

# **Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon**

**Post 24 August 2006 JROC**

## **Joint Land Operations**

The ability to employ joint forces to achieve military objectives within the Land Domain. Such operations include offensive operations, defensive operations, and/or stability operations. Joint Land operations will require the Regional Component Commander (RCC) to employ joint forces to engage adversaries across the spectrum of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. They are conducted as part of a campaign or major joint operation and extend across the full range of military joint operations (ROMO). Joint land operations can include operational maneuver from strategic and operational distances to directly attack centers of gravity in order to achieve the joint force commander's desired objectives. Close combat is a fundamental capability for successful joint land operations across the greater part of the ROMO. Joint Land Operations can include maneuver and engagement in order to destroy opposing forces, secure key terrain, control vital lines of communications, or to establish local or regional military superiority. Ultimately, Joint Land Operations seek to control territory, populations, and resources, which may require a long term commitment, in order to achieve national objectives. (Modified from JP 1-02)

**Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver** – The ability to dispose joint forces to impact the conduct of operations by either securing positional advantages or a mobility differential before battle is joined, or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. Operational Mobility includes Land Force Movement, Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances and Intra-theater operational maneuver. (Revised from UJTL, CJCSM 3500.04C)

**Provide and Employ Joint Fires** – The ability to provide and employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Joint fires refer to all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, and artillery, as well as other nonlethal means against enemy targets. Employment of Joint Fires is inextricably linked to the ability to conduct decisive maneuver. (Revised from UJTL, CJCSM 3500.04C)

**Conduct Decisive Maneuver** – The ability to apply ground forces supported by air, sea, and space to conduct simultaneous, distributed operations against enemy critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. It is characterized by continuous operations and controlled operational tempo that seeks to decisively resolve the outcome of battles and engagements through close combat with enemy forces. The ability to close with, and destroy the enemy. (Derived from TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0)

**Control Territory, Populations, and Resources** – The ability and desired endstate of controlling territory, populations, and resources during offensive or defensive operations, or as part of Stability Operations (SSTRO), includes management of EPWs, detainees, indigenous displaced persons, and/or refugees. (JCA Working Group definition; derived from Army FM 3-0, Dominant Land operations, pg. 1-6)

**Conduct Detainee Operations** – The ability to detain certain categories of persons, including unlawful enemy combatants and security internees. It includes the management of Detention facilities, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centers, and detainee reporting requirements within the Joint Area of Operations. (Derived from JP 3-63, Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations, in final coordination)

**Conduct Refugee Operations** – The ability to manage persons seeking refuge in another country to escape persecution. JCA Working Group Definition, 14/15 Mar 06)

**Manage Indigenous Displaced Persons** – The ability to manage persons who have been forced to leave their home for reasons such as religious or political persecution of war, but have not crossed an international border. JCA Working Group Definition, 14/15 Mar 06)

**Manage Enemy Prisoners of War** – The ability to manage detained persons as defined in Articles in Article 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention who are captured while engaged in combat under orders of their government. (JP 1-02)

## **Joint Maritime/Littoral Operations**

The ability to employ joint forces through the maritime/littoral domain to achieve military objectives. Such operations may include destruction of

enemy naval and coastal forces, expeditionary/amphibious operations and support, control of strategic approaches, establishment of local military superiority, control of maritime commerce, and the conduct and support of operations throughout the theater. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Surface Warfare** – The ability to conduct maritime operations in order to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Offensive Surface Warfare** – The ability to use the environment, geography, disposition of forces, passive sensors, maneuvering, and coordination of weapons to damage or destroy an enemy's capability before the enemy is able to harm own forces or impede missions. (Modified NWP 3-20.3)

**Defensive Surface Warfare** – The ability to use of the environment, geography, disposition of forces, passive sensors, maneuvering, and coordination of weapons to damage or destroy an enemy's capability after the enemy is in a position to harm own forces or missions. (Modified NWP 3-20.3)

**Undersea Warfare (USW)** – The ability to conduct operations to establish battlespace dominance in the underwater environment, which permits friendly forces to accomplish the full range of potential missions and denies an opposing force the effective use of underwater systems and weapons. It includes offensive and defensive subsurface, antisubmarine, and mine warfare operations. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Antisubmarine Warfare** – The ability to conduct operations that deny the enemy the effective use of submarines by neutralizing them at the time and place of our choosing and by protecting friendly maneuver areas. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Subsurface Warfare** – The ability to conduct offensive, defensive, disruptive, and supporting/enabling operations (other than ASW/MIW) from beneath the ocean's surface, including anti-access and area-denial environments, while denying an adversary or opposing force exploitation of this medium. (New Definition)

**Mine Warfare** – The ability to employ mines and mine countermeasures for strategic, operational, and tactical purposes. Mine warfare includes the laying of mines to degrade the enemy's capabilities to wage land/air/maritime warfare, and the countering of enemy-laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land or sea areas. (Modified JP 3-15)

**Mine Countermeasures (MCM)** – The ability to conduct offensive and defensive measures for countering a mine threat, including the prevention of enemy mine laying. MCM includes any actions taken to counter the effectiveness of and/or reduce the probability of damage to surface ships and craft or submarines from underwater mines. (NWP 3-15)

**Mining** – The ability to conduct operations to support the broad task of establishing and maintaining control of essential sea areas, and embrace all methods whereby naval mines are used to inflict damage on enemy shipping and/or hinder, disrupt, and deny enemy sea operations. Mines may be employed either offensively or defensively to restrict the movement of surface ships, submarines, and underwater/littoral systems and personnel. (Modified NWP 3-15)

**Maritime Interdiction** – The ability to conduct operations by other than air or missile means to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy's military potential and/or infrastructure before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or noncombatants. (Modified JP 3-03)

**Sea lines Of Communication (SLOC) Disruption** – Activities or operations conducted in the maritime environment that disrupt or destroy sea and air routes that connect an opposing military force with its source of sustainment. (New JP3-03)

**Maritime Interception Operations** – The ability to employ maritime assets in order to enforce sanctions or national policies imposed unilaterally by a state, multilaterally by two or more states or as directed by the United Nations Security Council. (NTTP 3-07.11)

**Maritime/Littoral Expeditionary Operations** – The ability to conduct operations requiring immediate deployment / employment of forces into remote or austere environments. Characteristics of expeditionary operations are tailored forces, forward deployed, rapid deployment, expeditionary basing at sea and ashore, forcible entry, and sustainment. (Modified USMC Warfare Publication)

**Amphibious Force Operations** – The ability to launch/conduct military operations from the sea by amphibious/expeditionary forces with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission - to include an assault,

raid, withdrawal and demonstration as well as sustained operations ashore. (Modified JP1-02)

**Riverine Operations** – The ability to conduct operations that cope with and exploit the unique characteristics of a riverine area, to include locating/destroying hostile forces and achieving/maintaining control of riverine areas. Joint riverine operations combine land, naval, and air operations, as appropriate, and are suited to the nature of the specific riverine area in which operations are to be conducted. (Modified JP1-02)

**Advance Force Operations** – The ability to conduct temporary missions in preparation for and support of major missions or amphibious operations in a given objective area (reconnaissance, survey, seizure of supporting positions, minesweeping, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, setting underwater infrastructure, etc.). (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Maritime/Littoral Fires** – The ability to provide fires by maritime gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. (Modified JP 3-02)

**Naval Fire Support** – Fires provided by naval surface gun or missile systems in support of joint forces. (Modified JP 3-02)

**Ocean/Hydro/River Survey & Support Operations** – The ability to conduct surface and subsurface operations that collect, or enable the collection of, unique environmental conditions in support real time and future operations (i.e. hydrographic, bathymetric, tidal, acoustic, traffic-ability, surface and subsurface conditions). (New definition).

