MOR Journal Abstracts
Volume 5

Volume 5 Number 1

Modeling Canadian Search And Rescue Operations (Bao U. Nguyen and Kevin Y.K. Ng)

In preparation for the forthcoming replacement of Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters in Canada, military planners are concerned with the operational performance of the new helicopter ‘Cormorant’ as well as its level of service when operating out of the existing SAR bases.

In this study, Bao Nguyen and Kevin Ng present a goal programming model incorporating maximal coverage and p-median concepts in location theory to assess the level of service for the proposed future SAR system (that is, the Cormorant is replacing the current Labrador helicopter). To quantify the operational performance of the Cormorant, they use queueing theory and simulation to obtain the best-, average- and worst-case analyses of the expected steady-state time a distress incident spends in the queue. They demonstrate that the proposed system provides a significant improvement over the current one. In addition, their analysis has established a baseline for future performance evaluations. (Pg. 5)

A Brief Combat Simulation Analysis of Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicles (Edwin Middlebrook, Bard K. Mansager and Carlos F. Borges)

The authors develop a combat simulation model of Autonomous Legged Underwater Vehicles (ALUVs), a proposed mine countermeasure system and use it to do a brief analysis of the system and its influence on amphibious operations. The system is modeled using off-the-shelf combat simulation software. A major theme of the research is to show how widely available legacy simulation software can be used to generate meaningful preliminary analyses quickly and inexpensively. (Pg. 17)

Knowledge and Combat Outcomes (Walter R. Perry)

Everyone agrees that information has a far-reaching effect on military operations, but few have tried to actually measure that effect. In this article, we suggest a way to do just this. New information-age analytic tools are needed such as: (1) an acceptable quantifiable measure of valuable information, and (2) measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that reflect the effects of knowledge on military outcomes. We suggest a probability model of knowledge using information entropy to measure the amount of uncertainty in the commander’s current knowledge of the battlespace. The knowledge metric developed is also used to explain relative information superiority and a way of thinking quantitatively about information dominance. Finally, we illustrate the use of the metric with a new measure of non-linear dominant maneuver that incorporates knowledge and speed to assess the degree to which a friendly unit controls a battlespace. (Pg. 29)

Flexibility in Operational-Level Logistics (Moshe Kress)

Good practice in Operational Logistics is both critical and crucial in winning war yet, this important subject matter has seldom been discussed in scholarly Operations Research publications. In particular, the issue of flexibility with regard to operational logistics systems has never been analyzed in a formal manner.

Flexibility is a very important attribute of a logistics system which is supposed to support and sustain combat operations in a battlefield environment that is characterized by friction, uncertainty and even chaos. To accomplish its mission successfully, the logistics system must be capable to respond effectively and efficiently to changing conditions and circumstances at the theater of operations, that is, it must be flexible.

In this article an attempt is made to discuss and formalize the concept of flexibility within the context of operational logistics. (Pg. 41)

A Validation Assessment For The THUNDER 6.5’s Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Module (Francine N. Nelson and Gregory A. McIntyre)

THUNDER is a campaign-level model and is considered the Air Force’s premier campaign-level model. THUNDER was designed as an analytical tool used to evaluate strategy, tactics, force structure, and operational effectiveness in a joint warfighting context. It is an important tool in evaluating the impact of proposed weapon systems, technology, tactics, and doctrine on combat outcomes.

Intelligence is critical to the success of military operations and is an aspect of that war must be incorporated into combat models to ensure the model is an effective tool and that combat is correctly represented. Timely, accurate intelligence can be the defining element between victory and defeat.

THUNDER has integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) representation into its combat processes. The ISR module of THUNDER affects many aspects of war, including prioritization of targets, aircraft/munition selection, target acquisition, and ground unit attrition. Since the complex and compounding effects of ISR significantly impact campaign outcomes in the real world, one must ensure that the impact of ISR is accurately represented in THUNDER. Ensuring a model accurately reflects a real-world process is model validation.

The purpose of this article is to assess the validity of the ISR module of THUNDER 6.5. We use two approaches to assess the validity of THUNDER’s ISR module. The first approach examines the real world ISR process and to compares it with the ISR process within THUNDER, and the second is to perform an experiment to verify the sensitivity of the ISR processes on combat outcomes. (Pg. 55)

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Developing, assessing, and selecting information operations (IO) courses of action is a difficult problem for IO planners. One of the most difficult parts of the planning process is the linkage between the decision maker’s IO objectives and option selection. Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) provides an efficient and effective means of evaluating COA’s on these objectives. The decision maker’s preferences also serve as a baseline against which sensitivity to small preference changes can be analyzed. Finally, the merit of COAs can be directly translated into the ability to achieve the decision maker’s objectives for IO.

