



THE FUND FOR PEACE

Measuring Progress in COIN

Military Operations Research Society Workshop
Improving Coordination Among Nations for Irregular Warfare Analysis

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The Fund for Peace (FfP)

Founded in 1957, The Fund for Peace's mission is to prevent war by alleviating the conditions that cause war.

For four decades, the FfP focused primarily on reducing tensions with the Soviet Union.

In 1996, the FfP shifted towards a search for solutions to dangers posed by a new class of threats - those stemming from weak and failing states.




The Fund for Peace



Successful COIN End State

A successful COIN campaign will ultimately leave behind the end state of *sustainable security* (safe and secure environment)



Sustainable Security

Sustainable Security means that a state:

- Maintains physical control of its territory without outside assistance
- Maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
- Is perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of the population
- Provides domestic security and reasonable public services
- Interacts with other states as a full member of the international community

Methodological Issues in Measurement

- **Data Retrieval: Both Quality and Quantity**
- **Data Sources: Quantitative, Content Analysis, Polls/Surveys, Experts**
- **Frameworks and Definitions**
- **Program Requirements: end user needs, level of analysis, timeframe**
- **Functional objectives: Strategic/operational or tactical analysis; assessment vs forecasting; planning, training, operational info; budgeting; war-gaming, hypothesis-testing; developing effects-based metrics**
- **Level of analysis (closely related to functional objectives): 30,000 ft level or ground level?**
- **Stove-Piping: Repetition can be good or bad but are we re-inventing wheel?**
- **Bias: Hidden values, coding bias, assumption of “rationality,” filtering, language problems**



Examples of Frameworks for Measuring Progress in COIN Operations

CAST

Conflict Assessment System Tool

MPICE

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

CAST



Adopts an Immunological Approach

- **Views internal conflict as a “pathology” of the state**
- **Measures intensity of clusters of known symptoms**

Measuring Conflict Risk and Mapping Progress

CAST measures the risk or vulnerability of a country to have internal conflict and maps trends in countries emerging from conflict

Two clusters of factors examined:

1. Drivers of Conflict (Twelve Indicators)
2. State Capacity to Cope (Core Five Institutions)

CAST performs baseline assessments prior to an intervention and tracks progress over time, including second and third-order effects.

Twelve Conflict Indicators

Intensity of quantitative and qualitative indicators is rated on a scale of 0-10

Social Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political/Military Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law & Widespread Violation of Human Rights
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

Core Five Assessment

Evaluates the capacity of key state institutions to solve the country's internal problems peacefully

1. Police Force and Corrections System
2. Civil Service or Professional Bureaucracy
3. Judicial system
4. Military
5. Leadership (Executive & Legislative)

Core Five Assessment

State Institutions should be

- ✓ **Legitimate**
Accepted or perceived by local population
- ✓ **Representative**
Not dominated by any single group or faction
- ✓ **Professional**
Competent to fulfill their functions

STINGS

Unanticipated factors that can accelerate or decelerate campaign efforts

- Surprises (e.g., commodity price collapse)
- Triggers (e.g., assassinations, coups d'etat, rigged elections)
- Idiosyncrasies (e.g., non-contiguous geographical territory)
- National Temperaments (e.g., cultural or religious perspectives)
- Spoilers (e.g., disgruntled followers, excluded parties)

CAST Automated Computer Tool



Examples of Inputs



Importer

Available full text articles are imported for each area and the date of the article is tagged to allow for creation of trend lines

Reader

Articles are scanned using Boolean phrases and proximity tokens to determine their relation to each indicator or sub-indicator (measure) of the CAST methodology

Filter

The analyst can add filter words based on their review or knowledge to make the CAST scores more accurate

Parser

Separates the geographical area into sub-unites to enable provincial and municipal-level analysis

Calculator

Scores are computed for the indicators & measures using a customizable and expandable set of algorithms

Reporter

Produces various, customized reports from processed data

Content Analysis


Viewer

Results from the CAST Reader can be viewed by the analyst to determine their relevancy and meaning


Editor

The analyst can also edit the phrases used by the Reader and reprocess the articles to add specific words or phrases used in a geographic area.


Desktop Tools



Area Map



Conflict Map



Trend Lines

- Recommended Strategic Shaping Options
1. Deploy JTF Headquarters-Forward to area
 2. Employ reconnaissance assets to the area
 3. Increase military exchanges and staff visits to area
 4. Conduct aircraft fly-overs

Options List

Examples of Outputs

CAST's Viewer

The screenshot displays the 'Viewer' application window. On the left, the 'View Information' panel includes dropdown menus for 'Area' (Ghana 2001), 'Sub Area' (National), 'Observation' (1 - Mounting Demographic Pressures), and 'Group' (152 - Land Scarcity). It also shows 'Data View' (All Matches), 'Area Count' (3), and date filters for 'From' (1/ 1/2001) and 'To' (11/30/2001). Below this, 'Area Filter Totals' shows 1569 for 'Area Count Filter' and 2285 for 'Area Word Filter', with a combined total of 2056 (4/2056 (0.195%)). The 'Measure' is set to 'Land Scarcity'. A 'Phrase ID' of 945 is selected with a 'Match' of 'Yes'. The search criteria are: "land dispute" or "land disputes" or "land ownership disputes". The 'Hits' section shows 1/4 (Match) with navigation buttons. At the bottom, it indicates 'Documents: 2445 (0.164%) Match' and a checked 'Show Other Countries' option, along with buttons for 'Retrieve', 'Save', 'Delete', 'Filter...', and 'Close'.