## **Joint Air Operations**

The ability to employ joint forces to achieve military objectives within and through the air domain. Such operations include those to establish local air superiority, provide missile defense, assault support operations and execute strikes. (JP 1-02, derived from “Air Control Operations”)

**Offensive Counterair Operations** – The ability to conduct offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close to their source as possible. Offensive counterair operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. These

operations include attack operations, fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defenses. Also called OCA. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)** – The ability to conduct an activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Offensive Counterair Sweep** – The ability to conduct offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in an allotted area of operations. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Escort** – The ability to conduct operations with aircraft assigned to protect other friendly aircraft and/or ground forces. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Offensive Counterair Attack Operations** – The ability to conduct offensive action in support of the offensive counterair mission against surface targets that contribute to the enemy's air power capabilities. The objective of attack operations is to prevent the hostile use of aircraft and missile forces by attacking targets such as missile launch sites, airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes, munitions stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure. Attack operations may be performed by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-surface weapons, special operations forces, or ground forces. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Strategic Attack** – The ability to conduct an offensive action against a vital target(s), whether military, political, economic, or other, specifically selected to achieve NCA or combatant commander's strategic objectives/effects. (Modified JP 3-0, Chap IV, para 3f)

Note: Strategic Attack is a subset of Global Strike, as seen in Joint Strategic Deterrence JCA.

**Conventional Kinetic** – All Strategic Attack efforts that do not include the employment of nuclear weapons. (No direct source; proposed to differentiate blast/fragmentation effects from radiation or RF spectrum disruption).

**Air Interdiction** – The ability to conduct operations to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Tactical Air Support** – The ability to conduct air operations carried out in coordination with surface forces and which directly assist land or maritime operations. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Close Air Support** – The ability to conduct air actions by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (Modified JP 1-02)

**Assault Support** – The ability for aircraft to provide tactical mobility and logistical support to joint forces. (Derived from MCWP 3-2 “Assault Support”)

## **Joint Space Operations**

The ability to employ joint forces across all domains to achieve national objectives in, from and/or through space. (Derived from JP 3-14).

*Key stakeholders in the joint and Service communities want to ensure the ability to map the four mission areas identified in JP 3-14 (i.e. space control, space force application, space force enhancement and space support) to the taxonomy and lexicon. Between the definitions and NOTES below, these critical concerns should be addressed.*

**Space Control** – The ability to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, denies freedom of action in space to an adversary. It may involve activities conducted by land, sea, air space, and/or special operations forces. (JP 3-14)

*NOTE: Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a set of required capabilities necessary to conduct space operations, especially space control operations. SSA capabilities are covered under the Joint Battlespace Awareness and Joint Command and Control JCAs.*

**Space Force Application** – The ability to conduct combat operations, in through and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict. (JP 3-14)

*NOTE: In JP 3-14, space force enhancement includes: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA); satellite communications (SATCOM); position, navigation and timing (PNT) and environmental monitoring. These components are covered in the following JCAs:*

- *ISR and environmental monitoring are covered in the Joint Battlespace Awareness JCA*
- *ITW/AA is covered in Joint Battlespace Awareness and Joint Command and Control JCAs*
- *SATCOM is covered in the Joint Net-Centric Operations JCA under “Information Transport”*
- *PNT is covered under the Joint Command and Control JCA under the Tier 2A “Access/Integrate Geospatial Information”*

*NOTE: In JP 3-14, space support is defined as, “The ability to deploy and sustain military and intelligence space systems in space. This ability includes launching and deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit and deorbiting and recovering space vehicles, if required.” The Space Support function is covered in the Joint Logistics JCA. Under Joint Logistics JCA, “Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution” covers the launch portions of space support and “Agile Sustainment” covers satellite operations, on-orbit servicing of spacecraft and reconstitution.*

## **Joint Access & Access Denial Operations**

The ability to conduct military operations across any domain, opposed or unopposed, to gain or deny freedom of action within a given battle space. (Modified JFEO JIC)

**Forcible Entry** – The ability to conduct a military operation in the face of expected armed opposition to gain entry of ground forces into an operational area in order to establish a lodgment to enable the conduct of follow-on operations. (Modified JFEO CBA)

**LOC Protection** – The ability to conduct activities or operations to protect land, sea, air, space, and cyber routes that connect an operating military force with its source of sustainment. (Modified JP1-02)

**Contingency Basing** – The ability to station forces or supplies for varying periods of time at land-based overseas facilities. (Modified “Forward Deployed” definition from MCRP 5-12)

**Sea Basing** – The ability to rapidly deploy and project combat power from the sea, provide continuous support/sustainment/force protection to joint expeditionary forces, provide expanded operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access & entry without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operating Area. (Sea basing JIC 24 June 2005)

**Freedom of Navigation** – The ability to provide required forces to conduct operations to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate the global commons (air, sea, space and cyberspace routes). (Modified JP1-02)

**Counter Operational Mobility** – A belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation. (Modified NWP 1-14M)

## **Joint Information Operations**

The ability to conduct operations using the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities\*, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)

*Supporting Capabilities: Information Assurance, Physical Security, Counterintelligence, and Visual Information Activities -- This list is not all-inclusive.*

*Related Capabilities: Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy -- This list is not all-inclusive.*

**Electronic Warfare (EW)** – The ability of the military to use electromagnetic energy and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1 and JP 1-02)

**Electronic Attack** – The ability to use electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Electronic Protection** – The ability to protect (using passive and active means) personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Electronic Warfare Support** – The ability to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Computer Network Operations (CNO)** – The ability to conduct computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling operations. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)

**Computer Network Attack** – The ability to conduct operations that disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and computer networks themselves. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Computer Network Defense** – The ability to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Computer Network Exploitation** – The ability for intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)

**Operations Security (OPSEC)** – The ability to identify critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a) identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b) determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; c) select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (Derived from DRAFT DoDD 3600.1)

**Military Deception (MILDEC)** – The ability to execute actions to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (Derived from DRAFT JP 3-58)

**Psychological Operations (PSYOP)** – The ability to conduct planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,

and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (Derived from JP 1-02)

### **Stability Operations: Military support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)**

The ability to conduct military and civilian activities across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states or regions. Military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) are Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. (DODD 3000.05 Military Support for SSTR Operations)

**Security** – The ability to establish and maintain protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influence. It includes reinforcing the perception of security by the populace. (Derived from definition #2 of the JP 1.02)

**Peace Operations** – The capability to conduct a broad range of activities encompassing peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (JP 3-07.3); (JP 1-02)

