MORS Workshop: Analysis for Non-Traditional Security Challenges: Methods and Tools
JHU/APL, Laurel, Maryland
21-23 February 2006

Draft Terms of Reference
(Last Updated 1 December 2005)

1.  Background 

The current National Defense Strategy builds upon the efforts of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the dramatic changes in the security environment and lessons learned in the post 9-11 world.  The strategy identifies four persistent and emerging challenges in this new, more uncertain area.  The four challenges, traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive, are depicted in the following graphic.

Figure 1

These persistent and emerging challenges are further defined in the 2006-2011 Strategic Planning Guidance which states that the defense strategy must be supported by capabilities and attributes that contend effectively with these challenges.  Specifically, components are explicitly directed to reduce risk by developing capabilities to counter the persistent and emerging challenges.

A prerequisite for reforming the way DoD does business in acquisition, requirements and trades is the transformation of the Analytic System.   The OSD Analytic Agenda was created to achieve this purpose.   It recognizes the changing nature of warfare brought about by new technologies, new missions and an enemy that is intelligent, unpredictable and continuously varying its patterns.

Our current modeling and simulation suites were evolved from Cold War models and have served us well.  As we have continued to improve legacy models we have also invested a considerable effort to develop newer, more robust models to support the defense analytic process.  However, the majority of modeling activity since the Cold War ended has continued to center on the analysis that supports traditional warfighting as we moved from the two simultaneous Major Theater Warfare strategies of the 1990s to the sequential Major Combat Operations strategy of this decade.  As we attempt to seek ways to develop techniques to analyze the non-traditional areas, we have found that our familiar existing suite of tools is not well suited to examine the capabilities of the Joint force against these new challenges. This leads to the need for a workshop to facilitate cross-community identification and sharing of tools, new techniques and methodologies (such as agent based modeling) and new developments.  The workshop is expected to provide immediate benefit to modeling developments and analytic support to provide insights to answer post 2005 QDR questions within the Department and in support of near-term component analytic plans and future Analyses of Alternatives.

2. Sponsor Interest 

Navy and Air Force have agreed to be co-proponents of this workshop.  The idea of a workshop to expand on the Navy’s internal World Class Modeling Workshop in June 2005 was originally discussed at the MORS Sponsors’ luncheon at the 73rd MORSS.  The meeting was again discussed during a World Class Modeling presentation at the 21 July 2005 Joint Analytic Data Management Steering Committee (JADM SC) and all of the remaining MORS Sponsors indicated interest and support.  Following a meeting between the co-sponsors and OSD representatives, the concept was briefed at the JADM SC on 25 August.

3. Purpose, Goals and Objectives

The purpose of the special meeting is to match stakeholder analytic gaps and deficiencies with potential methodology and modeling solutions in support of new developments in defense analytic requirements and capabilities.  Specifically, the workshop is intended to:

The workshop will help to achieve the following longer-term goals and end-states for the DoD community and workshop stakeholders:

The following objectives will ensure a successful workshop:

4. Approach 

The Analysis for Non-Traditional Security Challenges Workshop will be organized into five working groups and one synthesis group which will address gaps and deficiencies in assessing the three non-traditional challenges (irregular, catastrophic and disruptive), deterrence and decision-making/collaboration methods.  The workshop is predicated on analysis stakeholders having completed their gap analysis prior to the workshop so they can provide their needs as an input.  This requires stakeholders to be identified 3-4 months prior to the conference to enable them to have time to complete the prerequisite analysis.  Each breakout working session will then identify and compile commonalities and seek solutions.  A solution could be in terms of an existing or new methodology such as an experiment or exercise lesson learned, a legacy or improvement to a legacy tool or a new M&S development.  Overlapping/common gaps between stakeholders will be identified as potential for partnering.  This could lead to a common study, or co-sponsored new development.

Concurrent with the workshop planning will be an IDA led effort to develop the DoD Analysis M&S Master Plan.  To support this effort, an initial workshop is being planned in the November timeframe to identify M&S needs and M&S communities of interest.  It is anticipated this workshop will not only help stakeholders begin the process for identifying gaps and deficiencies, but may also identify additional stakeholders for the MORS workshop.  Subsequent M&S Master Plan workshops should also help to identify and the range of tools and even planned developments that can feed this workshop.

Two MORS workshops have been held this fall that will be leveraged for the  Non-Traditional Workshop.  The workshop on "Agent Based Models and Other Analytic Tools in Support of Stability Operations, was held at the SAIC Conference Center in McLean in late October and "Homeland Security - Homeland Defense Decision Support" was held in November at JHU/APL.  Products from these workshops will be filtered to provide inputs as appropriate to this workshop.

WG-1 Irregular/GWOT — Irregular challenges to U.S. security interests are characterized by methods such as terrorism and insurgency with the intent of eroding U.S. influence, patience, and political will.  Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human material, financial and political costs on the U.S. to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.  Our experience with the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our capabilities to contend with this irregular challenge more effectively. This working group will identify methods, tools and models that will focus on gaps and deficiencies for Irregular/GWOT areas such as: 

WG-2 Disruptive — In rare instances, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare.  Some potential adversaries are seeking such disruptive capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the U.S. and its partners.  Disruptive breakthroughs in areas such as bio-technology, cyber-operations, space, or directed-energy weapons could seriously endanger our security.  Identify maritime, land and air transportation tools, models, methods and metrics. This working group will identify methods, tools and models that will focus on gaps and deficiencies for Disruptive areas such as:

 WG-3 Catastrophic — In the face of American dominance in traditional forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire catastrophic capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Porous international borders, weak international controls, and easy access to information-related technologies facilitate these efforts.  Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack against the United States.   Proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with catastrophic challenges an urgent priority.  Even a single catastrophic attack against the United States would be unacceptable.  We will place greater emphasis on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade others from acquiring catastrophic capabilities, to deter their use and, when necessary to defeat them before they can be employed.  This working group will identify methods, tools and models that will focus on gaps and deficiencies for catastrophic areas such as:

WG-4 Deterrence — The Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD JOC) defines strategic deterrence as the prevention of adversary aggression or coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival.   The central idea of the SD JOC is to exercise decisive influence over a potential adversary’s strategic deterrence Center of Gravity:  the decision-making calculus of key adversary decision-makers.  Joint military operations and activities contribute to the “end” of strategic deterrence by affecting the adversary’s decision calculus elements:

Military means required to affect the decision calculus will vary significantly depending on the adversary but fall into two categories:  those that directly and decisively influence and adversary’s decision calculus and those that enable such decisive influence. 

Enabling “means” include:

Direct “means” include:

The SD JOC describes how each of these “means” contributes to the “ways” of achieving the strategic deterrence “end” and identifies how the joint force attributes identified in Joint Operations Concepts impacts these capabilities.

This working group will identify methods, tools and models that will focus on gaps and deficiencies for assessing the “means” to achieve the “ways” for the strategic deterrence end.  New deterrence concepts (global, transnational and regional) proposed by the QDR may also be considered.

WG-5 Decision Making and Integration — Effective decision-making requires new methods and tools to incorporate Non-Traditional Challenges.   Existing methods of collaboration will need to be reevaluated to consider the effects of incorporating the new challenges across all levels of classification.  New developments in adaptive planning and course of action analysis must account for these new areas as well.

Synthesis Group — By definition, these working groups are not mutually exclusive.  The inherent overlaps between the working groups provides synthesis points for integrating the conclusions from each as well as reducing the probability that major ideas will “fall through the cracks” between the workshop topics. The synthesis group will examine cross-group commonalities and insights and develop the overall workshops recommendations.

5. Workshop Planning and WG Chairs

Navy/Air Force Co-Proponents:
Dr Jacqueline Henningsen, FS, Air Force
Mr Trip Barber, Navy

Workshop Sponsor/Service POCs: 

Program Chairs:
Mr Lee Dick (N81/Axiom Corp) lee.dick@navy.mil, 703-693-8890
Co-Chair: Dr Jim Harris (AFSAA) James.Harris@pentagon.af.mil, 703-588-8294

Workshop Advisors:
Mr Jim Bexfield, FS, OSD
Dr David Markowitz (CAA)

Technical Advisor: Trena Lilly, JHU/APL

WG1–  Irregular/GWOT
Chair: Dr Ed McGrady, CNA
Co-Chair: Mr Mike Ottenberg, OSD-PAE/ATT
Recorder: TBD 

WG 2 – Disruptive
Chair: Dr Mike Bailey, MCCDC
Co-Chair: Mr Steve Farley, N81/ONR
Recorder: TBD

WG 3 – Catastrophic
Chair: Dr Al Sweetser, OSD (PA&E)
Co-Chair: Mr Walt Zimmers, DTRA
Recorder: TBD

WG 4 – Deterrence
Chair: LTC Steve Riese, STRATCOM
Co-Chair: Mr Mark Reid, MITRE
Recorder: TBD

WG 5 – Decision Making and Integration
Chair: Prof Greg Parnell, FS, USMA
Co-Chair: Mr Steve Richter, JHU/APL
Recorder: TBD

WG 6 – Synthesis
Chair: Mr Royce Reiss, AFSAA
Co-Chair: Ms Sunny Conwell, N81

6. Attendance 

Facility limitations will require attendance to be capped at about 250 people.  The goal is to seek the right blend of stakeholders and industry/government developers.  Quotas will be assigned to stakeholders and industry organization limits may be required to ensure diverse attendance.   Invitations are expected to be extended to foreign nationals and may include non-TTCP countries. Target attendance will be about 35 per working group excluding the Synthesis Group depending on breakout room accommodations.  The WAL has been reserved for WG-1 and will accommodate up to 80 with 50 seats reserved for using groupware. 

7. Deliverables

Several products will be generated from the workshop: 

8. Milestone Table

9. Planning and Organizing Committee

General Chair: Mr Lee Dick N81 

General Co-Chair: Dr Jim Harris, AFSAA

Advisors: Mr Jim Bexfield, FS, OSD(PA&E) and Dr David Markowitz (CAA)

Synthesis Chair: Mr Roy Reiss, AFSAA

Synthesis Co-Chair: Ms Sunny Conwell N81

Synthesis WG: Dr Tom Allen FS, IDA;

Site Coordinator/Poster Session Coordinator: Trena Lilly, JHU/APL

Administrative Coordinators: Brian Engler, Executive Vice-President, MORS and Natalie Kelly, Vice-President for Administration, MORS 

MORS Bulldog: Annie Patenaude

Sponsor/Service Reps

10. Administrative 

Name: Analysis for Non-Traditional Security Challenges: Methods and Tools

Dates: 21-23 February 2006

Location: The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD

Fees:   US Federal Government $310 and $545 for all others; Plenary (1 day  only) Government $160; Non-Government $280

Attendance: 250 people, by invitation

Classification: The Workshop will be unclassified.  Presentations with FOUO and/or limited distribution markings will not be distributed electronically or made available as a printed copy to the general audience.  Distribution of these materials will be determined by the originator.  Post workshop products such as the PHALANX article, executive outbrief, and 75th MORSS presentation will be cleared for public release and may be posted on the website.

11. Agenda

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Last modified: March 02, 2006