MAS President

J.P. Ballanger, Raytheon Company, JP_Ballenger@res.Raytheon.com

 

Unless you have been on a deserted island, you have probably seen and heard much about World War II this year.  World War II stories have abounded in the media.  In particular, the media has focused on the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.  After this attack on the United States Pacific Fleet, President Roosevelt declared that December 7 was "a date that will live in infamy."  The following day, 8 December 1941, the United States, Canada and Great Britain declared war on Japan.  World War II eventually became the most costly war ever in terms of human lives.  Tom Brokaw has aptly called the generation that fought the Axis, "The Greatest Generation."  For us baby boomers, that generation is our parents.  I am glad to see this media attention to history, because I believe George Santayana was on target when he stated, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

 

Operations Research (OR) was "born" in the early days of World War II, and it also fitting that we remember our past.  In the third edition of Naval Operations Analysis, edited by Daniel H Wagner, W Charles Mylander and Thomas J Sanders and published by the Naval Institute Press in 1999 is a concise paragraph on the history of Operations Research, later termed Operations Analysis (OA) in the United States Navy:

 

"Discussions of the beginnings of OA relate how on the eve of the Second World War the British military turned to civilian scientists for assistance in the resolution of operational problems under the exigencies of war grown more complex than any previously experienced.  The American military quickly followed the British lead.  The contributions made by these scientists, who came to be called operations analysts, were exceptional.  Perhaps their greatest and most lasting contribution, however, lay in the idea of applying the established methods of science to the resolution of military operational problems, problems which at first examination would appear hardly amenable to that kind of treatment.  This approach was well established, if not widely known, at the end of World War II."  [p. 4] 1

 

Paramount in this history is what our military OR founding scientists did.  Our founders solved complex military operational problems using the scientific method.  Here lies quite a parsimonious definition of military OR: solving complex operational problems using the scientific method.  From the beginning, our ranks have occupied a "big tent." That is, military OR is open to those desiring to solve complex problems.  Too often nowadays, it seems, the term "military OR" is relegated to only the business of developing, running or maintaining military simulations or to the business of conducting Analyses of Alternatives (AOA).  OR, if so narrowly defined, excludes many of our colleagues, serves to reduce our ranks and ignores our historical roots.

 

Scientists of various disciplines solve complex problems using the scientific method, yet that alone does not mean they are conducting operations research.  The key distinction, I believe, lies in the historical reference above: "--- applying the established methods of science to the resolution of military operational problems, problems which at first examination would appear hardly amenable to that kind of treatment."  Thus, it is complex operational problems, and specifically, those operational problems that would seem to elude the scientific method that fall into the realm of military OR.  Herein lies the rub for OR scientists.  It is tackling these types of problems that transcends the physicist from physics to OR, or the chemist from chemistry to OR, or the mathematician from mathematics to OR.  Our history also reveals that it has not been one scientific discipline, but many scientific disciplines, working in teams, that have addressed these complex operational problems that would seem to elude the scientific method.  Mention of this diversity is found in Naval Operations Analysis:

 

"As an organized body of activity, OA had its origin in the planning, and later the execution, of the air defense of Britain in the late 1930s.---The most prominent British OA pioneer was P. M. S. Blackett, later a Nobel laureate in physics.  He was the first to staff OA work with scientists from diverse fields unrelated to the technology of the equipment employed.---Literally the first U.S. OA organization was the Operational Research Group established at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory 1 March 1942.  This arose from seminar activity led by E. A. Johnson, and it addressed mining operations."  [p. 5] 1

 

Problems that seem to elude the scientific method not only intrigue some scientists but  may beckon the nonscientist as well.  Pseudo science or junk science can invade our ranks if we are not vigilant.  Political Correctness (PC) zealots and their spin meisters find fertile ground where the light of science does not shine.  Nature's laws still hold.  A superb slide presentation cannot create a perpetual motion machine nor alter the laws of physics.  I say this to emphasize that it is the scientific method to which we adhere.  I would like to echo my friend and colleague, Dr Roy Rice, who earlier (PHALANX, June 2001) entreated all of us to be disciplined, eschew "analysis by PowerPointÒ," and to complete the technical paper, or final report, as well as our slide briefing.  It is this rigorous, disciplined approach that sets us apart.

 

Remembering our past helps us remember who we are.  Military OR is not some amorphous concept; it is well defined.  Reviewing our history and the work of our founding scientists brings the definition of military OR into focus. 

 

I would also like to highly recommend reading Naval Operations Analysis.  It is a textbook used at the US Naval Academy (USNA) and at the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  I purchased the third edition a few months ago, and I keep it in my "special" reference collection. I am very grateful to my friend and colleague, Professor James Taylor, NPS, for bringing this text to my attention, and I would also like to thank Professor Charles Mylander, USNA, a co-author of Naval Operations Analysis, for his outstanding support provided to the Military Applications Society (MAS).

 

1. Wagner, Daniel, et al., eds.  Naval Operations Analysis. Naval Institute Press.     Annapolis, Maryland, 1999.