**Basic Services Restoration** – The ability to establish or reestablish the critical infrastructure necessary to ensure the immediate safety and security of the local populace. These activities, most likely military led, must ensure the functioning of basic services to include emergency response capabilities such as internal security forces, medical, fire, and the restoration of basic services such as power, communications, water and the reopening of critical local businesses. Restoration operations become the starting point for the international community to support reconstruction efforts. (Paraphrased from Stability Operations JOC, para 2.d.3, p 23.and 2.d.4 p 26, and JP 3-57 CMO)

**Humanitarian Assistance** – The ability to support those programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters (to include war) or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign

humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 3-07.6)

**Reconstruction** – The ability to rebuild the critical systems or infrastructure (i.e. physical, power, communications, economic, justice, governance, societal) necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance. It includes addressing the root cause of the conflict. Reconstruction is likely to be a civil led effort. (Derived from Stability Ops Working Group)

## **Joint Special Operations & Irregular Warfare**

The ability to conduct operations that apply or counter means other than direct, traditional forms of combat involving peer-to-peer fighting between the regular armed forces of two or more countries. The ability to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies, and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Special Operations** – The ability of specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces to conduct operations in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities that are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently of or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies. They may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Also called SO. (Derived from JP 1-02).

**Special Reconnaissance** – The ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance actions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or

operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Also called SR. (Derived from JP 3-05; JP 1-02)

**Direct Action** – The ability to conduct short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions using unconventional tactics, techniques, procedures, and forces in a hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environment. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk. Also called DA. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Counterterrorism** – The ability to conduct offensive measures to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Derived from JP 3-05)

**Unconventional Warfare** – The ability to conduct clandestine military or paramilitary operations in a hostile or non-permissive environment primarily by surrogate or indigenous forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed by an external source to achieve an identified endstate. It includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Civil-Military Operations** – The ability to conduct activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. (Derived from JP 3-57; JP 1-02)

**Irregular Warfare** – The ability to conduct warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may apply the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will. Also called IW. (QDR Execution Roadmap for Irregular Warfare).

**Counterinsurgency** – The ability to conduct military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Foreign Internal Defense** – The ability to participate in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Derived from JP 1-02)

## **Joint Global Deterrence**

The ability to prevent aggression or coercion threatening vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. It involves activities to convince adversaries not to take courses of action that have grievous results by means of decisive influence over their decision making. (Derived from the Strategic Deterrence JOC, Feb 04)

**Global Strike** – The ability to rapidly plan and deliver limited-duration attacks using the full range of kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic capabilities to achieve a range of desired effects against highly valued adversary assets regardless of range or access. (Derived from Strategic Deterrence JOC, Feb 04)

**Nuclear, Kinetic** – The ability to execute an integrated operational nuclear plan or series of sequential plans (predicated on commonly agreed strategic objectives) as a prerequisite to unity and, hence, economy of effort. (Derived from JP 3-12)

**Non-Kinetic** – The ability to create an operational effect using capabilities that do not rely upon explosives or physical momentum. Among these capabilities are: Information Operations, Space Control, Influence Operations, Strategic Communications, and Directed Energy Weapons (i.e. High Power Microwave, Laser, and EMP). (JP 3-13, JP 3-14, and JP1-02)

**Responsive Infrastructure** – The ability to conduct research and development and provide an industrial infrastructure for developing, building, and maintaining strategic offense forces and defensive systems. This includes the research facilities, manufacturing capacity, and skilled personnel needed to develop, produce, field, sustain, and modernize the elements of the new triad into an integrated strategic force as well as the supporting intelligence and command and control capabilities. (Mod NPR 2001 and NPR Implementer 2003)

**Inducements** – The ability to influence or mitigate an adversary's consequences of restraint. It includes the analytic capability to measure or model the effects of various courses of action and select the best

options. For example, shared early warning provided by the U.S. to a potential adversary could influence them to restrain themselves from taking an unconsidered (or inappropriate) reaction to U.S. or third-party activity. Shared early warning would mitigate the adversary's risk of being pre-empted. Another example may be an adversary's decision to forgo WMD ownership in response to U.S. Global Deterrence efforts. To mitigate the adversary's consequences of restraint, the U.S. can provide assistance in safely transporting, securing, dewatering or neutralizing WMD. (Strategic Deterrence JOC, Feb 2004)

## **Defense Support of Civil Authorities**

Often referred to as Civil Support, DSCA is the ability to provide DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department's career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05)

**Military Assistance of Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)** – The ability to provide a mission set of civil support involving DOD support, normally based on the direction of the President, to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order. The ability to provide forces and equipment to support the several states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories and possessions to restore and maintain law and order by suppressing insurrections, rebellions, riots and domestic violence. While normally based at the direction of the President with the consent of the Governor, in rare cases this mission may be performed without a Governor's consent to enforce Federal laws. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05; Homeland Security JOC, Feb 05)

**Military Assistance to Civil Authorities** – The ability to provide forces, equipment or training to support the Principal Federal Official (PFO) of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) on an as-requested, as-available, usually reimbursable basis. Examples include, but are not limited to, mitigating the effects of natural or man-made disasters, wild land firefighting and CBRNE consequence management. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05; Homeland Security JOC, Feb 04)

**Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)** – The ability to provide a mission set of DOD support to civil authorities

that include to civilian law enforcement agencies. This includes, but is not limited to: combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, border patrol augmentation, and critical infrastructure protection. The ability to provide forces, equipment or training to support civilian Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies. Examples include, but are not limited to, counter-drug operations, border patrol augmentation, and critical infrastructure protection. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05; Homeland Security JOC, Feb 04)

**Emergency Preparedness (EP)** – The ability to ensure DoD and U.S. Government processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and Secretary of Defense in a designated National Security Emergency. These missions consist of Continuity of Operations (COOP), Continuity of Government (COG), and other missions as directed by the President. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05; Homeland Security JOC, Feb 04)

## **Joint Homeland Defense**

The ability to protect U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05)

**Air & Space Defense** – The ability to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat air, missile, and space threats against the Homeland. [Homeland Security (HLS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Feb 04]

**Land Defense** – The ability to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat land threats against the Homeland. [Homeland Security (HLS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Feb 04]

**Maritime Defense** – The ability to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat maritime threats against the Homeland. [Homeland Security (HLS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Feb 04]

**Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)** – The ability to identify, assess, and enhance the security of physical assets, cyber assets, and associated infrastructures essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. (Derived from Homeland Security (HLS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Feb 04)

## **Joint Protection**

The process, set of activities, or utilization of capabilities by which the Joint Force prevents/mitigates adverse effects on personnel (combatant/non-combatant), physical assets, and information of the United States, allies and friends, required to ensure fighting potential can be applied at the decisive time and place against the full spectrum of threats. The Joint Force will achieve this through the tailored selection and application of multi-layered, active and passive, lethal and non-lethal, offensive and defensive measures, within all domains, across the range of military operations, based on assessment of acceptable level of risk. (Modified from Protection Joint Functional Concept (JFC), Jun 04).

**Protect Against Conventional Weapons** – The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to designated personnel, physical assets, and information from conventional weapons. (New definition provided by Joint Protection working group (JCA Offsite Dec 04)).

**Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat** – The ability to reduce or eliminate the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition Forces, including policy, resourcing, materiel, technology, training, operations, information, intelligence, assessment, and research aimed at reducing or eliminating the effects of all forms of IEDs used against U.S. and Coalition forces and specifically includes the following:

- Defeat of the IED – The ability to reduce the effects of IED detonations for safe operations including route clearance, device neutralization explosive detection, military explosive ordnance disposal, and vehicle and personnel protection. (DoDD 2000.19E, Feb 06).
- Defeat of the IED System – The ability to reduce the effects and interrupt the insurgent chain of IED activities through intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, device technical and forensic exploitation, disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance, and persistent surveillance. (DoDD 2000.19E, Feb 06).
- Training the Force – The ability to mitigate the effects of insurgent IED employment through, but not limited to, multi-echelon training, technology training, information management and dissemination, strategic communications, and doctrinal and institutional training changes. (DoDD 2000.19E, Feb 06).

**Integrated Air and Missile Defense** – The ability to provide integrated air and missile defense and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US national interests, protect the Joint force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to achieve adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. The threat set for this capability area includes adversary: Space-based and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; Ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs); cruise missiles (air, land, sea, and sub-surface launched); aircraft (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons, airships, etc); indirect fire rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); C2 nodes, battle management processes, and organizations used to employ adversary air and missile threats; launch sites, airfields, delivery platforms, and targeting sensors; munitions, supplies, and infrastructure supporting adversary air and missile threat potential. (Modified from the IAMD JIC – 10 Dec 04).

**Defensive Counterair Operations** – The ability to conduct defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Also called DCA. (Modified JP 1-02).

**Theater Ballistic Missile Defense** – The ability to integrate joint force capabilities to destroy enemy theater ballistic missiles in flight or to otherwise disrupt the enemy’s theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense; active missile defense; and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence measures. Enemy theater ballistic missiles are those that are aimed at targets outside the continental United States. (Modified JP 1-02 definition of Joint Theater Missile Defense).

**Global Defense** – The ability to protect the Homeland, the joint force, and national capabilities from adverse effects originating from extended ranges or targeted against globally distributed capabilities. (Global Deterrence Working Group definition (JCA Offsite Dec 04)).

**Personnel Recovery** – Operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm’s way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival; evasion; resistance; and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by

nongovernmental organizations, other U.S. government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these. (JP 1-02).

**Protect Against WMD Threat** – The ability to integrate and synchronize the dynamic activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. Government counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management efforts to counter WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**WMD Consequence Management** – The ability to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack or event and restore essential operations and services at home and abroad. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Non-proliferation** – The ability to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or the distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Threat Reduction and Cooperation** – Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a State’s existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Counterproliferation** – The ability to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, partners and allies. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Elimination Operations** – Military operations to locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a State or non-State actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in non-permissive environments. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Interdiction Operations** – Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems and associated technologies, materials and expertise from transiting between States, and between State and non-State actors of proliferation concern in any environment. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Active Defense** – Military measures to prevent or defeat the delivery of WMD. Measures include offensive and defensive, conventional or unconventional actions to detect, divert, and destroy an adversary’s WMD and/or delivery means while en route to their target. (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Passive Defense** – Measures to minimize or negate the vulnerability and effects of WMD employed against U.S. and partner Armed Forces as well as U.S. military interests, installations, and critical infrastructure.” (Derived from National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Feb 06).

**Protect Against Terrorist Threat** – The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to designated personnel, physical assets, and information from terrorist acts. (New definition from Force Protection working group (JCA Offsite – Dec 04)).

**Physical security** – That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. See communications security; security. (JP 1-02).

**Protection From Exploitation** – The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects to designated personnel and physical assets information from enemy actions and to take full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. (Modified from JP 1-02).

## **Joint Net-Centric Operations**

The ability to exploit all human and technical elements of the joint force and its mission partners by fully integrating collected information, awareness, knowledge, experience, and decision making, enabled by secure access and distribution, to achieve a high level of agility and effectiveness in a dispersed, decentralized, dynamic and/or uncertain operational environment. (Derived from Net-Centric Environment JFC)

**Information Transport** – The ability to provide the physical communications media over which assured connectivity takes place, supported by switching and routing systems, and the computing infrastructure. (Derived from NCE JFC)

**Network Management** – The ability to provide the network with the desired level of quality, agility, and trustworthiness. NM focuses on the configuration, availability, performance and manageability of network services and the underlying physical assets that provide end-user services, as well as connectivity to enterprise application services. (Derived for Joint Concept of Ops for GIG NetOps)

**Information Assurance** – The ability to provide the measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (DoD Directive 8500.1, Information Assurance)

**Enterprise Services** – The ability to provide well-defined, enterprise network functions that accept a request and return a response through an interface with a user or another service such as collaboration, messaging, or information discovery and storage. (Derived from NCOE JIC)

**Applications** – The ability to provide a locally resident software program or group of programs that interfaces directly with Joint Force decision-makers and communities of interest, which carries out generalized or mission-specific tasks or processes for which a computer is used, i.e., word processing, spreadsheets, graphics, database management, and communications packages. (Derived from NCOE JIC)

**Knowledge Management** – The ability to systematically discover, select, organize, distill, share, develop, and use information in a social domain context to improve warfighter effectiveness. (Derived from NCOE JIC)

## **Joint Logistics**

The ability to provide effective, responsive, and efficient movement and sustainment capacity; exercise control from end to end; and provide certainty to the supported Joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time in all domains. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, December 2003).

**Joint Deployment/Rapid Distribution** – The ability to deliver mission ready, tailored forces and sustainment globally and on time for the full

range of military operations. (Derived from Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept; Campaign Plan for Integrating Joint Deployment and Global Distribution, version 2.3).

**Agile Sustainment** – The ability to provide materiel, facilities, services, and other support to maintain readiness and enable operations until successful accomplishment of the defined mission or national objective. (Derived from JP 1-02).

**Operational Engineering** – The ability to provide effective, efficient, responsive and tailored engineer support to plan, design, construct, acquire, and maintain the temporary and permanent infrastructure needed to project combat power and sustain forces. (Derived from Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept).

**Force Health Protection** – The ability to synchronize, prioritize and direct medical operations. It includes control of a total life cycle health system that employs an integrated and focused approach to protect and sustain the force by providing rapid Joint, interoperable and scalable medical capabilities in all operational environments. The core capability areas are casualty management, patient movement, medical logistics, surveillance, intelligence, preventive medicine and human performance enhancement. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concepts Dec 2003).

**Joint Theater Logistics (JTL)** – The ability for the Joint Force Commander to exercise directive authority for logistics to generate and sustain full spectrum operations. JTL includes organization, authorities, and processes over assigned and attached forces to achieve desired joint and combined effects and operational objectives. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept DEC 03; VJ4 approved definition - pending JTL GOSC approval).

**Logistics Information Fusion** – The ability to merge operational and logistics information to create a single, integrated, common operational picture. It provides the means for rapidly matching critical logistics capabilities to operational requirements ensuring the right logistics support at the right place and time. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept Dec 2003).

**Multinational Logistics** – The ability to provide coordinated logistic activity, involving two or more nations, supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition. Multinational logistics enables burden sharing among nations, increased operational efficiency and interoperability, a reduced multinational footprint, stronger regional engagement and lower costs for

joint logistic support of the full range of military operations. (Derived from the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept Dec 2003).

## **Joint Battlespace Awareness**

The ability to develop shared situational awareness and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. It is the knowledge and understanding of the operational environment's characteristics and conditions, friendly, adversary and non-combatant disposition and other natural and man-made effects that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate assessments in support of national and military objectives. (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04).

**Planning & Direction** – The ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level, to ensure robust situational awareness and knowledge of intended domains is gained. (JCA CRC, 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01).

**Identify Information & Collection Requirements** – The ability to identify items of information regarding the adversary and the environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. A collection requirement is an established intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence resources to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of the commander. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**Conduct Collection Management** – The ability to authoritatively develop and control collection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements that normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the collection manager has authority, or the generation of tasking requests to collection management authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. Also includes establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**Build Collection Plan** – A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to

appropriate agencies. This is a continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04).

**Develop ISR Architecture** – A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of national and theater assets both current and planned and which encompasses automated data processing equipment capabilities, communications and information requirements, and responsibilities to provide national, geographic combatant, operational, and tactical commanders with the full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations. (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04).

**Observation & Collection (All Domains)** – The ability to use sensors in order to detect and monitor both physical and non-physical objects and events in all domains (i.e., Physical -- maritime, air, space, land; Virtual - - cyber and information; Human -- social, moral and cognitive). Observation and collection include the gathering of pertinent environmental factors that can influence operations throughout the domains. Collection is the means in which observed information is obtained prior to processing. (JCA CRC, 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01; JCA CRC – Mar 06).

**Radio Frequency** – The ability to collect emitted electromagnetic emissions and data. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01)

**Materials** (Chem-Bio) – The ability to collect data on various material types and signature data. Materials include chemical and biological agents and toxic industrial materials. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Geophysical** – The ability to collect and store acoustic, oceanographic, hydrographic, meteorological, riverine, and terrain data. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Electro-Optic/IR** – The ability to collect visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics data. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Nuclear/Radiological** – The ability to collect and store detected particles that are products of nuclear reactions or other radioactive decay. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Radar** – The ability to collect returned signatures as a result of directing energy at specific objects. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Human** – The ability to collect data related to individual and group intentions, will, attitudes, morale, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Processing and Exploitation** – The ability to ensure data and information obtained from collection is assimilated through a variety of means to prepare for analysis and production. (JCA CRC, 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01).

**MASINT** – The ability to technically derive intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities include radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing system as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**HUMINT** – The ability to use intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**GEOINT (IMINT)** – The ability to use analysis and exploitation of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT exploitation may include the use of visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**SIGINT** – 1. The ability to use intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. The ability to use Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**TECHINT** – The ability to use Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeeding higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to

neutralize the adversary's technology advantage. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**OSINT** – The ability to use Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (Modified from JP 2-01)

**Analysis and Production** – The ability to convert processed information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated intelligence needs. (Modified from JP 2-01).

**Indications and Warning (I&W)** – The ability to analyze and integrate operations and intelligence information to assess the probability of hostile actions and provides sufficient warning to preempt, counter, or otherwise moderate their outcome. The focus of I&W varies at each echelon, and is most specific at the operational and tactical levels. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01)

**Current Intelligence** – The ability to produce and disseminate all-source intelligence on the current situation in a particular area. It is similar to I&W in that both depend upon continuous monitoring of world events and specific activities in the commander's battlespace. The joint force receives current information from all levels of the Intelligence Community. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01)

**General Military Intelligence** – The ability to analyze pertinent information concerning the political, economic, and social aspects of foreign countries as well as all information on the organization, operations, facilities, and capabilities of selected foreign military forces. GMI is tailored to specific subordinate joint force missions. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01)

**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace** – The ability to use analytical methodologies to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace facilitates the development of extensive databases for potential operational areas, which can be accessed or analyzed to determine potential impacts on friendly and enemy operations. The databases are then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents results in a useable form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuous process. (Modified from JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Operational Intelligence & Targeting Intelligence** – The ability to use operational and targeting intelligence. Operational intelligence is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. Targeting Intelligence is intelligence that is required to inform the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC, Mar 06)

**Science & Technology** – The ability to use products resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers: foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and material; the research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Counter-Intelligence** – The ability to use information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 2-01)

**Modeling & Simulation** – The ability to use live, virtual, and constructive simulations to identify and assess the success or failure of potential courses of actions, before, during, and after the planning process. (Modified from JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Predictive Intelligence** – The ability to use intelligence that determines the enemy's intent and anticipates future enemy actions based on its capabilities. (JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Dissemination and Integration** – The ability to make information and intelligence available to support the development of an accurate, complete and timely User-Defined Operational Picture (UDOP). (JCA CRC, 28 Apr 05; modified from JP 2-01).

**Develop Databases and Applications** – The ability to ensure intelligence is available to various users; unique tools will be utilized to capture processed and analyzed intelligence and will

support production methodologies. Databases will contain information that is normally structured and indexed for user access and review. Databases may exist in the form of physical files or formatted automated data processing system data files. An example of this type of application is the DoD Intelligence Information System or DODIIS. (JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Enable Smart Pull/Push for Intelligence Products** – The ability to use intelligence that will be formatted prior to dissemination to ensure the appropriate information is uniquely ready to support the intended audience. Designated systems will be able to receive and transmit intelligence both raw and processed and translate information as needed to support decision makers. (JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Enable Real-time Intelligence for the Warfighter** – The ability to use intelligence that is not processed in advance and that can be directly provided to the warfighter. Raw intelligence such as video from a UAV can be made available in near real time. (JP 1-02 & JP 2-01; JCA CRC Mar 06)

**Evaluation and Feedback** – The ability to continuously assess and improve the information and processes used to provide battlespace awareness. (Modified from JP 2-01, 7 Oct 04).

**Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding** – The ability to share and access a “common operational picture” (COP) with mission partners as necessary, presenting current and forecast information on adversary and friendly forces, neutral elements, the environment and geospatial information. The “picture” is built through access to both processed and raw data from sensors, analysts and other sources, and through collaborative analysis and assessment of this data. SA, transformed into knowledge through synthesis, experience and collaboration, enables situational understanding. (C2 JIC).

**Access/Share information on**

**Adversary/Neutral/Noncombatants** – The ability to access and share intelligence information and forecasts, including information on adversary, neutral, and non-combatant entities of interest, and collaboratively assess and share implications. Use intelligence, policies, structures and tools to collaboratively assess adversary/neutral/unknown location, identity, status, capabilities, limitations, and intentions. Collaboratively conduct comparative, multi-discipline assessment of adversary strengths and vulnerabilities versus our own - Use existing command and net-

centric available information to collaboratively assess adversary capabilities and intentions. Develop shared understanding of adversary's current capabilities and weaknesses by revealing critical nodes and vulnerabilities, and recognizing the adversary's goals, intentions, strengths, weaknesses, and behavior. Ensure maximum allowable intelligence and information is shared with all mission partners. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Access/Share Blue Force Situational Awareness** – The ability to provide access to and integrate information on location, identity, status, capabilities, and limitations of friendly forces; collaboratively assess and share implications - Use command structures and systems to collect and share information on location and status of friendly forces (Blue Force Tracking). (Derived from C2 JIC). Blue Force Tracking Defined: Employment of techniques to actively or passively identify and track US, allied, or coalition forces for the purpose of providing the combatant commander enhanced battlespace situational awareness and reducing fratricide. (CJCSI 8910.01A).

