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MORS Workshop:
Homeland Security-Homeland Defense Decision Support
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Maritime, Land and Border Security |
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Identification and Protection of Critical Infrastructure |
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Air and Missile Defense |
| Potential Scenarios |
2.
Sponsor Interest
3.
Goals and Objectives
The goal
of this meeting is to provide an opportunity to bring together a
multi-disciplined team of Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD)
representatives and analysts in a forum for discussing tools and metrics being
used by both organizations and to help identify critical analytic issues and
capabilities. The workshop will
identify areas where analytic efforts overlap, where decision support tools
exist in one community and not the other, and where there is a lack of decision
tools in both communities to address key issues and questions.
The result will be the expansion of the envelope on quantitative decision
support to secure and defend the homeland.
| Key
areas: critical analytic issues,
current and projected analytic capabilities, opportunities for cooperative
analysis, current assessment techniques, tool sets and models, data
repositories/sources, and analysis gaps/shortfalls. |
| Threads:
interoperability, communications requirements, connectivity and
shared database access. |
| Sharing:
specific common tools for sharing between DHS and DoD |
| Metrics: most appropriate to measure homeland security and homeland defense effectiveness |
4.
Approach
a. Mini-Symposium – The meeting will commence with a mini-symposium format that will include operational based discussions as well as a panel discussion. The purpose of this portion is to bring all participants up to speed on the state of the practice and frame the analytical challenges and issues for the working groups.
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Keynote Presentation – (~ 1 hour presentation, including time for questions) |
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Panel Discussion – (~ 1 ½ panel, including time for questions) |
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Guest Speaker – (~ 1 hour presentation, including time for questions) |
b. Workshop – The Mini-Symposium will be followed by a two-day workshop where participants will meet in working groups to further examine specific topics, including discussing the overarching issues of the Workshop. Working groups will prepare a report on their activities to present to other workshop participants at the last session of the workshop. The workshop attendees will be organized into six working groups plus a synthesis group. The working group structure is detailed below.
WG-1
Maritime Security—In
the accelerating global economy, maritime trade will continue to serve as the
life blood of this nation. Maritime security must be finely balance with
unimpeded trade for this economy to flourish. As evidenced by the Long
Beach, CA dockworker strikes, shutting-down US ports can cause a daily
multi-billion dollar loss to the global economy. The National Maritime
Security Strategy directs that we engage threats to the nation as early and as
far from US shores as possible. This working group will identify tools,
models, methods and metrics that will focus on measuring and predicting:
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Layered
Defense in Depth - Homeland Defense or Homeland Security? |
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Quantifying
and Mitigating Maritime Risk |
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Maritime
Domain Awareness |
WG-2 Transportation—Identify maritime, land and air transportation tools, models, methods and metrics. This working group will focus on assessing the impact of HLD/HLS on the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Has the HLD/HLS community defined transportations requirements well enough to support analyses? How will USTRANSOM balance the requirements of HLD/HLS and still meet the requirements of the other Combatant Commanders? Compare total DTS requirement against total DTS capability. Determine the analytical tools required to perform the analyses; can data be shared among agencies? Identify metrics to be used to define success.
WG-3
Air and Missile Defense As the
global war on terrorism continues we face an uncertain environment in regards to
which non state actors will be developing and deploying cruise and ballistic
missile capabilities in order to attack the United States. As such some of these
threats create the potential for use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
against our homeland. In light of these issues, the need to balance the risk
associated with the development of a robust Air and Missile Defense system, both
tactical and strategic, is absolutely necessary. These systems and command
structure must provide the ability to defeat any threat with specific focus on
Homeland Defense. Analysis that is
ongoing and planned is critical in the evaluation of the appropriate systems to
defeat the ever-changing complexion of Air and Missile Defense. The pillars of
Attack Operations, Active Defense, Passive Defense, Battle Management/Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers (BM/C4I) and the cooperation between DoD
and DHS provide us the areas to focus our efforts and evaluating the concepts
for defense of our Homeland against these genera of threat. As such the working
group will provide special focus in the areas of:
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Analysis
of force structure implications of providing Air and Ballistic Missile
Defense to the Homeland |
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Ongoing
and planned analysis in the areas of Cruise Missile and Short Range
Ballistic Missile Defense from the sea (maritime platforms such as container
and break bulk cargo ships) |
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Weapons
of Mass Effects, |
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Battle
Management//Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence(BMC4I), |
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Active
Attack Operations, |
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Passive
Defense |
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Interagency
cooperation in this mission area (DoD to DHS to State and Local) |
WG-4 Land Defense — The DoD Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (HLS JOC) defines National Land Defense as: “All measures of HLD taken to detect, deter, prevent, defeat, or nullify hostile land threats against US territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure.” Short of a Presidential directed DoD response to an invasion of the Homeland, the land defense mission remains an inherent protection and law enforcement responsibility of DoD’s interagency partners. Military involvement will be part of a synchronized strategic approach involving federal, state, and local resources to defeat or otherwise respond to any adversary threat to the homeland. The focus of WG-4 will be to identify useful measures of effectiveness to evaluate the National Land Defense mission area and to identify interfaces between the Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) arenas. Our primary areas of emphasis will be:
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Protection
of locations/resources identified as elements of Critical Infrastructure | ||
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Force
and installation protection | ||
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Border
Security | ||
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DoD
support of civilian law enforcement and counterterrorism authorities
consistent with US law
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WG-5 Consequence Management — Effective consequence management may be considered in terms of the three phases listed below, each contributing to the other. Attention to each of these focus areas will be based on participants’ primary areas of interest, requirements and capabilities.