VFT was applied in the development of an offensive IO value model. This model was created with the direct support of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (now the JIOC) and the U. S. Special Operations Command. A joint IO planning cell applied this value model to an example problem of conducting IO operations against a weapons-of-mass destruction (WMD) facility in order to rollback WMD development, production, and stockpiling while minimizing collateral damage, minimizing the friendly personnel at risk, maximizing weapons survivability, and protecting sensitive information. (Pg. 5)

Combinations of probabilistic operations research methods and applied statistics can provide a surprisingly powerful mathematical tool for nuclear strategic operations practitioners. A random variable theory for nuclear targeting and survivability is demonstrated which is powerful enough to explain the past and predict the future. In this context, explaining the past means deriving from first principles Douhet's 1921 notion of "circles of destruction", and the 1960's Cold War approach of the Physical Vulnerability System and its central mathematical results. The context of predicting the future includes the treatment of new problems in a modular and straight-forward way that are extremely difficult using current nuclear targeting methods, including the problem of weapons effects variations due to a degrading nuclear stockpile with significant yield uncertainty. (Pg. 19)

In today’s environment of constrained resources, decision makers know they cannot have unlimited numbers of every type of C4ISR sensor and associated platforms; they are searching for the best mix of types and numbers of sensors and platforms to get the C4ISR job done. This article describes a classical OR approach to prescriptively modeling and analyzing the performance-cost–benefit trades of combinations of C4ISR assets and architectures. The Sensor-Platform Allocation Analysis Tool (SPAAT) (formerly known as the Sensor-Platform Allocation Model/Analysis Tool [SPAM/AT]) allows users to model various assets (sensors, platforms, ground stations) to optimize performance or costs of C4ISR force mixes. It also provides analysts an interface with combat models to measure the military worth or utility of C4ISR assets and architectures. We have found no other tool that does what SPAAT does. (Pg. 37)

This article demonstrates a method for effective requirements allocation of a system of systems to its component systems, considering cost as the independent variable. Innovative integration of cost and performance models enables simultaneous consideration of key performance parameters across disparate yet linked systems. The article shows a proof of principle demonstration that features a constrained, nonlinear optimization algorithm adapted to both (1) closed-form representation of the objective function and (2) simulation-based objective function. Variants of the process are now being applied to support CAIV analyses for the Navy Theater Wide program, and to focus future science and technology investments for mine countermeasures. (Pg. 53)

The advent of expensive precision weaponry and long-range strike warfare has increased the importance of bomb-damage assessment (BDA). While it is possible to overwhelm uncertainty with firepower, the Department of Defense has instead chosen to invest heavily in sensors and command-and-control systems to improve post-strike assessments. Unfortunately, the analysis community has found that finding the appropriate mix of BDA sensors and precision weapons has been a difficult challenge. In this article, Kirk Yost and Al Washburn present a new methodology for integrating BDA sensors and air-to-ground strike assets in a single optimization model. Their methodology combines a well known OR technique (linear programming), with a largely unused body of theory (partially observable Markov decision processes, or POMDPs) to allow direct computation of an optimal sensor-shooter mix. This article discusses the warfighting issues, presents an overview of the theory, and gives results for notional major theater of war (MTW) data set. (Pg. 77)

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Volume 5 Number 3

The New Sciences - Chaos, Complexity and Computability (Julian Palmore) (Pg.5)

The Stochastic Versus Deterministic Argument for Combat Simulations: Tales of When the Average Won’t Do (Thomas W. Lucas)

Analysts use combat models to provide information to decisionmakers who must make and justify decisions involving billions of dollars and impacting many lives.  A longstanding debate is whether combat simulations should generally be deterministic or stochastic.  This article argues that the nature of combat, along with fundamental mathematical principles, implies that most combat models should be stochastic.  One decisive reason is that deterministic approximations to stochastic elements almost always generate biases in outcomes, which might foster poor decisionmaking.  This fact is illustrated by examples that cover the critical combat elements of attrition, detection, timelines, tracking, data fusion, and queues. (Pg. 9)

Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC): An Artificial-Life Approach to Land Combat (Andy Ilachinski)

Artificial-life techniques — specifically, agent-based models and evolutionary learning algorithms — provide a potentially powerful new approach to understanding some of the fundamental processes of combat. This article takes a step toward this goal by introducing two simple artificial-life-like "toy models" of land combat called ISAAC and EINSTein. These models are designed to illustrate how certain aspects of land combat can be viewed as emergent phenomena resulting from the collective, nonlinear, decentralized interactions among notional combatants. Their bottom-up, synthesist approach to the modeling of combat stands in stark contrast to the more traditional top-down, or reductionist approach taken by most conventional models, and represents a preliminary step toward developing a complex systems theoretic analyst's toolbox for identifying, exploring, and possibly exploiting self-organized emergent collective patterns of behavior on the battlefield. The research described here has been sponsored, in part, by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR). A Windows 95/98 executable of EINSTein (currently under development) is freely available from http://www.cna.org/isaac. (Pg. 29)

Modelling Combat Using Fractals and the Statistics of Scaling Systems (Michael K. Lauren)