**Access/Integrate Geospatial Information** – The ability to access and integrate geospatial, environmental information, forecasts, and meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information; collaboratively assess and share implications. Use communication links, net-centric ISR feeds and related data to collect and share environmental, METOC and geospatial information. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Reachback for subject matter expertise** – The ability to find and access subject matter experts as necessary/required. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Display tailored, relevant SA information UDOP** – The ability to display tailored, relevant, synthesized, actionable information to promote understanding. Develop and display tailored, relevant situational information (e.g., provide overlays and filters to transition rapidly between views) with timely input from available sources. (UDOP, User Defined Operational Picture) (Derived from C2 JIC).

## **Joint Command & Control**

The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. A commander performs command and control functions

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Derived from C2 JFC, Feb 04 and JP 1-02).

**Exercise Command Leadership** – The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders must be able to exercise effective leadership of an interdependent joint force in rapidly changing scenarios involving complex distributed, simultaneous or sequential operations, often with other agencies and nations. Unity of effort and the authority and accountability of the commander must be preserved. (C2 JIC).

**Establish and promulgate rules of engagement** – The ability to ensure the Commander has adequate ROE to execute assigned tasks. Empower commands and staffs to recommend changes or modifications to ROE. Ensure subordinate commands disseminate ROE. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Set Priorities, Guidance, and Standards** – The ability to issue necessary guidance for the employment and support of the provided forces. Understand not only Service force capabilities and limitations, but also how the Services interrelate at the theater level. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Cultivate relations with mission partners** – The ability to establish and cultivate relations with mission partners. For clarity, mission partners include, but are not limited to, supported/supporting commands, non-DoD agencies such as State or CIA, coalition partners, host nation civil authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Manage risk** – The ability to continually reassess operational risk as situation changes. Attempt to mitigate risk, if possible (risks vs. rewards). (C2 JIC).

**Develop Strategy** – The ability to employ all assets available including instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. As a precursor, develop strategic estimates, command or theater strategies, and supporting peacetime plans for assigned responsibilities in order to implement US national security and military strategies. (JP 1 & JP 1-02).

**Establish/Adapt Command Structures and Enable Both Global and Regional Collaboration** – The ability for Commanders to quickly establish or adapt command structures across the force, with all mission partners and within the staff tailored to the mission, and to create the processes that will enable horizontal and vertical collaboration. They must have a menu of alternative schemes for organizing the components and defining command relations, with associated guidance on when and how to apply them. It is essential that the infrastructure be in place to enable rapid reaction to new crises. (C2 JIC).

**Organize staff to align with mission** – The ability to organize the staff to align with the conditions of the mission environment, assign roles and establish internal structures and processes. Establish clear roles, accountability, and decision-making authority. Exercise the core functions of command from austere as well as robust fixed sites, from mobile sites (i.e., “on the move”) and in transition between sites. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Refine JTF component organization and integrate capabilities** – The ability to establish/refine the joint task force component organization and integrate capabilities. Develop organizations and links between organizations to provide the agility to allow units to create self-synchronizing joint forces. (Derived from the C2 JIC).

**Refine Command Relationships** – The ability to establish/refine command relationships to enable appropriate coordination relationships, including lines of authority and accountability. Effectively establish command relationships between commanders, staffs, units and associated organizations, to include multinational military, non-DOD agencies and, as appropriate, NGOs. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Establish/Identify collaboration mechanisms:**

- The ability to identify collaboration requirements; coordinate collaboration infrastructure requirements - Set knowledge management rules to enable knowledge sharing, implement information/ knowledge management within the staff, across the force, and with mission partners. (Derived from C2 JIC).
- The ability to establish/refine collaboration structures and processes across the force, including standing and ad hoc functional cells and communities of interest - Use existing, historical and available staff collaboration structures and

processes to develop tailored interagency and multinational partner collaboration structures and processes. (Derived from C2 JIC).

- The ability to establish collaboration mechanisms (business rules, etc.) with mission partners - Effectively manage and integrate collaboration efforts, and use existing and net-centric C2 systems to ensure interoperability. Continuously investigate and develop sources and repositories to enable identification of collaboration requirements. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Communicate Commander's Intent and Guidance** – The ability for a Commander to concisely express the operational purpose and desired end state. As the impetus for the planning process, it may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of acceptable operational risk. In the net-centric collaborative environment, the commander's intent must be shared early and often to enable parallel planning and self-synchronized execution. (C2 JIC)

**Incorporate strategic mission and guidance into commander's intent** – The ability to incorporate strategic mission and guidance into commander's intent. The strategic mission and guidance is an expression of the strategic purpose and desired end state. It is the impetus for the commander's intent and guidance. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Conduct mission analysis** – The ability to collaboratively conduct mission analysis. Implement and empower commands and staff sections and organizations to conduct collaborative mission analysis to develop commander's intent, warning order, deployment order, etc. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Develop/promulgate initial Commander's intent/guidance; Update as required** – The ability to develop and promulgate initial commander's intent and guidance, including operational objectives, to subordinate echelons, and staff and ensure it is understood. Use personal meetings, briefings, paper and electronic media and available COA tools and applications to promulgate commander's initial guidance to staff and subordinate commands. Update as required commander's intent and guidance and ensure it is understood - C2 capabilities must ensure timely communication of this guidance to subordinate units, especially during rapidly changing situations. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Direct action through mission-type orders** – The ability to direct action through mission-type orders to subordinate echelons. Use appropriate tools to provide mission-type orders to subordinate commanders with minimal delay and confusion. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Operational Planning** – The ability to plan utilizing approach that directly ties offensive actions to campaign objectives, drawing on global resources and considering global consequences. Planning must be conducted with the collective knowledge of the decisions and plans of others to produce coherent integration. Planners must be able to focus on exploiting critical adversary vulnerabilities and also must consider friendly critical capabilities and potential collateral damage. Parallel, distributed, collaborative planning capabilities and improved assessment tools are needed to compress process timelines. However, collaboration does not imply decision making by committee or consensus. The ability to assess the suitability of a plan through wargaming and mission rehearsal prior to execution is also needed. (C2 JIC).

**Develop/Analyze/Select COAs** – The ability to collaboratively develop, analyze and select the COA(s) and branches and sequels. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Develop Joint/Coalition Campaign Plan** – The ability to collaboratively develop joint/mission partner campaign plan, including the synchronization matrix. Develop the joint campaign plan and synchronization plan by simultaneously and collaboratively engaging all relevant staff and mission partners. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Develop Plans Across Full ROMO** – The ability to collaboratively develop operational plans across the joint capability area domains. Conduct planning activities that collaboratively include the appropriate staffs and expertise. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Assess plan effectiveness; Prepare for Execution** – The ability to assess effectiveness of plans and prepare for execution. Use analysis, wargaming and rehearsal activities to gain collaborative feedback and assessment on the effectiveness of existing plans. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Synchronize Execution Across All Domains** – The ability to conduct effective planning as an essential means of achieving synchronized action provided the plan remains appropriate to the situation and is executed properly. However, in keeping with the adage that “no plan survives

contact with the enemy,” the commander must be able to achieve synchronization when operations are not executed as planned. This can be done through centralized redirection, as in the past, or in a decentralized manner through self-synchronization of subordinate forces. The latter is the preferred method for future C2, but this approach may not always be feasible or appropriate. The commander must have the ability to employ whichever method of synchronization is appropriate to the situation. Self-synchronization requires subordinates to have a clear understanding of the commander’s intent, shared SA and operational trust, good communications and the ability to act without detailed direction from above. (C2 JIC).