DocID: {0001BAFC-27E4-4D32-876F-B935264F90C8}

Document | Reports

Date: 12/10/2001 Source: AFRICA NEWS SERVICE Sources...

parcels of land were the subject of a litigation between the chief who allocated the land to him and another chief whose land shares a boundary with that of Mr. Mensah's chief. According to Mr Mensah, the people said they were acting under the instructions of Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the present Asantehene. Mr. Mensah is in a quandary. He cannot tell whether those people were actually instructed by Otumfuo or whether they are imposters misusing the name of the Asantehene. And he does not see how he can seek audience with Otumfuo to find out the truth or otherwise of what the people told him. In any case, other lessees have built houses or are in the process of completing them. What he knows is that he went through all the proper channels and processes to acquire his plot and he does not see why and how anybody can stop him from developing it on some dubious claim of a **land dispute** or of instructions from Otumfuo. MULTIPLE ALLOCATION Mr. Mensah does not believe that his local chief has indulged in double or multiple allocation of the same plot. After all, none of the people who came to him claimed the same plot as theirs. Of course, Mr. Mensah's case of interference in the enjoyment of his lawfully acquired property is not unique. Disputes over building plots continue to bedevil the country. Such disputes have often resulted in violent clashes resulting in serious injury or even death in some cases. Today, the term 'land guard' has entered our vocabulary and it conjures up frightening images of lawlessness, fear and bloodshed. The unscrupulousness and greed of certain chiefs and family heads have led to **land disputes** in some cases. Such chiefs and family heads sell a plot to more than one person and such double or multiple sales cause trouble as the different claimants either resort to the law or take the law into their own hands by hiring land guards. Some chiefs try to take away a portion of the plot they have allocated on the grounds that the plot is too big, as if they had their eyes closed when the layout was being planned. Some chiefs have even reportedly sliced away large portions of school land in order to sell them to those willing and ready to put dwelling houses on them. Sometimes, when a chief dies, his successor, out of greed, tries to nullify the allocation of his predecessor. All sorts of unfair charges of wrongful allocation are trumped up and lessees with proper leases are asked to submit them for inspection. SUCCESSOR CHIEFS Sometimes, even when there is nothing wrong, the successor chief simply asks for more money for that very plot. Some chiefs unilaterally and illegally rezone plots allocated for, say, the dumping of garbage, schools and open spaces. Even swampy or greenbelt areas do not escape the greed of such chiefs and family heads. Also blameable are some officials of the Lands Department who reportedly collude with unscrupulous chiefs or people seeking plots to put up houses. They cause files to disappear or alter the documents so that land that is already allocated to someone is declared vacant. Such shady and unlawful transfer of land already allocated leads to trouble and endless litigation. It is a safe assumption that every normal being in this country

Hits: 1/4 (Match) << < Back Next > >>

Documents: 2445 (0.164%) Match Show Other Countries Retrieve Save Delete Filter... Close


Assessing Pressures on the State

Indicators

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures	9.0	9.5	9.2	8.7	9.2
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons	8.5	9.5	9.2	8.7	8.8
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia	9.0	8.9	8.5	8.5	9.0
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight	8.0	7.7	7.5	7.3	7.0
5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines	8.2	7.7	7.5	7.5	7.5
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline	9.0	8.5	8.2	8.0	7.7
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State	9.0	8.5	8.2	8.3	8.8
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services	9.5	9.2	8.9	8.5	8.5
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of Human Rights	9.8	9.5	9.0	8.7	9.0
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"	9.5	8.7	8.5	8.5	9.0
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites	9.0	8.7	8.7	7.6	8.0
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors	9.5	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
Totals:	108.0	106.4	103.4	100.3	102.5


Assessment: Trends Over Time

CAST Indicator Totals




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Assessment: Capacities



Mapping Sudan to Sweden

Strong = Good



Weak = Bad

Amount of Pressure on the State
(Indicator Totals)

Low = Good

High = Bad



CAST Adapted: MPICE

Measuring
Progress
In
Conflict
Environments

Partners:



CAST Adapted: MPICE

MPICE is a collaborative effort sponsored by DoD. Its goal is to create a broad, interagency framework and software tool for measuring progress (or lack thereof) in conflict and post-conflict environments to assist in formulating policy and implementing strategic plans.

For this effort, CAST has been adapted to the MPICE framework based on the “Viable Peace,” a midpoint on a continuum between a collapsed state, on one end, and Sustainable Security at the other end.

MPICE: Framework Design

Like CAST, MPICE is a framework that assists in identifying sources of continuing violent conflict and instability and in evaluating the capacities of core state institutions to overcome them. Instead of 12/5 framework, MPICE measures progress along five sectors or logistical lines of operations (LLOs):

- Political Moderation and Stable Democracy
- Security
- The Rule of Law
- Economic Sustainability
- Social Well-being


MPICE: Framework Design

Stages of Conflict Transformation and Stabilization

Stage 0: Drivers of violent conflict persist, requiring the active and robust international presence (Imposed stability)

Stage I: Drivers of violent conflict are reduced to the extent that they can begin to be managed by indigenous institutions, enabling reduction international assistance to sustainable levels (Viable Peace)

Stage II: Local institutions are able to resolve internal disputes peacefully without international assistance (**Sustainable Security** or self-sustaining peace)



Summing Up

Both frameworks provide:

- Quantitative and qualitative indicators
- Long-term view of the lifecycle of a conflict
- Ways to measure the drivers of conflict
- An assessment of local conditions and institutions
- An assessment of second and third-order effects
- An appreciation of unintended consequences
- Understanding of regional, trans-border, sub-national dynamics and spill-over effects

Summing Up

Both frameworks provide:

- Risk Assessment at National, Provincial, and Municipal Levels
- Early Warning through Trend Analysis
- Measures Effectiveness of Peace Operations
- Tests the Impact of Mitigating Options
- Provides a Framework for Interagency Cooperation
- Training Tool for Simulations and Scenarios