

## ***MORS QDR Plenary Session, January 13, 2009***

### ***Strengthening the Next QDR Through Timely and Relevant Analysis***

***Chair—Mr. Mike Leonard; Co-Chair—Dr. Jim Thomason***

#### ***Words of Welcome***

***Dr. Michael J Kwinn -- MORS President***

***Mr. Eric Coulter, SES – for MORS Sponsors (OSD, PA&E)***

***Dr. Ruth David – Host (President of ANSER)***

#### ***Opening Remarks, Workshop Overview and Background-- Mr. Mike Leonard, IDA***

Welcome to all of you.

QDR History. The history of QDR or QDR-like studies goes back some 40 years, to National Security Study Memorandum-3 in 1969. NSSM-3 generated a strategy change (to 1½ wars, the level supported by programmed resources, from 2½ wars). This effort was also broadly similar to QDR 2010 in that a parallel examination of the possible tradeoffs between national security and domestic priorities was undertaken.

The next such study was PRM-10 in 1977, which examined a wide range of alternative strategies and force postures, only two or three of which (at roughly the then-projected resource levels) received serious attention. PRM-10's primary strategic effect was a greater emphasis on developing the Rapid Deployment Force, which ultimately evolved into the US Central Command.

The Bottom-Up Review in 1993 was the next major look at strategy, forces, and resources. It resulted in confirmation of the Two Major Regional Contingency (2 MRC) strategy that emerged from General Powell's Base Force study in 1990, which was largely a Joint Staff/Service exercise.

The Commission on Roles and Missions recommended conduct of a Quadrennial Strategy Review (QSR) that would include inter-agency participation and assess capabilities of alternative force postures based on risk across the national security mission spectrum. In implementing this recommendation, DoD changed the name/focus of the study to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and did not undertake (in any of the three QDRs to date) a comprehensive assessment of alternative force postures across the national security mission

space. QDR 1997 did examine tradeoffs between force modernization and readiness, reaffirming that the projected balance was right for the 2 MRC strategy.

QDR 2001 initially featured a series of SecDef-directed external study groups (e.g., on Personnel and Force Transformation). In mid-summer an actual QDR was undertaken but its report was changed considerably following the 9/11 attacks. This QDR posited the “1/4/2/1” strategy, i.e., homeland defense coupled with deterrence in four key regions, prompt halting of aggression in two regions, and full-scale “regime change” in one.

QDR 2006 (now slipped to submission in February of the year following onset of a new Presidential term) featured participation of other US agencies and key allies. This QDR changed the strategy by calling for worldwide deterrence (vice four key regions) and by adding a requirement to *either* halt two major aggressions at once or to halt one major aggression while conducting a sustained irregular conflict effort. While applauding the inclusion of other agencies and allies in the study, the GAO faulted QDR 2006 for not looking at a range of alternatives, failing to justify its resulting end-strength goals, and not providing an adequate risk assessment.

Current QDR Legislation. The present version of the QDR legislation calls for submission of the final report in February 2010. The QDR law says, “The Secretary of Defense shall every four years...conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a ‘quadrennial defense review’) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”

The law requires an accompanying risk assessment, prepared initially by the CJCS with comments by the Secretary of Defense. The law also requires submission of a budget plan that provides sufficient resources to “execute successfully the full range of missions called for in the defense strategy, at a low-to-moderate level of risk,” thus implying no *a priori* fiscal constraints as well as implying a requirement to examine a number of alternative force structures and programs to explicitly identify those with low-to-moderate levels of risk. The law in addition provides details on the report’s contents and calls for an independent panel’s assessment of the QDR to be sent to Congress within three months of the QDR report’s submission.

QDR 2010 Context. The over-arching context for the next QDR is daunting due to three factors: (1) the general US economic situation; (2) the mismatch between forces/programs on one hand and resources available to DoD on the other, a discrepancy likely to be exacerbated with the ending of supplemental funding requests; and (3) the on-going conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which place considerable stress on current forces.

QDR 2010 Prospects. We attempted to get a perspective on the QDR from a representative of the incoming Obama administration. We were unable to do so due to their rules on public appearances/discussions immediately prior to the inauguration.

Absent this perspective, there are two factors that could have significant influence in shaping the QDR: (1) Secretary Gates' views concerning the necessity of getting other government agencies with national security roles better empowered and resourced to perform these roles; and (2) the recent completion of the Project on National Security Reform, which calls for broad changes in inter-agency organization, processes, and resource allocation. These factors suggest that instead of the customary QDR that produces modest tweaks to DoD's force structure and modernization, the upcoming QDR could become, or be part of, a serious inter-agency strategy review that actually moves resources among major components of national security. An obvious initial challenge here is the integration of the DoD QDR with on-going major reviews by DHS and the Intelligence Community (both to be briefed at the second Workshop Plenary session).

Role of Analysis. It is likely that the next QDR will continue the gradual trend away from traditional force-on-force, major conflict analysis. At higher echelons it may also be more dependent on judgment among disparate things (e.g., tradeoffs among military capabilities, diplomacy, intelligence, and economic aid). However, at middle and lower levels, there remains a great need for high-quality analysis to inform judgments on such tradeoffs to the greatest extent possible. Developing supporting analytic tools, as well as an over-arching methodology for presenting and assessing major tradeoffs, is clearly an important mission for MORs, and the driving rationale for this QDR 2010 Workshop.

### ***A Congressional Perspective--Summary of Remarks Presented By HASC Chairman Ike Skelton (with Mr. Mark Lewis of the HASC Staff)***

#### **Why the QDR is important to Congress**

- Congress has constitutional obligations to provide oversight and fund the military
  - Uses input such as QDR to help form policy positions. These positions may be different than the Administration's and Congress must understand the implications
  - Congress uses the QDR to provide context for and to evaluate DOD legislative and budgetary proposals
- Much of the value is in the discovery learning process – it forces DOD to go through a rigorous process, consider alternatives, test assumptions.

#### **Congressional concerns for the 2010 QDR report**

- The statute is clear and detailed. Congress expects the DOD to comply with it.
- Encourage transparency and occasional consultation during the review so that Congress understands the thought processes and assumptions more thoroughly

- Assumptions: the law is clear about what sort of assumptions should be highlighted in the report. The 2006 QDR was unsatisfactory in that regard
  - Congress looks across the full range of United States agencies and activities. The QDR only focuses on DOD. Understanding those assumptions is essential if Congress is going to make trade-offs within the Department and across Departmental lines in other national security related activities.
  - Congress expects a much clearer treatment of assumptions in this QDR – a section of the report devoted to specifically highlighting them would be appropriate.

Congress also expects a much clearer treatment of the budget plans to meet the requirements of the QDR
- Force structures: here, again, the law clearly requires that the QDR define sufficient force structure to meet the requirements of the national defense strategy
  - Congress needs to see what is required and why
  - Congress will also need to make trade-offs to meet budget constraints. The QDR should include alternate force structures and a way of determining how a set of tradeoffs may have an impact on the ability to execute the national defense strategy.
  - In recent years many force structure changes have been made outside the QDR process, e.g. reductions in the number of Navy aircraft carriers and significant reductions in numbers of tactical aircraft of the Navy and Air Force, as well as increases in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. The level of the detail on force structure in the QDR needs to be useful to the Congress for analysis while still allowing the flexibility for some level of change over the four year period between reviews.
- Risk Assessment: The 2006 Chairman’s risk assessment said almost nothing. Congress must know how and where the DOD perceives risk so that it can conduct appropriate oversight to help mitigate that risk.
- In the future it is possible that DOD could move some of the material in the QDR that is not required by law into the new Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. That Roles and Missions review should be “nested” under the QDR, with direct linkages between the two processes and their documents.

**DoD Perspectives -- Summary of Remarks Presented By Andrew Hoehn, Vice President, The RAND Corporation**

- **Forthcoming (expected soon)**

## ***Non- DoD Contributions to National Security--Remarks by Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)***

It is a pleasure and honor to be here. I benefited greatly from the introductory remarks by Congressman Skelton and Andrew Hoehn. They have gotten this workshop off to an excellent start. What they said serves to remind us that the worst thing that one can do is to project our misunderstandings of the present into the future. Defense planners need to do better than that.

I mention this because there is, I believe, very little reason to assume that the future defense environment will resemble that with which we are familiar. Let me cite some examples.

The fiscal constraints on defense spending have already been mentioned. Andrew Hoehn was, I believe, correct to posit that the biggest trade-offs will not be between the services but between defense spending and other priorities. Of course, some – like Marty Feldstein – advocate what might be called military Keynesianism: spending on defense to provide high tech jobs and to inflate the defense industrial base. But that view is probably in a minority. The bigger question, since we have gotten into the habit of running our country on credit rollovers and our creditors are Arab and Chinese is why we should expect them to continue to lend us money to build weapons and develop capabilities intended to bully them? This is a question worth pondering.

In recent years, we have alienated allies, offended friends, and ignored our partners internationally. In military science, we are constantly told, logistics is everything. Given the unwillingness of many people abroad to be seen in our company these days, why should we assume that the alliances, bases, and access rights on which we depend for our status as a world power will continue to be there for us? It is not impossible to imagine that they will not be. This too is something we must consider and address.

Then there is the issue of new technologies to counter our ability to project power abroad. There has been much discussion, in this context, of the concept of a "peer competitor," which is a euphemism for "China." But China doesn't seem to be thinking of itself or behaving as a peer competitor. It has responded to the threat it perceives from our designation of it as such not by trying to match our capabilities and compete head-to-head with us like a peer but by exploring means of asymmetric warfare that can checkmate our military superiority. The result is an arms race between us in cyberspace and in outer space and the development of weapons systems that can take out aircraft carriers. The concept of peer competitor is a wonderful open-ended program driver for defense procurement but I, for one, am left to wonder whether it is a sound construct for defense planning.

Finally, we have the central lesson of 9/11, which we have so far seemed to miss. That is that if we bomb other peoples' homelands, they will find a means to bomb ours. We are no longer immune to reprisal. The perpetrators of 9/11 saw themselves as conducting a reprisal for our direct and indirect interventions in Muslim lands. We must face the fact that what we do to others can now be done to us.

But I was asked to talk about non-military contributions to national security, not these things. Let me turn to the topic that was assigned to me.

This meeting was convened to strengthen the QDR process, and this is the Military Operations Research Society. In this context, the topic of non-military contributions to defense is entirely appropriate. It is also timely, given the failure of purely military means to deliver security or accomplish US foreign policy objectives in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. SecDef Gates has been eloquent on the consequences for our national security and our military of the hollowing out of US diplomatic, development, and other civilian capabilities to conduct operations abroad. I will not repeat what he has said. I am sure he himself will do so.

But, I must point out that the topic of non-military contributions to national security would be incomprehensible to most of the world. Few abroad equate national security with military capabilities as we and the Israelis have come to do. Others see military means as one among many contributing factors to national security, not its essence. They see coercive means, including the use of force, as a last resort, to be employed sparingly, if at all. For them, the topic that might resonate would be "military contributions to national security."

Europeans, in particular, do not equate military capabilities or defense spending levels with security. That's one reason we are having a hard time convincing them on issues like missile defense, NATO enlargement, or additional military commitments to Afghanistan. Different views on this, not anti-Semitism or the influence of domestic Muslim voting blocks, are behind our differences on the war Israel has launched in Gaza. No one in Europe believes that Israel's attempt to bomb and strafe Palestinians into peaceful coexistence can work. Many here think it can. Without exception, our allies and friends abroad see Israel's war on Hamas as a classic misapplication of military power to a problem beyond the capacity of military means to solve. They expect that this war will prove tactically counterproductive for Israel and strategically very costly to both it and its American backers. Time will tell who has it right.

Be that as it may, we are who we are and we are where we are. Who we are is the last country on earth to staff its national security system through the spoils system. This means that every four or eight years, we administer a frontal lobotomy to our national policymaking apparatus. We then spend a couple of years regrowing the brain cells we have gouged out, and learning by trial and error, often lots of error.

And where we are, after sixty years of effort during the Cold War and thereafter, is that we have the world's most professional and lethal military, its least professional diplomatic service and national security policy apparatus, and – relative to our global ambitions – its most anemic development programs and staff.

Unique among the world's nations, 1/3 of our country's senior civilian representatives abroad – our ambassadors – are amateurs whose only known qualification is the campaign contributions they made. With a few exceptions, they were, in other words, appointed for the good of their political party, not the country, and if they have performed well, this was most likely a surprise to them as well as everyone else. For better or ill, they are also irrelevant to our future national security, as all of them are now leaving government.

Our foreign policy agencies – OSD, State, Treasury, and so forth – now have almost no truly

senior career civilian staff. Political appointees today occupy policy positions down to levels in the bureaucracy that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. Very few in our Congress have military experience. Almost none have diplomatic experience. The civilian staffs in the nations cooperating and competing with us internationally, by contrast, are almost all professionals – some of them with decades of experience in the national security arena.

Let me briefly digress at this point. Everyone knows – or thinks they do – what soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines do. Very few Americans, including those appointing men and women to diplomatic missions, know what diplomats do. Let me immodestly read an excerpt from my own book of a decade ago, "Arts of Power," to describe what diplomacy is and what diplomats do and thereby illuminate what is lost when both are neglected.

*"Diplomacy is the form that statecraft takes in times of peace. It is the elegantly unbloody arm of strategy in war.*

*"Diplomats work alongside spies and warriors to counsel statesmen and to monitor and guard the interests of their state in relation to others. They harness the power of other states to that of their own in coalitions to promote these interests. They shape the perceptions and actions of other states, harmonize their interests, and build cooperation between them. They erect and operate the framework for their nation's political, economic, cultural, and military interaction with foreigners. Diplomats assist their fellow citizens in international trade, investment, and cultural exchange. They protect the interests of their compatriots abroad.*

*"The task of diplomats is the nonviolent advancement of the political, economic, cultural, and military interests of their state and people. They nurture relations with foreign states that will evoke cooperation or neutrality when war becomes necessary. Diplomats conduct the passage from protest to menace, from dialogue to negotiation, from ultimatum to reprisal, from war to settlement and reconciliation with other states. They build and tend the coalitions that deter or make war. Diplomats disrupt the alliances of enemies and sustain the passivity of potentially hostile powers. Their activity marks the phase of policy prior to war; it aggregates the power of allies; it helps to set the aims of war; it contrives war's termination; it forms, strengthens, and sustains the peace."*

Or, when diplomacy and diplomats are not tasked to do these things or provided with the resources to do them, they do them poorly or not at all.

Let me return to our present circumstances.

Our diplomats have seldom been trained to work with our military and, until recently, have had little experience of doing so. And there are far too few of them. 1/3 of foreign service positions in the US are now vacant. So are 12 percent of diplomatic positions around the world, other than Iraq and Afghanistan, which are fully staffed. 2/3 of our foreign service is forward-deployed abroad at any time; 70 percent of those so deployed are at hardship posts; in the past five years, over a fifth of our diplomats have served at posts where it is too dangerous to bring their families. The current situation allows no possibility of training in critical language and other skills to influence foreigners to see and do things our way. And the terms of service, which

involve a 20.89 percent pay cut for service overseas and no equivalent of the veterans medical benefits and annuities for families conferred on military colleagues, are taking a predictable toll on retention rates.

After the end of the Cold War, we abolished the United States Information Agency and neglected public diplomacy. We have cut staffing at the Agency for International Development to about a fourth of what it was – even though doing various forms of nation-building, including rehabilitating failed states or states we have caused to fail, is now seen as vital to the success of our national security policies. Our foreign assistance effort, as a percentage of our GDP, has been among the least generous of all developed countries.

The resulting imbalances have grave consequences. Military professionalism, numbers, funding, experience, competence, and dedication to a life in service to the country contrast with civilian unpreparedness, lack of resources, inexperience, incompetence, and lives dedicated to the enhancement of their personal egos and incomes. Our military have had to cope with a policy apparatus here that does not understand either the use of force or its limits and with the absence of adequate and effective civilian partners abroad.

This leads to wars with no clear objectives and no war termination strategies to end them. It leads to experiments in nation-building carried out by campaign gerbils assigned on the basis of their political loyalty rather than their expertise. It leads to stability operations supported by an inadequate number of government civilians who are not development professionals, do not speak the local language, have no prior relevant experience, and who do not stay long enough to get much done. It leads to the sort of disasters we all observe.

Inevitably, it leads to men and women in uniform having to be thrown into the resulting breach to make sure that what needs to get done actually does get done. And it leads to our once and future Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, having to assume the role of our most articulate advocate of a diplomatic, public diplomacy, and development plus-up. The fact that the SecDef has taken on this role leaves room for hope, provided the coming QDR cycle synchs with a serious effort on the part of the new Secretary of State and other cabinet officials to recover and build up civilian capacity. We all better hope it does.

This brings me to a final observation. The greatest deficit in our national security policy is the absence of grand strategy – a strategy that integrates the policies and armaments of our nation in such a way that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with maximum chance of victory. We had such a strategy during the Cold War and it enabled us to win without fighting. We have shown no capacity to develop a grand strategy to deal with the challenges of the post Cold War era. Our inability to integrate civilian and military aspects of our interaction with allies, partners, friends, competitors, adversaries, and enemies is the ultimate cause for the imbalances in civilian and military capabilities to which I have referred. This is what has caused us to allow our civilian capabilities to atrophy even we enhanced our military power.

National security is not dependent upon and cannot be left to military power alone. It must enlist the other strengths of our nation – political, economic, and cultural – to engage the world persuasively, not just coercively. We must recall how to lead, not just bully others into doing

things our way.

We face serious challenges that we cannot meet without partners.

We must redefine relations and establish manageable border between NATO and Russia if we are not to see a return to instability at the western end of the Eurasian landmass.

We must enlist the Muslim allies we need to be effective against the extremists who are our common enemies. We cannot do this if Muslims perceive an American crusade against Islam. That is what feeds the legitimacy of anti-American jihad.

We must develop a strategy to assure the security of the Persian Gulf region at levels of cost and effort that are affordable and sustainable. This is something we have not done that we must do before we leave Iraq.

We must manage a relationship with a rapidly strengthening China that is both our competitor and partner. We need China's help, for example, in reforming the international financial system to assure our future prosperity and that of the world.

We must consider how best to sustain an overseas base structure and access rights that support our global operations. We cannot do so if ever fewer foreign partners are prepared to pay the price in their domestic politics of association with us.

There are other issues of this magnitude before us, but these will suffice to illustrate the need for the interagency process, which currently lacks any mechanism for strategic reconsideration of policy or long-term planning, to restore or create such capabilities. It is clear that we need to reconstitute and strengthen the civilian foreign policy capabilities we have let slide. Recognizing this, however, does not tell us what specific capabilities are most relevant and required. There is no way to determine that without a strategy that defines our long-term purposes internationally and measures our means of achieving them. We will not get by with more of the same. Unless the QDR is part of such a strategic planning process, however, that's all it will be. Unless a reinvigorated strategic planning process reconstitutes diplomatic, public diplomacy, and development capabilities to complement our military capabilities, our defense effort will continue to be hobbled by these incapacities and our military will continue to be left to hold the bag in unnecessary misadventures abroad.

***The Project on National Security Reform-- Summary of Remarks by James Locher, Executive Director, PNSR***

1. I appreciate the opportunity to summarize PNSR's report, *Forging a New Shield*, and highlight some of the recommendations that could impact the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
2. In particular, I'd like to discuss the project's recommendations on planning and planning guidance and also on the critical need to link strategy and resources.
3. First, about PNSR:
  - a. Mandated by Congress

- b. 2-year study
  - c. Formally submitted to the President, President-elect, and Congress on November 26
  - d. Released on December 3
4. Theme of change dominated politics this year
- a. At the top must be bold transformation of the national security system
  - b. The national security system is misaligned with 21<sup>st</sup> Century security challenges.
    - i. Our government is dominated by rigid, bureaucratic, competitive, vertically-oriented departments and agencies.
    - ii. Threats require a tight integration of departmental expertise and capabilities.
      - 1. We need highly effective horizontal teams.
    - iii. What we have are horizontal problems, and a vertical organization.
5. PNSR was created to address these problems
- a. Private-public partnership
  - b. 22 Guiding Coalition members
    - i. lost four to the Obama team – General Jim Jones, Jim Steinberg, Michele Flournoy, and Ash Carter
    - ii. may lose Admiral Denny Blair
  - c. 300+ national security professionals
  - d. 106 case studies
  - e. Two phases – interagency and departmental and agency reforms
6. In recent years, there has been compelling evidence of the inadequacy of current arrangements.
- a. Terrorist attacks of 9/11
  - b. Troubled stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
  - c. Inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina
  - d. These setbacks are not coincidental.
    - i. They are evidence of a system failure.
7. Our organizational performance has been troubled for many decades.
- a. Made worse by complexity and speed of change.
  - b. Growing gap between demands being placed on the system and its capacities and speed.
8. Foremost among problems is that the system is grossly imbalanced.
- a. It has powerful departments and agencies, and weak integrating mechanisms.
  - b. This was a design flaw of the National Security Act of 1947.
  - c. Personnel incentives work at cross-purposes with system needs.
9. Other problems include:
- a. The national security system is not managed as a system.

- i. The lack of strategic direction, which denies the national security system unity of purpose.
      - 1. No strategic planning or visioning at the national level.
      - 2. System is focused on the problems of today and tomorrow.
  - b. Management of issues tends to be centralized in the Executive Office of the President.
    - i. Overburdens
    - ii. Too few issues
  - c. Resources are not aligned with strategic objectives.
    - i. Has led to a critical imbalance between the military and nonmilitary budgets.
  - d. Congress is focused on the parts and cannot provide a whole of government perspective to national security missions.

10. 38 recommendations – seven themes

11. Adopt new approaches focused on national missions and outcomes, emphasizing integrated effort, collaboration, and agility

- a. Broaden the scope of national security
  - i. Security from aggression
  - ii. Security against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces (pandemics, natural disasters, climate change)
  - iii. Security against the failure of major national infrastructure systems
  - iv. Sustained stewardship of the foundations of national power (sound economic policy, energy security, etc.)
- b. Replace National Security Council and Homeland Security Council with a President's Security Council
- c. Create in statute the Executive Office of the President position of the director for national security
  - i. Principal assistant to the president on all matters relating to national security
  - ii. Shift from national security advisor to national security manager

12. Create unity of purpose

- a. Focus the Executive Office of the President on high policy, grand strategy, and strategic management (while maintaining the capacity for well-informed operational and crisis decision-making)
- b. Mandate National Security Review and annual National Security Planning Guidance**
  - i. Institute a National Security Review to be performed at the beginning of each presidential term in order to prioritize objectives, establish risk management criteria, specify roles and responsibilities for priority missions, assess required capabilities, and identify capability gaps.**
  - ii. The National Security Review acts as a mechanism to set integrated high-level policy guidance at the beginning of every administration.

- iii. The National Security Review should facilitate the creation or improvement of strategy and planning competencies within the Executive Office of the President and federal agencies. It would also provide unifying direction to the several mission-specific strategic reviews – **including the QDR** - currently required by statute.
  - iv. Based upon the priorities, criteria, and assessments of the National Security Review, require the preparation of National Security Planning Guidance to be issued annually by the president to all national security departments and agencies.
  - v. The NSPG acts as an instrument for the White House to integrate department and agency resources. The NSPG would serve two critical functions. First, it would clarify the president’s priorities for departments and agencies contributing to national security objectives. Second, it would direct the creation of a select number of integrated interagency plans to support those objectives, thereby linking strategy to planning to resources.
- c. Executive secretary of the President’s Security Council to support system management (e.g., strategic guidance, macro-resource allocation, assessment of performance, interagency personnel, knowledge management)

13. Decentralize management of national security issues and achieve unity of effort by creating interagency teams and interagency crisis task forces.
- a. Initiate the process of shifting the management of national security issues from the President’s Security Council staff (and supporting interagency committees) to interagency teams with one common mission
    - i. Start with teams for presidential priority issues.
  - b. For crises, create interagency task forces with a single integrated chain of command

14. Link resources to goals - Currently, the United States does not effectively link resources to goals through national security mission analysis and budgeting, and national security budgets are driven by the needs of departmental equities rather than issue teams. In addition resource allocation of the national security system, with reference to strategic planning processes and documents, is not developed with full recognition of resource constraints and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative resource choices. Producing an integrated national security budget will include justification material that reflects how each department’s and each agency’s budget and the overall budget align with the objectives of the National Security Review and National Security Planning Guidance. This reform will provide the president and the Congress a government-wide understanding of activities, priorities, and resource allocation, and identify redundancies and deficiencies in the resourcing of national security missions.
- a. Six-year budget projections based upon National Security Planning Guidance
  - b. Direct the President’s Security Council (PSC) staff to lead a joint PSC-OMB review of the six-year resource plan of each national security department and agency.
  - c. Produce an integrated national security budget with mission budget displays

15. Align personnel incentives with strategic objectives
  - a. Human Capital Strategic Plan
  - b. Create a National Security Professional Corps
  - c. Use promotion requirements to create incentives for service in interagency assignments
  - d. Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel
  
16. Improve flow of knowledge and information
  - a. Create the position of Chief Knowledge Officer on the staff of the President's Security Council
  - b. Establish a single security classification and access regime
  - c. Consolidate security clearance procedures and approval
  
17. Build a legislative branch-executive branch partnership
  - a. Establish Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and House
  - b. Strengthen the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee by empowering them to formulate and enact annual authorization bills
  - c. Provide greater flexibility on reprogramming, transferring of funds, and contingency funding
  
18. PNSR has three sets of reforms in mind.
  - a. Executive orders and presidential directives.
  - b. Amendments to Senate and House rules.
  - c. A new national security act.

***A National Security Perspective on QDR 2010-- Summary of Remarks by Dr. Peter Feaver, Duke University***

I was asked to make some contributions based on what might be called a broader national security perspective – the vantage point in the government where decision makers are trying to balance three things:

1. National ambitions, across the full spectrum of political, economic, military, social, and so on goals.
2. National means, referring to the full toolbox of statecraft across the full spectrum of political, economic, military, social, and so on goals.
3. Political constraints, referring to the pulling and hauling within the executive branch, across the branches of government, and extending outward to the parties, the public, and the media

The White House (WH) is the only place where responsibility for this is lodged, though arguably the WH is not the only place where expertise is lodged, and inarguably the WH is NOT the only place where opinion on this is lodged!

## **I. Beginning with the NSS, which was my point of entry into this issue: 3 Lessons on doing the NSS**

1. Writing it is very hard: challenge of NSS: at least 5 different audiences

1. Friends: have you downgraded us?
2. Enemies: are you unfairly targeting us, or needlessly elevating us?
3. Publics in enemy lands: have you forgotten us?
4. American public: why are you doing what you are doing?
5. American government: what is your priority?
  - a. 3 D's story from AID and 2006 NSS
    - i. Note Natsios and Atwood reinvoke the 3 D's in recent Foreign Affairs

2. But writing it is not impossible:

Substantive: strong bipartisan consensus on our grand strategy, at least as strong and coherent as containment was

- (1) prevent emergence of a hostile peer-competitor rival by coopting Russia/China into the system and appeasing India/Brazil and by keeping US military strength at unrivaled levels
- (2) spread democracy and capitalism as widely as possible using all non-military elements of national power
- (3) use the UN to deal with security threats but if it is unable to act, act outside with a coalition of the willing

3. But they should change the way it is written

-required too early. Should be timed with first state of the union (i.e. Jan of second year in office)

-shouldn't be annual: just one per term, with a "what have we learned" at the end of the term

-I am more skeptical about proposals to link to the budget process: an interagency QDR. Noble, but not realistic, in my judgment

## **II. 4 myths about the inter-relationship of defense/military and national security broadly defined**

**(1) The military has gone to war and the rest of the public has gone to the mall.**

The public has done what it has been asked to do, and has stomached a more costly set of military operations than it was led to expect, and it has seen far more operational setbacks than it had come to expect in a post-Desert Storm era.

I think there can be a reasonable debate about additional things we might ask of the American public, but the critique, in the narrow terms it usually is advanced, is misguided.

**(2) The public has a bottomless reservoir of support for funding the military.**

There is, I think, very little public stomach for increasing defense spending and a concomitant expectation that there are great savings to be had if only we remove wasteful redundancy. I don't have hard data on this, but it is a sense.

When the public was asked at the height of the campaign what one issue they wanted the candidates to talk more about, defense/military was mentioned by only 2%

When asked to assess Bush Admin in the defense/military arena: 39% "made progress," 21% "stood still," 36% "lost ground."

**(3) The military has gone to war and the rest of the government has gone to bed.**

We can all think of examples where the interagency has let the military down in some fashion or other. Indeed, it is now a rite of passage for military officers at the Command and General Staff College and War College levels to write blistering denunciations of the interagency process and contribution.

And yes, some of those failings are due to organizational culture, risk-averseness (for instance, a reluctance bordering on refusal to deploy).

Yet in my experience, there is an even more basic common denominator: a resource gap. The capability gap is, at its root a resource gap, not a commitment gap.

**(4) QDR 2010's biggest challenges will be resolving inter-service trade-offs on major weapon systems.**

This will be a huge challenge, to be sure.

But, especially if proposals for an integrated, inter-agency-wide QDR process are acted upon, I can expect even thornier trade-offs across departments and, to make things really messy, across governmental and non-governmental/contractor organizations.

One small example: we tried to launch a civilian reserve and this proved enormously difficult, not simply because of cultural issues.

It turned out to be very expensive to create the mobilization and training capacity outside of DoD and the service reserves.

If I were not trying to cram everything into my Procrustean bed of quads, 4 this and 4 that, I might even mention yet another related myth: the idea that we have militarized foreign policy in the sense of applying traditional military tools in an inappropriate way to problems best resolved by non-military tools. That is not what has happened, rather we have:

Used military assets to wield non-military tools.

We are not blowing things up that shouldn't be blown up. We are asking the military, which specializes in blowing things up, to also rebuild the things they have just blown up, because there is no one else available to do it. That is called the militarization of foreign policy, but it is something different.

**III. 4 sound observations about the interagency and national security**

**(1) To make a lasting change in departmental or agency effectiveness, you have to increase resources, specifically personnel resources**

**(2) there is a lot that can be done to improve interagency effectiveness on the margins, but dramatic change will require reform of Congress**

**a. note I say reform OF Congress, not reform BY Congress. Congress has been fairly willing to engage in massive reform of the Executive Branch, but it has resisted reforming itself.**

**(3) Personality trumps org chart**

**a. reformists focus on the org chart, but it matters far more who is sitting in what positions than what titles and what reporting lines are written on paper**

**b. Disagreements are a dime a dozen, debates are more precious. What turns disagreements into debates is only partly about structure or org chart and is mainly about personality.**

- (4) Existing structures exist because they reflect the interests of existing powers.**
- a. Even dysfunctional structures probably work well enough or the powerful would have changed them.
  - b. Regardless of what the wiring diagram shows, the actual functioning of the White House and by extension the interagency reflects the de facto perceived preferences of the powerful, especially the President
  - c. Thus, attempts to change that wiring will not work unless one of two things is true:
    - either they change the power distribution
    - or they change the perceived interests of the powerful

### **In Conclusion: 2 Uber-observations**

**Point 1: The problems/challenges we have been discussing can only be decided by the President so any failures here are, in the final analysis, the President's fault.**

- The biggest trade-offs that QDR2010 will confront can only be decided by the President. True even for trade-offs within the building.
- Ditto the trade-offs with larger fiscal austerity.
- Ditto trade-offs between departments
  - Every wiring diagram ends in the same spot: in the Oval.
- This trickles down. The NSC staff can manage the interagency process better or worse but the decisive factor is not, in the final analysis, the relative quality of the staffs or the title/rank but rather what the President does and who he (or she) backs.

**Point 2: The world needs a strong United States because, for the foreseeable future, there is no substitute. And because the world needs the United States, I think the obit writers have been premature.**

- The United States may not enjoy the unique position it had in the 1990s, but my read of the 2025 forecasting that the NIC did is that, despite what the headlines wrote, the US is likely to remain the preeminent global player – what Albright called the indispensable power.
- Thus, QDR 2010 is not rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. It might be closer to the Solarium Project, where the Eisenhower Administration sought to put the Cold War on a sustainable footing

***Q&A: Mike Leonard moderated a Q&A session from 11am-Noon.***