**Enable Self-Synchronization of Subordinate Forces** – The ability to enable execution and self-synchronization of subordinate forces as appropriate. Provide subordinates with the authority and trust to enable them to self-synchronize their forces when appropriate for the operation. Synchronize/self-synchronize operations within and among physical and functional domains - Collaboratively synchronize operations among staff and subordinate commanders. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Synchronize operations with mission partners and other agencies** – The ability to establish appropriate operational, personal, and liaison linkages with mission partners to ensure coordination of operations. Facilitate this through the use of net-centric capabilities, and pre-coordinated and ad hoc procedures, as necessary. Coordinate operations with non-DOD national agencies and international organizations - Effectively establish relationships with non-DOD agencies and, as appropriate, NGOs. Establish appropriate operational, personal, liaison, electronic and network linkages with mission partners to ensure coordination of operations. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Synchronize Execution Between/Across Phases** – The ability to effectively establish communications contact and ensure synchronization of activities and that procedures exist to support the effective transition of phases. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Validate Targets** – The ability to validate targets prior to attack. Provide accurate, NRT, targeting capability to ensure minimization of fratricide, collateral damage, and unintended effects. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Monitor Execution, Assess Effects and Adapt Operations** – The ability for Commanders to maintain SA, assess plan execution effectiveness and rapidly update plans by identifying alternative COAs and redirect forces

as circumstances change. Commanders must have visibility over friendly unit decisions and capabilities and the ability to monitor and react to changes in adversary status. Planners must be able to predict desirable and undesirable attack consequences and how effects may propagate throughout an adversary's system. The ability to respond rapidly and effectively to changing circumstances will enable commanders to maintain the initiative. (C2 JIC).

**Assess Compliance with Commander's Intent** – The ability to assess compliance with commander's guidance and intent, including ROE; intervene in subordinate actions as needed. Continually examine inputs and reports of ongoing actions to assess compliance with the implementing commander's objectives, guidance and intent. Provide guidance and corrective measures as needed. Track, shift, reconfigure (i.e. control) forces, equipment, sustainment and support, even en route - Provide a total asset visibility for all forces, equipment, sustainment, support and personnel. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Assess Achievement of Planned Effects** – The ability to collaboratively assess achievement of planned effects. Assess achievement of planned effects through the use of collaborative communications, applications and networks. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**ID/Assess Implications of Unplanned Effects** – The ability to collaboratively identify and assess implications of unintended effects. Use existing or situational means to collaboratively identify and assess implications of unintended effects and respond with corrections based on the best command, staff and expert advice and counsel. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Adapt Operations to Changing Situations** – The ability to adapt operations to changing situations through initiative and self-synchronization when practical. Commanders and staffs, using associated support tools, collaboratively execute plans to meet the changing operational priorities. Rapidly re-plan and synchronize operations to adapt to changing situation - Use appropriate existing commanders, staffs and associated support tools to collaboratively update and adjust plans to meet changing operational priorities. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Determine Achievement of Desired Objective, End-State, or Phase Points** – The ability to determine when desired objective, end-state or phase points have been reached. Collaboratively integrate commanders' feedback, staff and organization inputs and

overall operational knowledge to determine the appropriate action when desired objective (military end-state) is reached. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Leverage Mission Partners** – The ability for Commanders to achieve/maintain unity of effort and to leverage the capabilities of mission partners not under his command. Mission partners may include other DOD units, non-DOD agencies, coalition and international organizations. This is accomplished He does this through coordination, collaboration, influence, persuasion, negotiation and diplomacy as appropriate. (C2 JIC).

**Communicate Mission Objectives, rationale, intentions and support/action** – The ability to communicate mission objectives and support needs. Use every acceptable and mission-relevant medium fitting the task for communication of the needed mission objectives, rationale, intentions and desired support/action from mission partners to associated staffs/units/organizations and communities. Communication media will vary depending on the audience and available and applicable means of communication. (Derived from C2 JIC).

**Coordinate with mission partners to gain actionable commitment** – The ability to coordinate with mission partners to gain actionable commitment. The commander must be able to win the support of people and organizations over which he does not exercise command. He does this by including them in the decision-making process, and through diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation, collaboration and coordination. Establish structures and processes for collaboration with interagency and multinational partners. The ability to use existing, historical and available staff collaboration structures and processes to develop tailored interagency and multinational partner collaboration structures and processes. (Derived from C2 JIC).

## **Joint Force Management**

The ability to integrate existing and future human and technical assets from across the Joint Force to make the right capabilities available at the right time and place in support of the National Defense Strategy. (Derived from Force Management Joint Functional Concept dtd 2 June 2005).

**Global Posture** – The ability to position forces and their supporting infrastructure in order to execute US defense strategy today and in the future. Key elements of global posture are facilities/infrastructure, activities and host nation relationships/agreements. (Derived from OSD/Policy brief to Strategic Planning Council, 26 May 04).

**Global Force Management** – The ability to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements; present comprehensive insights into the global availability and operational readiness of U.S. military forces; globally source joint force requirements; and provide senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment and apportionment changes. (From Annex A (Glossary) "Global Force Management Guidance FY 2005").

**Planning** – The ability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require; occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires the regular involvement of senior DoD leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options. (Adaptive Planning Roadmap v1.1)

**Future Capability Identification** – The ability to identify capabilities needed to meet joint force requirements in the future to inform Force Generation activities. (Derived from FCB responsibilities as described in CJCSI 3170.01E dtd 11 May 2005).

## **Joint Public Affairs Operations**

The ability to plan, coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to support the commander's operational and strategic objectives through the communication of truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation (AO) to foreign, domestic, and internal audiences. This capability includes advising the commander on the effects of public information activities on operations, and the effects of operations on foreign, domestic and internal audiences. (Derived from JP 3-61).

**Public Affairs Operational Planning** – The ability to advise, plan, synchronize and facilitate the timely release of factual public information in support of the commander's strategic and operational objectives. (Derived from JP 3-61).

**Public Information** – The ability to disseminate truthful, timely and accurate information about military activities, consistent with security guidelines, to local, national and international audiences. (Derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-61).

**Media Relations** – The ability to plan and conduct activities to provide truthful, timely and accurate information about military activities, consistent with security guidelines, through the media, to national and international audiences. (Derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-61).

**Visual Information (VI) Activities** – The ability to advise, plan, synchronize, and rapidly acquire and distribute visual products (still and video) to external audiences in support of commanders' strategic and operational objectives. (Derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-61).

