77th MORSS
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS
16-18 June 2009
Composite Group A
Strategic Operations
WG 1, WG 2, WG 3, WG 4, WG 5
WG 1 - Strategic Operations
CHAIR:
Dr. Lalit Yudhbir, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., (703) 399-7611, lyudhbir@spa.com
CO-CHAIRS:
John Andrews, USSTRATCOM , (402) 294-0002, andrewsj@stratcom.mil
Dr. Gene Schroeder, USSTRATCOM, (402) 232-5348, schroedg@stratcom.mil
ADVISOR:
Karen Phipps, USSTRATCOM, (402) 232-7266, phippsk@stratcom.mil
Strategic Operations is the aggregate of interconnected operations by one or many armed forces and supporting activities. This singular or interagency effort may be offensive (conventional and/or nuclear), defensive or mixed (forces simultaneously conducting offensive and defensive operations). Appropriate analysis should consider: the need for follow-on platforms and weapon systems, threats (current and projected), CONOPS, weapon effects (nuclear, conventional or combined), and policy implications of potential shifts in targeting strategy.
Operations research continues to evolve and play an important role in understanding and analyzing problems in these areas. Alternative strategic future worlds may change the current strategies for assuring allies, dissuading potential competitors, deterring adversaries, or should deterrence fail, defeating the adversary. Improving non-kinetic capabilities – ISR, information operations, cyber warfare, with current and projected precision of non-nuclear weapons, offers a myriad of options to strategic operations. We seek presentations on ongoing or completed works that not only highlight issues in the traditional approach (primarily nuclear) to strategic operations, but offer insights into how means such as capability based planning, effects based operations, etc., accommodate interagency and joint participation.
Join us at the 77th MORSS: “Responding Globally, Leading Analytically”
WG 2 - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense
CHAIR:
LTC Thomas Rothwell, Center for Army Analysis, (703) 806-5173, thomas.rothwell@us.army.mil
CO-CHAIRS:
Charlie Holman, ATEC-AEC, (703) 681-3376, charlie.e.holman@atec.army.mil
Gaurang Dave, NSWC-DD, (540) 653-0423, Gaurang.Dave@navy.mil
Eric Lowenstein, Northrop Grumman supporting DTRA CBT, (703) 924-3050x 5147, elowenstein@cnttr.dtra.mil
Laura Sears, DTRA-CBT, (703) 767-3337, laura.sears@dtra.mil
Jon Calomiris, USANCA, (703) 806-7879, jon.calomiris@us.army.mil
Aaron Fifarek, General Dynamics, (937) 258-2273, ext 18, Aaron.Fifarek@gdit.com
ADVISOR:
Jerry Glasow, Institute for Defense Analyses, (703) 845-2133; jglasow@ida.org
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense continues to evolve on both the battlefield and the home front. Current threats include the willingness of Iraqi insurgents to use improvised explosive devices configured to release chlorine gas, the first time since WWI that US forces have been attacked by chemical weapons. The stated intent of those insurgents and others to acquire and use biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons demonstrates the full scope of the CBRN threat. On the home front, collaborative OR efforts across federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and public institutions are necessary to confront this threat. The improvements in the multi-purpose abilities of the CBRN defense community has led to ways of looking at system improvements, comprehensive education and training programs, innovative applications of military-oriented CBRN defense technologies to public and private sector security, force protection and anti-terrorism guidelines, and military-private research and development (R&D) initiatives. Great uncertainty does exist; nevertheless, risk management methods to identify and assess threats and vulnerabilities exist for the rational allocation of scarce resources. The vast amount of assets that the US has focused against CBRN attacks demonstrates our resolve to counter that threat. However, it is this same tidal wave of CBRN defense funding and initiatives that have caused an explosion in the need for analysis at the same time as leaders are reluctant to take the time required to generate real data and do hard analysis on the best ways to defend the nation and military forces against CBRN attack.
Against this backdrop, Working Group 2 seeks presentations on efforts, both complete and ongoing, that have generated new data for CBRN analysis despite data shortfalls and limitations. Papers may also address OR's potential to enhance CBRN risk management in order to provide for a more secure world. Subject areas may include, but are not limited to: characterization of CBRN threats and effects; hazard prediction modeling; near real-time post-attack analysis; decision support tools; sensor characterization and placement; decontamination operations; CBRN protection capability analysis; data fusion for attack warning and detection; data shortfalls and limitations; capabilities leveraging military OR to support civil authorities; and OR contributions to CBRN defense research, development and acquisition.
