Below are the first view paragraphs of the Lead article for the March 2000 PHALANX. The original article first appeared in Air University Review in 1967. Look for the March issue of the PHALANX for the entire article!!

In My Opinion
ON ANALYSIS

MAJOR GENERAL GLENN A. KENT

Too much has been written by too many on how to do analysis. But too little has actually been accomplished by too few. At the risk of being placed in the first category, I will offer some remarks in the hope of enhancing the state of understanding as to how to go about achieving good analysis.

Simply said, the purpose of an analysis is to provide illumination and visibility — to expose some problem in terms that are as simple as possible. This exposé is used as one of a number of inputs by some "decision-maker." Contrary to popular practice, the primary output of an analysis is not conclusions and recommendations. Most studies by analysts do have conclusions and recommendations even though they should not, since invariably whether or not some particular course of action should be followed depends on factors quite beyond those that have been quantified by the analyst. A "summary" is fine and allowable, but "conclusions" and "recommendations" by the analyst are, for the most part, neither appropriate nor useful. Drawing conclusions and making recommendations (regarding types of decisions) are the responsibility of the decision-maker and should not be pre-empted by the analyst.

Under the heading of "summary" one can write quite perceptively, stating that, within the factors we have been able to quantify, if such and such is true, then this is the outcome. But, most important, one is not required to go beyond those factors that have been "analyzed" and make a recommendation which surely is based in part on factors that have not. Of course there are the nonuseful recommendations. A common one of this type is something like "The subject requires further study." Not only are such statements of little import, but such a conclusion is usually quite obvious without being stated.

So, to repeat, the job of the analyst is to provide illumination and visibility — to expose the problem. This is so obvious that it hardly seems necessary to make the point. Still there is ample evidence to show that many analysts were surely not focussed in that direction when they went about their work. In fact I have reason to believe that most card-carrying analysts would look upon the idea of omitting conclusions and recommendations as sheer heresy.

How can one go about exposing a problem? He thinks in the following terms: I am going to make a simple "analogue computer" of this problem. Now, this analogue computer is not an electronic marvel; it is nothing more than a curve (or curves) on graph paper. One can easily handle four variables: the dependent variable on the ordinate (usually the measure of merit) and three independent variables — one on the abscissa, another on a family of curves on each graph, and still another by having a family of graphs (actually one can handle more independent variables, since variables can be combined or aggregated — a "Reynolds number," for example).

So the idea is to construct an analogue computer. It is a computer since it tells the outcome (on the ordinate) for given values of the independent variables. Such a computer allows one to look at trends as shown by the slope and placement of lines. One should as matter of course make all possible cross plots. That is, now make the variable that was once on the family of curves the running variable on the abscissa, and so on. Not all the cross plots will be useful, of course. But plot all possible combinations, and use those that provide the greatest visibility. The analogue computer should be exercised. It will tell what input factors drive whatever is being measured and how sensitive the answers are to these factors. Digital computers are quite useful in calculating points in constructing the analogue computer. But the print-outs of digital computers are not terribly useful for presentation. Our analogue computer is the way to present the results so as to expose the problem. The digital computer should be regarded as simply a means of relieving oneself of the drudgery of calculation.

This brings me to the next point. Many people who like to call themselves "analysts" are really "calculators." They spend more time having calculations made on a digital computer than they spend in analyzing the results. They are "expanders" rather than "distillers" and can be identified easily by the pride which they exude when they present some "decision-maker" with a "five-foot" study and announce how many hours it took to generate all this material on some high-speed computer.

If an analyst is asked what is the effect of halving the circular probable error of a missile in attacking hard targets, he will derive simple statements such as: "If the CEP is halved, it takes only one-fourth as many missiles to have a certain assurance (damage expectancy) of killing a certain number of targets." Further, he will add that the ratio of four to one is independent of the hardness of the targets being attacked, the absolute value of the CEP, the assurance desired, and the number of targets. The "calculator" will do a number of war games and, if he is persistent, may discover that the ratio of missiles is about 3.948 for some particular set of circumstances. But rarely will calculations (particularly single valued war games as such) expose the universal truths. If at all possible, reduce (collapse) the problem to a simple formula or formulas and then show the solutions to these formulas by graphs or tables. Actually these graphs are the analogue computers we talked of earlier. The idea is the same, but I have described it another way for emphasis, in the forlorn hope that more and more people will believe in this approach and actually try it.

There are many examples where problems have been "collapsed" in an elegant and simple way. They will not be described in detail here. But the final results of two examples will be alluded to in order to whet the appetite of the curious and to demonstrate that complex problems can be made simple if "analysts" think about them for weeks rather than have "calculators" quickly call on a "programmer" to turn the problem over to an unimaginative electronic marvel.