1. Preparedness (includes training, planning, public awareness)
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Training MOEs will necessarily be written in terms of “how well do training exercises and drills improve response and recovery performance (how much faster, how much more safely, how much more adaptable are teams, etc.)?” |
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Planning MOEs: How robust is the incident command/communications structure? |
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Public awareness MOEs: How quickly can the public be alerted to the disaster? How quickly can car and foot traffic be re-routed away from the disaster? |
2. Response (1st 72 hours; save lives, relieve suffering, prevent further disaster)
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How quickly can incident command post be set up? |
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How detailed, and up-to-date, is the geographic/infrastructure “database” (needed to help set up triage sites, temporary water/food/shelter stations)? How quickly, and correctly, can follow-on effects of initial attack be predicted (for example use of plume models)? |
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How quickly can debris blocking emergency vehicles (land, water, or air) be removed? |
3. Recovery phase (follows response phase; return state and citizens to normal conditions; emphasis on cleanup and returning people to normal activities)
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How accurately can the medical community predict the spread of airborne particulates, microorganisms? |
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How quickly can power grids (transportation networks, etc.) be returned to pre-incident status? |
| How well can costs for removal of debris be estimated? |
WG-6 Scenario Development The focus for this working group will be to help decision makers assess current and future scenarios, understand the scenario development process, and examine ways to make future homeland defense scenarios more useful for analysis. The global war on terrorism and defense of the homeland confront scenario developers with unique challenges. In previous analytical efforts, a scenario for a traditional campaign began with an enemy incursion against an ally’s territory and ended with a carefully scripted US concept of operations for swiftly defeating that enemy. In these traditional scenarios, the choice of CONOPS -- the initiative of how we bring the fight to the enemy -- always remained with the US coalition. However, when we consider scenarios for defending the homeland, the nature of the potential conflict places the initiative squarely in the hands of the attacker, and places US forces in a reactive mode. Moreover, since the initiative is in the hands of the enemy, a single scenario for homeland defense might fail to capture the countless ways an enemy could choose to attack the homeland, and any “scenario” may end up a set of possible avenues for that attack. Further complicating the scenario problem, the distinctions between “Homeland Defense” and “Homeland Security” introduce technical and legal definition problems that make it more difficult to author a scenario on which to ground analyses of the range of Homeland Defense challenges. Given these challenges, the Scenario Development working group will focus on the following questions:
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What
are the analytic questions we want a scenario to frame for us? |
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Will
analysis of Homeland Defense differ from traditional analyses? If so, how? |
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How
can we avoid ceding the analytic initiative to the other side? |
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How
do we appropriately incorporate features of Homeland Security in a Homeland
Defense scenario? |
| Is a “representative sample” of attack options sufficient and appropriate for analysis? |
Synthesis
Group—The synthesis group
will bring together the work of the six working groups and develop the overall
recommendations from the analysis community to the individual service operations
analysts. As well, this group will
provide inputs and recommendations on development of analytic support to the HLS
and HLD communities.
5.
Attendees
a.
Attendance will be by invitation only. Attendees
will include invited experts from the Department of Homeland Security, US
Northern Command, OSD, all Services, the Joint Staff, University
Affiliated Research Centers,
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, operational commanders, DoD
contractors and others. Workshop
chairs will control membership of their sessions in conjunction with the
Organizing Committee. Attendance
will be limited to 200 people.
b.
Working Groups (WGs) will be led by a Chair, one to three Co-Chairs and an
Advisor. This leadership group will
be comprised of all MORSians or a combination of MORSians and Subject Matter
Experts (SMEs). The
responsibilities of this team include:
