



Irregular Warfare Analysis Workshop
WG 1: Global Engagement

Military Operations Research Society
Working Group Out Brief

3-6 February 09

Chairs: Andy Caldwell, Col Tom Feldhausen

Agenda



- Working Group Purpose/Charges
- Participants
- Schedule / Briefs received
- Findings / Suggestions
- Key Take-Aways

Global Engagement through Theater Security Cooperation

- **DoD Security Cooperation - Those activities conducted with allies and friends, in accordance with SecDef Guidance, to: (directly related to 3 GEF Global End States)**
 - **Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests**
 - **Build allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations**
 - **Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.**
- **Theater Security Cooperation (TSC): Those activities conducted by combatant commanders to further SecDef goals and priorities. TSC is a subset of DoD Security Cooperation.**

Charges



WG1: Global Engagement: Provide recommendations on appropriate analytical techniques to prioritize, plan, and assess Theater Security Cooperation activities to assist the COCOMs in addressing the analytical challenges that they currently confront.

- 1. What tools are available to assist in the identification and development of activities to support objectives?**
- 2. In a resource constrained environment, what tools would aid in the prioritization of TSC events to obtain maximum benefit?**
- 3. How do I assess the results of TSC activities?**
- 4. How do I appropriately evaluate progress towards objectives?**

Participants



- Clark Heidelbaugh, JS J7
- Larry Young OPNAV N81
- Steve Goode CAA
- Tony Durant Culmen Int'l
- George Rollins OSD PA&E
- Ben Runkle RAND
- John Benedict JHU APL
- Tom Feldhausen JS J5
- Andy Caldwell OSD PA&E
- Brad Nissal CENTCOM
- Mary Cerniglia-Mosher AF/A9
- Tim Hope WBB
- Joseph Adams AT&L
- Paul Works TRAC
- Herman Orgeron CAA
- Martin Lidy IDA

WG1 - Agenda



- Wednesday, 4 Feb 09
 - **1040-1130**
 - **Presentation on PACOM, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM TSC/theater campaign planning processes, supporting analytical methods and analytical challenges – Andy Caldwell (OSD/PA&E) / Col Tom Feldhausen (JS/J5)**
 - **1130-1300 LUNCH**
 - **1300-1430**
 - **Distribute master question list for workshop participants**
 - **Group discussion on one topic – Andy Caldwell to facilitate**
 - **1430-1445 BREAK**
 - **1445-1530**
 - **Feedback/group discussion and recommendations on question discussed**
 - **1530-1615**
 - **Presentation on Global Maritime Security Update (SECRET REL to USA AUS CAN GBR). Recent efforts by OPNAV N81G to determine the U.S. Navy's steady-state demand signal for execution of Global War on Terror and Theater Security Cooperation mission sets.**
 - **CDR Larry Young (USN), N81GD**

WG1 - Agenda



- Thursday, 5 Feb 09
 - 0800-0830 Review progress from previous day
 - 0830-0900
 - **CASE STUDY: “AFRICOM Interagency Mission Analysis”** Presentation on linking resourcing priorities to interagency partners and identifying goals and objectives. Martin Lidy (IDA)
 - 0900-1000 Group work on master question list –session 2
 - 1000-1015 BREAK
 - 1015-1045
 - **METRICS & MOE: “How are we doing?”** Presentation on linking activities to objectives and developing MOE for CJTF HOA and OEF - Philippines. Ben Runkle (RAND)
 - 1045-1200 Group work on master question list – session 3
 - 1200-1300 LUNCH
 - 1300-1345
 - **ASSESSMENT & ANALYSIS: “Nodes or Networks? Instability Assessment Meets the Global Economic Crisis”**. Presentation on the value of system dynamics in measuring instability. Col Tom Feldhausen (JS/J5)
 - 1345-1430 Group work on master question list – session 4
 - 1430-1445 BREAK
 - 1445-1630 Consolidation/discussion of recommendations from the master question list

Friday, 6 Feb 09


- 0800-1045 Complete out brief materials for plenary

Presentations




- PACOM, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM TSC/theater campaign planning processes, supporting analytical methods and analytical challenges. (UNCLAS) – **Andy Caldwell (OSD/PA&E) / Col Tom Feldhausen (JS/J5)**
- Global Maritime Security Update. Recent efforts by OPNAV N81G to determine the U.S. Navy's steady-state demand signal for execution of Global War on Terror and Theater Security Cooperation mission sets. (UNCLAS). **CDR Larry Young (USN), N81GD**
- AFRICOM Interagency Mission Analysis. Linking resourcing priorities to interagency partners and identifying goals and objectives. (UNCLAS). **Martin Lidy (IDA)**
- “How are we doing?” Linking activities to objectives and developing MOE and Metrics for CJTF HOA and OEF – Philippines (SECRET-REL). **Ben Runkle (RAND)**
- Nodes or Networks? Instability Assessment Meets the Global Economic Crisis. The value of system dynamics in assessing instability. (UNCLAS). **Col Tom Feldhausen (JS/J5)**

Theoretical Planning to Engagement Process



Challenges



Objectives/Measures Comparison

| | PACOM | AFRICOM | SOUTHCOM | CENTCOM |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| GEF End-States | 3 to 7 GEF end-states, depending upon the COCOM | | | |
| Strategic Objectives | 7 Strategic Objectives | 6 Theater Strategic Objectives | 6 Strategic Goals | 6 Strategic Objectives |
| Intermediate Objectives | 95 Objectives (duplication) | 25 to 30 Effects | 30 Intermediate Military Objectives | 26 Effects |
| Indicators or measures | Measures of Effect | 215 Indicators | 130 – 150 Indicators | 86 Indicators (of which 56 are healthy) |

Multiplied by the number of countries this requires tens of thousands of data items

Assessment Techniques



| Analysis Method | Description | Examples |
|--|--|--|
| Quantitative data | Collection of input/output data associated with activities and | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •TCSMIS database •Country indices on corruption, etc. |
| Polling and surveys | Polling and surveys | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •USNS Comfort port visit |
| Content Analysis | Survey popular media for identified | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failed States Index (Fund for |
| Expert Opinion | Stakeholder Groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Objective identification |
| Modeling/ Simulation and Gaming | Simplified representation of a complex system | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMPOEX (PACOM) |

Baseline

Trends

Forecasting

Activities (14 engagement tools)



1. **Combined/Multinational Education**
2. **Combines/Multinational Exercises**
3. **Combined/Multinational Experimentation**
4. **Combined/Multinational Training**
5. **Counter/Non-Proliferation**
6. **Counter Narcotics Assistance**
7. **Defense & Military Contacts**
8. **Defense Support to Public Diplomacy**
9. **Facilities & Infrastructure support projects**
10. **Humanitarian Assistance**
11. **Information Sharing/Intelligence Cooperation**
12. **International Armaments Cooperation**
13. **Security Assistance**
14. **Cross-Cutting Programs**

Findings-- Suggestions



Q1. How should objectives and indicators be written, structured and prioritized?

- Ideally, a comprehensive set of metrics should be identified, where that is not possible indicators should be MOE rather than MOP.
- Beware, decomposition can be endless. “If you can’t measure the objective then you have no objective!”
- Involvement of the analyst in structuring the specific language used in objectives is essential. It must mean something analytically. Embed analyst in the strategy division?
- SME qualitative indicators. Are they valid and consistent between different experts? May not be able to trend the data, there will be limits here. Prefer something that is quantitative but don’t take judgment out of the process.
- Consider prioritizing indicators, on basis of which are most important, not by which are easiest to collect. (Embedded analyst can assist).
- Don’t forget to re-evaluate what indicators you are using. Iraq experience of looking at MOP rather than MOE to assess progress. And reframe the problem at the objective level, reprioritize when necessary, goals should be achievable.

Findings-- Suggestions



Q2. How should a baseline be established and maintained?

- Identify the indicators before looking for data, this allows you to identify gaps in the data you collect.
 - Have to put effort into thinking about inclusive measures – no laundry list
 - End states & steady-states.
- Use, wherever possible, existing government or reliable data sources. Be aware of the origin of data where sources may not be reliable.
 - Be aware of dangers of active verses passive data collection
 - Some indicators useful for forecasting, others not. There will be some universal measures, such as child mortality rates which will be good indicators across a range of objectives.
- Aggregate diverse data elements into composite index. Will show trends.
 - Need correct SMEs to interpret the data. Most data will be messy.
 - If you measure too often you may affect the system.
- If you can't present your data reliably you've failed. Map background and cartographic display and trends work well. For stop-light charts define criteria.

Findings-- Suggestions



Q3. How should developing partner nations' security forces be evaluated and supported?

- Focus on sustainability (institutional change, 15 years)
 - Trust and confidence
 - Build the professional military education school house before going out on the rifle range
 - Target/create/instill/develop the cadre of professionals
- Assessment methods for building security institutions
 - Defense Resource Management Study Project (DRMS) difficult to implement for under-developed institutions
 - Comprehensive baseline surveys must be conducted. E.g. U.S. Country Team or SOF site survey. Consider host nation's security forces – not just military.
 - Can we do that with other U.S. government institutions? Authorities and treaties are issues. Other allies where required.
- Assessment measures must be tailored to each country's unique security requirements, authorities and situation
 - Existing U.S. assessment measures may be considered for establishing baseline or appropriate framework
 - A negotiation on suitable role/end-state for each partner nation's forces
 - Leverage capacity of other allies to help build regional capacity
 - You don't necessarily need a U.S. level of performance to be successful

Findings-- Suggestions



Q4. How would you begin to address analyzing cause and effect?

- Can't easily get to cause and effect. Is measuring effect enough for the COCOMs to make good decisions?
 - Without cause and effect how do we build models?
 - Need to be realistic about the level of perfection that can be achieved, “better than a coin toss” may be an appropriate standard
- Make more structured use of SMEs
 - Use techniques to add scientific rigor to SME contributions: pair-wise comparison, gaming, structured interviews, role-playing, value focused thinking,
 - SME selection remains important, encourage diversity of opinion - groupware
 - Try and think through to potential second & third order effects
- Other techniques that may be valuable
 - Historical analysis, electronic markets, risk-consequence management
 - Near real time data required for insights on causal relationships.
 - Modeling needs to be issue specific, at least initially. Need to be able to look under the hood (no black boxes, we need insights not just answers)
- Need to understand the lag between action and response in the system
 - System dynamics
 - What is the ideal refresh rate for indicators and reframing objectives? It may be different from one indicator or objective to the next.

Findings-- Suggestions



Q5. What is missing from the process?

- Consider the link between the indicators required for the baseline and measuring the effects of activities. Is there a common set?
- Activity Identification is immediately resource constrained
 - Need to identify unconstrained requirement to estimate risk
 - Where in the process do we do the risk evaluation?
- Policy incentives to encourage regional development
 - NATO was a strong incentive for development
- Stronger links between COCOMs and OSD/ PA&E and Policy
 - Understanding resource constraint earlier in the process will assist with assessing IPL requests and creating new authorities, policies and funding vehicles.
- Design new engagement tools to meet regional security challenges
- Potential misalignment of assessment resources to assessment requirements – Continue to prioritize objectives and indicators.

Key Takeaways



- Many of the effects are potentially unquantifiable (and will remain so). The challenge remains informing decision makers given this constraint.
- Interagency analytical resources can assist and are essential
 - National Institute of Justice
 - Office of Military Affairs at USAID
- Don't just accept objectives or rush to create them. Need to focus on shaping objectives as well as measuring progress. Reframe.
- IW analysis will affect traditional analytical paradigms
 - Messy data
 - Cause & Effect
 - No easy “one-size-fits-all” toolset
- Effective Security Cooperation exceeds the boundaries of DoD's authorities and capabilities
 - An obvious statement but it applies to the analytic community too