WG 3 - Strategic Relations and Influences
CHAIR:
Hunter Marks, USSTRATCOM/J811, (402) 294-4215, Hunter.Marks@us.af.mil
CO-CHAIRS:
Brenda Harms, Allied Joint Force Cmd Brunssum; DSN 314-364-3380, harmsb@jfcbs.nato.int
Kevin Hayden, DTRA, (703) 767-6573, kevin.hayden_contractor@dtra.mil
Dr. John Hummel, Argonne National Laboratory, (630) 252-7189, jhummel@anl.gov
Dr. Roy Rice, FS, Teledyne Brown Engineering, (256) 726-2038, roy.rice@tbe.com
1Lt Christina Willy, AFIT/ENS, (574) 276-8552, Christina.Willy@us.af.mil
ADVISOR:
Pat McKenna, USSTRATCOM/J5, (402) 294-1958, mckennap@stratcom.mil
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review laid out four defense policy goals: assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion towards U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary. This reinforced the importance of the U.S. deterring adversaries. While deterrence remains an enduring goal, the U.S. has also continued to face the need to conduct stability operations around the globe, including most recently, countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these missions present challenges to the OR community as we try to develop methodologies to assess capabilities and outcomes in these mission areas. The global nature of these missions presents the challenge of theatre security cooperation as missions typically span more than one geographic combatant command. In addition to these three challenges, we find the resurging need for arms control in today's world. While nuclear arms control appears minor in scope compared to the days of the Cold War, we also face the need for arms control in the realms of space, missile defense, and cyberspace. The continued importance of these issues is accompanied by an elevation of attention given to it by the MORS community.
In order to respond globally, the working group is soliciting analytically leading papers on the full spectrum of current and future issues. These issues include but are not limited to: Deterrence, Causes and Prevention of War; Conflict and Peacekeeping; Emerging, Catastrophic, and Disruptive Events; Regional Security Forces and Strategy; Theatre Security Cooperation; Arms Control; Proliferation Maintenance, Monitoring, Prevention and Mitigation; Stability and Escalation Dynamics; Diplomatic and Military Approaches; Delivery and Defenses; Alternative/Potential Futures; Sustainment; Development; and Changing Environments.
Papers employing modeling, simulation, game theory, optimization, decision analysis, management science, assessment across PMESII and other quantitative/ analytical techniques are especially welcomed. Both completed tasks and work in progress are encouraged.
WG 4 - Air and Missile Defense
CHAIR:
Kelly Culpepper, Raytheon Missile Systems, 520-794-3595, klculpepper@raytheon.com
CO-CHAIRS:
John Winkelman, Lockheed Martin, (609) 326-5077
Woody Bevill, Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Global Services, (703) 414-6581
Martin Goodman, US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, (256) 955-1937
Dr. Nigel Siva, SPARTA Inc., (703) 797-3103
Chris Foley, JHU/APL, ( 240) 228-0814
Hany Aly, Lockheed Martin, (856) 638-7085, hany.aly@lmco.com
Bobby Thomas, Lockheed Martin, (972) 603-7607, bobby.p.thomas@lmco.com
Dr. Rich Goodwin, ITT, (402) 991-4402, rich.goodwin@itt.com
ADVISOR:
Launa Zaffram, NSWCDD, Warfare Systems Dept, (540) 284-0183
Fourth Generation Warfare has drastically changed the face of war and the art of war. Our greatest threats have changed from organized military forces to non-state actors and insurgents. Due to the expense of modern air forces, our enemy will attack using asymmetrical methods, mainly rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. These threats are cost effective, particularly if used against a small defended area. RAM threats can be employed using unsophisticated systems and have been widely used throughout OIF. UAVs can be assembled in home garages using components purchased at a hobby shop and hardware store. Land attack missiles have become widely available and easier to use thus having a strategic and political impact far greater than their tactical efforts. Furthermore, a handful of countries have demonstrated the willingness to develop and deploy both theater and intercontinental missile systems, which threaten the United States and its allies. With existing and new technologies becoming increasingly available worldwide, and sophisticated weapons being easier and less expensive to produce, steps must be taken today to provide effective air and missile defenses against the threats that are expected to emerge over the next 20 years.
The military is driving towards a net-centric force in which assets will be shared across multiple platforms. To this end, integration and coordination will be the driving factors to a greater Air and Missile Defense (AMD) capability. Due to the nature of current and projected threats, there must be a seamless integration of AMD capability that cuts across all terrain, environments, missions, and military services. Future sensor, weapon, and command and control systems must provide the ability to defeat any missile threat, with a specific focus on National Missile Defense and Homeland Defense. Simultaneously, protection of our troops in theaters of operations must continue to be a primary focus.
