and judge the affects of that influence.

• Better integration of IO with INTEL planning process. The attainment and maintenance of information superiority, and the use of that superiority to successfully execute information operations requires the intelligence process to develop the required data. To assure that this is done effectively, information operations must be integrated into the intelligence planning process and the intelligence preparation of the battlespace to assure that all requirements are identified and met.

• Integration of IO planning process and integration with JOPES. If IO is to be a primary option, then it must be incorporated into the primary planning process as a viable option. It must be integrated into the planning process, not be an “add on,” aside to the process.

• Tools for tradeoffs between IO capabilities. As with any other system, option, or platform, we must be able to measure its value and its cost. The OR community will have to assist in this effort.

• Dedicated career paths to support the IO community. Although previously discussed, this is a key point. The education, training and experience necessary to fully exploit IO suggests that personnel stay in this field longer than a tour. To do this, a career path that affords the opportunity for promotion is a necessity.

Conclusion

Thanks to the support of the members of the workshop organizing committee, the working groups chairs and co-chairs, the presenters, the MORS and BAH staffs, and most importantly, the participants, the IO Workshop has identified a number of challenges for the military operations research community. The workshop has taken some initial steps to clarify the current state of the art in IO/OR and has identified future needs. There is, however, much more work to do. While the workshop has exceeded its initial goals, it will only truly be a success if the military operations research community takes up the challenges outlined here. A key battlespace of the 21^st Century is the information realm. A key to victory in that battlespace will be the support and contributions of operations research.