The New Zealand Army is currently undergoing a programme of modernisation, and at the same time is using operations analysis to explore possible future force structures. Current operations analysis methods and wargaming tools typically place heavy emphasis on weapons capabilities. But if targets adapt their tactics to counter the threat of an advanced weapon system, the pay-off from this advance may be much lower than otherwise expected. Since such an effect is due to the behaviour of the participants, rather than the physics of their weapons, an effort must be made to understand how incorporating behaviour into combat modelling affects the outcomes. The Defence Operational Technology Support Establishment (DOTSE) has been developing methods of characterising these effects, and this report describes some of key ideas underlying our efforts. (Pg. 47)

Robust Dynamic Strategy Model: Time-Phased Allocation of Combat and Support Forces to Theater and Deep Attack Forces to Missions for Stochastic Alliance Scenarios (Jerome Bracken)

This paper addresses the problem of allocating forces in a dynamically unfolding situation in which alliances are not known in advance.  It embeds within a more general structure the classical problem of allocating deep attack forces to close combat forces, ground and air combat forces in the rear and ground and air support forces in the rear.

The paper is game-theoretic in its general approach. It determines strategies which are robust in the face of the stochastic evolution of the overall warfare scenario. It builds on the existing literature of two-sided optimal allocation of aircraft to missions while seeking to broaden the conceptual range of previous work. (Pg. 59)

Properties of the Battle Trace (David Bitters)

This article investigates a measure of effectiveness called the battle trace. A representation is derived that involves only one-sided force strength data and a parameter called the battle discriminant. This appears to suggest that it may be possible to forecast a battle’s outcome knowing only information about friendly force strength. However, estimating the battle discriminant requires force strength information about both combatants. A point estimate and a significance test for the battle discriminant are developed. For actual battles, two-sided force strength data might be difficult to obtain, though perhaps less so as information technology advances. In simulations, as well as in testing or training situations, data availability might be less problematical. With improvements in information technology, estimates of the battle discriminant may be possible over increasingly shorter time intervals, providing faster, more timely information for the decisionmaker. (Pg. 67)

The Microfoundations of the Lanchester War Equations (Kjell Hausken and John F. Moxnes)

Warfare is modelled stochastically. The Kolmogorov equations are developed for a continuous time, discrete group size Markov process. For large group sizes expectation and variance coincide for the Markov process, a set of developed stochastic difference equations, and variations of the Lanchester equations. For small group sizes discrepancies arise. The stochastic difference equations are used to model the December 1944 Ardennes Campaign. (Pg. 79)

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Volume 5 Number 4

A Problem in Traffic Analysis: Estimating the Number of Unheard U-Boats (Brian McCue)

During the Summer of 1943, some 300 radio interceptions revealed the presence of about 100 German submarines in the North Atlantic. A decision-maker might well have asked an electronic warfare analyst, “But how many haven’t we heard?” Brian McCue examines three applied statistics approaches to this operations research and intelligence question, noting the ways in which the validity of each approach can be checked in light of the data such analyst would have had—as well as against the now-known true number. (Pg. 5)

Stochastic Analysis for Deployments and Excursions (SADE) (Patrick J. DuBois and Thomas M. Kastner)

The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the Cold War and marked the transition from a bipolar to a multi-polar world.  This transition caused the United States (US) and its military establishment to change its focus from conflict with the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe to responding to regional events called major theater wars (MTW) and small scale contingencies (SSC).  These new strategic and operational demands compel the US Army to carefully and frequently reassess its force structure, major weapons systems, and tactics so as to meet the expectations of the political leadership and the nation.  This paper describes a methodology that incorporates stochastic processes to “come to grips” with the uncertainty associated with SSC and provides a SSC forecast so that civilian and military planners can resource military operations in the future. (Pg. 19)

On the Strategy of Diversion (William Hurley)

This article begins with the observation that great military commanders have been able to achieve victory in battle using a diversionary strategy.  They convince their counterpart that the main attack is beginning at some place that it really isn't.  This article asks why their opposing commanders are so easily fooled.  To study this issue we employ a simple game where an attacking force is pitted against a defending force.  We show that, when the defending commander has a limited force, he is subject to two unfortunate outcomes: in one he pits most or all of his reserve force against the bluff; and in the second he will choose not to commit his full reserve to a full frontal assault. (Pg. 37)

A Value-Focused Approach For Laboratory Equipment Purchases (Steven F. Baker, Steve G. Green, James K. Lowe and Vernon E. Francis)

This paper describes how the USAF Academy allocates its $1 million laboratory equipment budget.  We develop and implement a hierarchy of mission criteria using Value Focused Thinking, expert representatives from each academic division, and the stated mission goals and educational outcomes of the Academy. As a result, we insure equity among academic departments, maximize educational value, and provide an objective rubric for internal as well as external budget validation. (Pg. 43 )

Operations Research and the Defeat of Nazi Germany (Maurice Kirby)

This article presents an original and informed assessment of the contribution of OR in enhancing the combat effectiveness of RAF Bomber Command in its campaign against the German homeland in World War II.  The OR techniques that were devised to improve navigation capabilities and bombing accuracy are described in detail.  The article concludes that OR transformed the Command into a cohesive weapon of strategic value which contributed substantially to the German capitulation. (Pg. 57 )

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