**Public Websites** – The ability to plan, create and sustain delivery of Public Information via a command-sponsored public website. (Derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-61).

**Command/Internal Information** – The ability to communicate with service members, civilian employees, contractors and family members of the joint force, both deployed and at home stations to create an awareness of the joint force's goals and significant developments affecting deployed forces. (Derived from JP 1-02).

**Community Relations** – The ability to plan and synchronize programs to enhance interaction and communication among U.S. Joint Forces, and select domestic and foreign stakeholders throughout all operational phases to support commanders' strategic and operational objectives. (Derived from JP 1-02 and JP 3-61).

## **Joint Shaping**

The ability to support Joint Force, Interagency and Multinational operations - inclusive of normal and routine military activities – performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping is executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and national strategic objectives and national goals. These activities are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing behavior of both adversaries and allies. Each capability supporting Shaping Operations, to include Information Operations, must adapt to a

particular theater and environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve effects in another. (Derived from 3 Jan 05/18 April OPSDEPs TANK on “Standardizing Campaign Phases and Terminology”).

**Military Diplomacy (MD)** – The ability to support those activities and measures U.S. military leaders take to engage military, defense and government officials of another country to communicate USG policies and messages and build defense and coalition relationships. (Derived from March, 2004 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism).

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD)** – The ability to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance U.S. interests, and to collaboratively shape the operational environment. This ability can include public information activities as well as information operations to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching foreign target audiences through communication channels such as websites, radio, print, and television.” DSPD comprises DoD’s support to USG public diplomacy, which are defined as those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (Derived from Draft DSPD DoDD xxxx.x; (still in Draft and unnumbered) IO EXCOM brief 27 Jun 05; NMSP-WOT Annex H Appx 1; and JP 1-02).

**Strategic Communication** – The ability to focus United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, and programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power. [Derived from Draft QDR Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication 2006; unsigned).

**Analytical Support and Assessment** – The ability to collect, analyze, fuse and assess information pertaining to target audience analysis, foreign public opinion polling, media analysis, public opinion analysis, identifying sources of influence, mapping the media environment, measures of effectiveness, perception management, human factors analysis, and cultural/societal analysis in order to achieve a holistic assessment of the information environment and support strategic communication activities. [Originated by AOs working on Shaping lexicon].

**Security Cooperation** – The ability for DoD to interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, including allied transformation, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure. DoD Security Cooperation will be integrated with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve national security, defense and foreign policy objectives (SECDEF 2003 Security Cooperation Guidance).

**Building Military Partner Capability** – The ability to improve the military capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coalition. [Originated by AOs working on Shaping lexicon].

**Building Military Partner Capacity** – The ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies and partners through training, education, assistance, diplomacy and other activities so they are prepared to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while strengthening relations with friendly global and regional powers. [Originated by AOs working on Shaping lexicon].

**Regional Security Initiatives** – The ability to reduce partner nations' vulnerability to aggression and coercion while limiting the options of would-be opponents. [Originated by AOs working on Shaping lexicon].

**Presence** – The ability to appropriately position forces to advance and defend U.S. interests by supporting deterrence, projecting power, promoting regional stability and US security commitments, and ensuring continued access. [Originated by AOs working on Shaping lexicon].

## **Joint Force Generation**

The ability of DOD to man, equip, and organize resources and to develop Joint Force skills necessary to ensure the Joint Force Commander has the capabilities to fulfill the National Military Strategy. Personnel and equipment are resourced through recruiting and acquisition programs, and are implicitly linked to Joint requirements. Developing personnel and unit skills to perform military tasks and functions are accomplished

through Service and Joint education, training, and exercise programs.  
(Derived from NMS, 2004)

**Man** – The ability to recruit personnel to meet Service and Joint requirements. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Recruit** – The ability to attract personnel to enter military duty to fulfill Service and Joint requirements. (Derived from Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia)

**Equip** – The ability to acquire and integrate materiel to meet Service and Joint requirements. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Acquire** – The ability to obtain equipment to meet Service and Joint requirements. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Integrate** – The ability to arrange military equipment into a force so it operates as a cohesive unit. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Organize** – The ability to package personnel and equipment into optimal units to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commanders. (Derived from Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia)

**Develop Skills** – The ability to develop doctrine and to educate, train, and exercise personnel and units to enhance their ability to conduct military operations. (Derived from CJCSI 1800.01B/Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia)

**Doctrine** – The ability to develop fundamental principals to guide the actions of military forces or elements thereof in support of national objectives. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Educate** – The ability to instruct personnel to enhance their cognitive thought and leadership skills. (Derived from CJCSM 3500-03A)

**Academic** – The ability for individuals to receive instruction leading to accreditation by non-DOD sources. (Derived from CJCSI 1800.01B)

**Professional Military Education (PME)** – The ability to develop the broad body of knowledge and ability to develop the habits of mind essential to the military professional's expertise in the art and science of war. (CJCSI 1800.01B)

**Train** – The ability to instruct personnel to enhance their ability to perform specific military functions and tasks. (Derived from JP 1-02)

**Individual** – The ability to train individuals to perform duties in organizations. (Derived from CJCSM 3500.03A)

**Collective** – The ability to train based on doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare units or forces to respond to or execute their assigned missions. (Derived from CJCSM 3500.03A)

**Staff** – The ability to train individual staff members to operate as a cohesive staff or staff element to accomplish their mission. (Derived from CJCSI 3500.01C Draft)

**Exercise** – The ability to conduct military maneuvers or simulated wartime operations to validate training, conduct pre-deployment mission rehearsal, and/or synchronize IIM efforts. (Derived from CJCSM 3500-03A)

**Validation** – The ability to verify the soundness of or suitability of units, staff, or individuals to accomplish tasks or functions in accordance with doctrine or TTP. (Derived from JP 1-02/CJCSM 3500.03A)

**Mission Rehearsal Exercise** – The ability to (during pre-deployment training) test the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness of participating forces; ensuring all echelons are familiar with plans; and testing communications-information systems. (Derived from JP 1-02, rehearsal phase)

**Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (IIM) Exercises** – The ability to conduct interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational exercises

### **Joint Interagency/IGO/MN/NGO Coordination**

The ability to coordinate between elements of the Department of Defense, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational entities (e.g. partnership states) for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (Derived from JP 3-0800).

**U.S. Government Interagency Integration** – The ability to coordinate all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. Integrated planning, liaison, logistics, education, and training are critical elements that help synchronize the application and coordination with interagency partners to include state and local governments and agencies. (Modified JP3-08).

**Intergovernmental Organization Coordination** – The ability to effectively coordinate with key intergovernmental organization to ensure unity of effort and support of U.S. objectives (e.g. United Nations, European Union, Organization of American States) (Modified JP3-08).

**Multinational Coordination** – The ability to coordinate actions with two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. [Derived from JP3-08].

**Nongovernmental Organization Coordination** – The ability to effectively coordinate with key nongovernmental organizations to ensure unity of effort and support of U.S. objectives (e.g. Red Cross/Crescent, Catholic Relief Services). (Modified JP3-08).

## **Joint Force Projection**

New tier 1 JCA added by 24 Aug 2006 decision. Supporting tier 2 JCAs and accompanying lexicon are in development.