To support the 77th MORSS, WG 4 will primarily focus on analyses that address current and future capability studies that cut across multiple services, as well as tools that support the analysis of this asymmetric warfare. In light of threat countries like Iran, who cultivate nuclear development programs, and the cooperation between potentially antagonistic countries, additional focus will be on future air and missile threat analysis, and the balance between defending America from both state and non-state actors. AMD is a critical element to the Joint Warfighter. WG 4 will foster education and collaboration on the diverse and changing facets of air and missile defense. Both completed and works-in-progress are welcome.
WG 5 - Homeland Security, Homeland Defense and Civil Support
CHAIR:
Julie Seton, ThoughtWeb USA Inc, 575-639-3158, julie.seton@thoughtweb.com
CO-CHAIRS:
Cherie Gott, USNORTHCOM, cherie.gott@northcom.mil
Lisa Izumi, Lockheed Martin, 757-965-9513, lisa.a.izumi@lmco.com
Kim Warren, MITRE, 703-298-7423, kwarren@mitre.org
ADVISORS:
Tom Denesia, NORAD-NORTHCOM, 719-554-9680, thomas.denesia@northcom.mil
Jerry Diaz, Homeland Security Institute, 703-416-3083, jerry.diaz@hsi.dhs.gov
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, there have been major efforts in the United States to secure the homeland, particularly with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), March 2002, and the establishment of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), 1 Oct 2002, within the Department of Defense (DoD). USNORTHCOM is teamed with the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in providing homeland defense with their complementary missions. Specifically, USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to anticipate, deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and when directed, provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence management operations. NORAD’s mission is, in close collaboration with homeland defense, security, and law enforcement partners, prevent air attacks against North America, safeguard the sovereign airspaces of the United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted, and unauthorized air activity approaching and operating within these airspaces, and provide aerospace and maritime warning for North America. DHS was established to provide the unifying core for the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure the United States of America. DHS’s mission is to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce. (From http://www.dhs.gov)
The focus of WG-5 takes this year’s MORS Symposium theme into its core, by looking across DoD and Interagency partners to find analytical solutions to complex issues involving protection, deterrence, response, and consequence management within the US and its global responsibility across the world.
Assessing the impacts to DoD in executing these missions in regard to both DoD and DHS policy will be one of the central goals of this working group. For example: What are the force structure impacts of homeland defense operations on other combatant Commands? How does the military size itself to support this new mission? What is the critical infrastructure that DoD is trying to protect in the homeland and how can it be prioritized?
The other equally important goal of this working group will be assessing the issues and associated policy of DoD’s support of civil authorities. This is unique to the military, since, in most situations, the civil authorities will have lead responsibility and DoD will be in a supporting role. For example: How does DoD currently interface with civil authorities and how should it interface in the future? What are the trigger points and thresholds where state and local authorities’ capabilities reach capacity and DoD support may be required? How can DoD develop plans when it is in a “supporting” role and not a “supported” role. How and by what means can DoD support this country during natural disasters, as well as terrorist events?
The third central goal is to address issues involving information sharing across DoD and DHS in their respective missions. This is complicated by current responsibilities of some DoD organizations explicitly tied to DHS response. Questions of policy and procedure in regard to these issues are addressed in the questions asked above, but from a different perspective. How might DoD and DHS cooperate in their analyses tasks so that the same data sets might be accessed? What happens if different analyses come up with differing results, even contradictory results? How are these differences worked out?
From a more strategic perspective, there are many questions to be answered, such as: How do you transform the military mind set and policies so that interface with civilian agencies can be seamless? What steps should be taken to transform traditional military command and control processes into an environment which includes civil agencies? How is classified and sensitive information (databases, etc.) exchanged between military and civil agencies?
The questions are endless. This is a monumental shift in military thinking. This working group will serve as a test bed for new thoughts, ideas and approaches that our analytic community can bring to bare. We must re-develop ourselves to provide the senior decision makers and leaders of this country with the best options and recommendations on the many unique issues that are and will drive defense of the homeland.
WG 5 intends to work throughout the year to address some of these issues and will be active in MORS events to demonstrate our commitment to conducting analyses that can lead to improvement of interaction and response for all agencies involved in defending our Homeland.
Composite Group A • Composite Group B • Composite Group C
Composite Group D • Composite Group E • Composite Group F